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This study adopts the structure-conduct-performance paradigm to analyse the effects
of various elements of industrial structure, including government policies (such as
price controls, regulation of entry and international trade) on industrial profitability in
Malawian manufacturing.
With the help of an extension to Modigliani's exposition of the limit-pricing approach,
a structure-performance model which gives prominance to barriers to entry, is derived
and linked to the analysis of the implications of price controls.
The model is estimated using pooled cross-section and time-series data for the
period 1969-72. The main result is that price controls appear to have modified the
hypothesised positive relationship between profitability and industrial concentration.
Other variables are hypothesised to be largely independent of the influence of price
controls. Among these, the ones which have been found to influence significantly
profitability are demand, import competition, association with diversified enterprises,
and variables representing potential problems with scarce inputs namely imported
material inputs, and working capital. The results with respect to the input variables
suggest that input scarcity tends to facilitate the exploitation of monopoly power.
Although barriers to entry have not been found to exert a significant influence on
profitability, they are found to be a very important factor in influencing the degree of
industrial concentration.
A study of elements of conduct is carried out using a distinct body of data. These
primary source data were gathered from Malawian firms in 1984 using a postal
questionnaire which was sent to all substantial firms. Since this was nearly a year
after the initiation of price deregulation, the analysis of these data has also provided a
means of investigating the effects of abandoning price controls.
FOREWORD
Since the 1950s and 1960s governments in many less industrialised countries
(LICs) have been almost frantic in their attempts to encourage more rapid
industrialisation and hence greater diversity in their economies. Much of the
available research on the manufacturing sectors of these countries reflects this
and makes much of the creation of industrial capacity, as a function of
government policies.
The usual approaches to research, have been much inspired and influenced by
international trade theory, and what is being termed the 'new' cost-benefit
analysis. Key concepts are therefore comparative advantage and efficiency
both at the sectoral, and at the international levels. Government policies have
come to be evaluated in terms of the provision of incentives to industry, and
according to whether they were 'outward-looking' or 'inward-looking' which
can be loosely interpreted in terms of export-orientated and import substituting
industrialisation respectively. The impact of existing levels of competition
hardly has any explicit role in such analyses.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the creation of new capacity, whether
in new or existing industries, is a function of perceived prospects for
profitability in those activities. This in turn can be seen as a function of
market structures in the respective industries which can include existing and
potential competition, as well as government policies. These policies can
operate with respect to a wide range of aspects including international trade,
firms' pricing behaviour, the entry of new firms, and so forth.
This study responds to problems on two levels. The first and the more general
level relates to the general bias of research in LICs mentioned above, while the
second level reflects the bias of research in Malawi.
One reason why the first type of bias must be redressed is that the problems
besetting LIC's industrialisation programmes can no longer be regarded as
solely or mainly those of creation of new capacity in new manufacturing
activities. One testimony to this is that following the current debt crises, the
International Monetary Fund, in particular, has been pressing the countries
concerned to deregulate their economies. This typically involves large
devaluations of their currencies, reduction in public expenditure and the state's
involvement in economic activities. A number of countries including several in
Africa have since announced liberalisation of their economies. For the
manufacturing sectors this has meant reduction in state participation, reduction
in the levels of tariff and other protection, and the abandonment of routine
price controls. Malawi announced her intention to do the same in November
1983 initiating the dismantling of the system of price controls which had their
origins in the 1950s.
As far as research in Malawi is concerned, the bias has reflected the fact that
the economy is largely agricultural. As a result, virtually no comprehensive
study of the manufacturing sector has been published despite the fact that the
desirability of economic diversification is a well-accepted goal, and despite the
existence of abundant fairly good quality data.
The following study adopts the structure, conduct, performance paradigm
because of Its malleability in dealing with a wide range of behavioural
assumptions and variables that are directly affected by different policies. In so
far as behavioural patterns and government policies are all relevant for firms'
long-term performance (eg. in terms of profitability), they are also likely to
influence the dynamics of market structures in terms of entry and exit of firms,
as well as growth of established ones.
The study is organised into two parts. Part One focusses on the theoretical,
conceptual and modelling problems. Part Two deals with the empirical
investigation of the Malawian manufacturing sector, with regard to the
relationships discussed in Part One.
In Part One, Chapter 1 deals with the origins and definitional aspects of the
structure, conduct, performance paradigm (SCP) including its suitability for
analysing manufacturing policy problems in less developed countries. Chapter
2 deals with some relevant theoretical issues such as implications for
estimated models of certain behavioural assumptions (eg. short- run vs.
long-run profit maximisation). Chapter 3 is a review of previous empirical
approaches in the SCP tradition. Chapter 4 deals with some special structural
elements that are characteristic of manufacturing in some less developed
countries, namely price controls and scarcity of productive inputs. The model
to be estimated with Malawian data is also presented in this chapter.
Part Two comprises the rest of the study, from Chapter 5 to Chapter 9.
Chapter 5 serves as an introduction to some relevant features of the Malawian
manufacturing sector including the institutional framework and several
structural and behavioural elements. Chapter 6 considers the problems of
derivation of the variables for the structure-performance model suggested in
Chapter 4. The main source of data for this was Malawi's National Statistical
Office's Annual Economic Survey. Chapter 7 approaches the problem of
estimation, and reports on the results for the 1969-1972 period. Chapter 8
consists of analyses of data from a survey conducted in November 1984 with
the specific aim of providing a basis for studying firms' behaviour. Finally,
Chapter 9 offers conclusions including discussions of policy recommendations
based mainly on the empirical findings.
Matters of less direct relevance to the main body of the study have been
relegated to appendices, which for purposes of easy reference are named after
the chapters to which they correspond.
PART ONE
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES, AND
MOOEL SPECIFICATION
CHAPTER 1
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE : BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
A central issue in industrial economics is the question of whether the degree
of seller competition influences their power over prices, and hence their ability
to earn above - 'normal' profits1 in the long-run. This and related issues have
come to be studied under the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP),
which hypothesises a link between elements of market structure and conduct
on the one hand and performance on the other hand.
Bain (1968) stated this as,"We look initially to the characteristics of market
structure and market conduct as primary determinants of the market
performance of enterprises, or of groups or industries of business firms". p3
The driving force behind the paradigm is its implications for antitrust
legislation, which inevitably involves a mixture of economics, politics and
morality. Hence antitrust legislation, where it exists, is often expressed in
terms of 'unfair' practices, which include firms' power over prices and the
conduct of excluding or elimination of competition.
The possession of 'significant room for manoeuvre in its price or output
policies' is what sets a firm or group of firms with monopoly power apart from
those without (Evely and Little, 1966). The latter would be those firms which
are constrained by forces beyond their control. It is supposed that the
dominant firms with monopoly power in setting prices well above costs
misailocate resources and 'redistribute incomes in favour of those in powerful
positions'. (Weiss, 1974, pi84). If it can also be established that the tendency
towards monopoly is widespread or on the increase then the problem assumes
greater significance.
Both tendencies are quite commonplace. For instance economies characterised
by small markets are said to be also characterised by monopolistic market
structures (see end of this chapter).It has also been observed that
concentration could rise from a number of factors which are prevalent in many
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economies including the large industrialised ones. The factors include
increasing diversification of the largest firms (Utton 1979 ppix, 1) product
innovation or successful advertising in conjuction with scale economies.
THE ORIGINS OF THE STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE HYPOTHESIS
Mason (1957) had seen with the books by Chamberlin, Robinson, and Berle and
Means some change in direction in microeconomics. His assessment was,"On
one side is a re-examination of market models and the theory of the firm; on
the other, factual and statistical studies of economic concentration, market
structure, and business policies". Heralding a new type of enquiry in the latter
direction, Bain (1951) put forward his famous hypothesis:
"The hypothesis in brief is that the everage profit rate of
firms in oligopolistic industries of a high concentration will tend
to be significantly larger than that of firms in less concentrated
oligopolies or in industries of atomistic structure".(p294)
This is the hypothesis of the concentration - profits relationship. One
significant thing about the hypothesis is that it puts on different sides of a
functional relationship, two variables that had previously both been suggested
as different approaches to measure the same thing, namely monopoly power
(Encaoua and Jacquemin 1980 p 87). Later attempts to develop oligopoly
models play around this same idea2.
Bain (1951 p 294), and Mann (1966 p 296) saw the basis of the concentration -
profits hypothesis as being in 'conventional price theory' and relating to
long-run equilibrium. Holding demand, cost and entry conditions constant,
monopoly or effectively collusive oligopoly, 'tends to yield higher profit
aggregates and prices in long-run equilibrium than competition or imperfectly -
or non-collusive oligopoly'. (Bain 1951 p 295)
What does concentration represent?
It is usually assumed that high concentration facilitates collusion even where
rivalry would have been a natural tendency, because of the mutual costs of
such rivalry. With smaller numbers, the probability is high of detecting and
retaliating against behaviour that goes against the joint interests of firms
(Stigler 1964). Hence the association between concetration and collusion is
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viewed in probabilistic terms. It is supposed that the more effective collusion
is the more the joint profits of the group tend towards what would be
predicted for a monopolist.
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, MARKET CONDUCT, AND PERFORMANCE
Over the years, the literature has brought up several 'new' variables or new
approaches to their measurement in estimated models of the SCP. The
majority of these variables can be and are often classified under market
structure and are all contained in a paragraph of an old article by Mason (1939).
Furthermore, the important ones were systematically taken into account in an
early empirical work by Bain3.
Industrial Structure
Mason (1939) suggested the following approach to the identification of
elements of market strucure:
'The structure of a seller's market, then, includes all those
considerations which he takes into account in determining his
business policies and practices". (p195 in Readings)
'All those considerations' include;
Type of product
- whether consumer good or producers'
- durable vs non-durable
- degree of standardisation or product
differentiation
Nature of Costs
- magnitude of fixed costs in the
short-run
- flexibility of costs
- locational factors
- existence of joint costs
Distribution
- number and size distribution of sellers
- entry of new firms
Demand




According to Mason (1939 p 198-199), it is the degree of similarity of these
conditions among firms that is likely to influence similarities in policies and
behaviour. But in order to avoid hypotheses that are too inclusive and tending
towards irrefutability, attention has largely centred on the few elements
considered to exert significant influence on performance. On this point,
according to Bain (1970) 'the counsel of wisdom seems to be that we should
specify on a priori grounds or from experience a very few independent
structural variables ...'p43.
Seller concentration has emerged as the most prominent of these few
structural variables, to the extent that it has sometimes been considered
legitimate to investigate its influence on performance in isolation from other
variables. "Measures of concentration try to express the number and size
distribution of competitors in terms of a one-parameter index, which could
then be regarded as a direct measure of the degree of oligopoly". (Scitovsky
1955 p 109)
Among the other elements that have been isolated as important are barriers to
entry, the degree of product differentiation, integration and diversification, and
economies of scale.
Market Conduct
Market conduct also involves wider policies than just pricing. The conduct of
firms involves;
"(i) ... the aims they pursue and methods they apply in
establishing what prices to charge, what outputs to produce,
what product designs to choose, what sales promotion costs to
incur, etc.; and
(ii) The process or mechanism of interaction,
cross-adaption, and coordination of the policies of competing
sellers in any market". (Bain, 1968, p9.)
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Performance
Performance too may be regarded in multidimensional terms including the level
and growth of output, employment, research and development, profitability,
equity and allocative and X-efficiency.
The structure-conduct-performance relationships may be illustrated as
STRUCTURE ^ CONDUCT ^PERFORMANCE
K- /
The bold arrows represent the direction of causation (or association) that is
usually assumed, while the broken ones indicate the possibilities that now
cannot be discounted and which some are insisting ought to be considered
(see Phillips, 1970; Jacquemin and Thisse,1972; Demsetz,1973; Clarke,Davies and
Waterson,1984).
THE SCP AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Empirical work with the SCP in the industrialised Western economies- United
States and United Kingdom to start with - has had a long run,spanning more
than three decades. The intensity of such work has also been such that the
concentration - profits hypothesis, which is central to the SCP, has been
described as being one of the most thoroughly tested hypotheses in
economics. (Weiss 1974 p193)
Similar work for the less developed countries (LDC's) has had a late start and is
still very scant. This is despite the fact that LDCs' manufacturing faces greater
problems regarding almost every element of performance than manufacturing
in the developed countries. Possible reasons for this neglect may lie in the
traditional preoccupations of economic research for those economies.
Much of the orthodox economic development literature with an interest in
industrial development in LDCs has been concerned with the analysis of trade
policies because of trade's vital necessity (Reynolds 1970). In all there have
been some attempts "to distinguish between policies that have a direct bearing
on the establishment of industrial capacity (various incentive measures and
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investment protection schemes) and policies that work through the channel of
international trade (tariffs and quotas, exchange rate policies, etc.)" (Kirkpatrick
and Nixon, 1983 p 9)
To the extent that these anaylses focus on some elements of performance (e.g.
output growth, import substitution, efficiency variously measured, and some
elements of industrial structure) they could be said to conform to the general
orientation of SCP. Their major limitation is that domestic competition plays
no active role in the analyses since it is either implicitly assumed not to exist
or that its existence is immaterial4. Most of the industries in those economies
are thought to be highly concentrated and characterised by market
imperfections and distortions. This has lead to government policies playing a
central role in the analyses. For instance neoclassical trade theory has inspired
analyses like the 'new' cost benefit analysis, that stress such efficiency
indicators as effective rate of protection and domestic resource costs, all
related to international competition.
In contrast, the SCP has proved flexible enough to bear on most of the policy
issues handled in these other analyses, within the context of domestic
competition and even allows for foreign competition. This comes as no
surprise considering the range of elements that constitute 'structure' 'conduct'
and 'performance'. Thus in the few studies that are now available of LDCs
involving the SCP, a number of hypotheses have been advanced and tested,
with much scope for policy recommendations.
Two early and very influencial books on oligopoly are those by J.S. Bain (1956)
and P. Sylos Labini (1957, trans.,1962). These have been reviewed in a famous
paper by Modigliani (1958). On the implications of the two works for policy
aimed at fostering competition, Modigliani noted (brackets added):
"On the whole, the outlook (of Bain's analysis) for effective
public policy is not too optimistic, although it is by no means as
gloomy as that of Sylos. But then, Sylos' gloom is
understandable. His inspiration comes from the Italian economy,
where markets are naturally small and are made still smaller by
tariffs and other artificial restrictions. According to his own
model, the tendency to oligopolistic structures, and their power
of market exploitation, will tend to be greater the smaller the size
of the market". p3785
Here then are two books about the same issues but inspired by two widely
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different economies in terms of size, policies and characteristics of markets.
The features noted about the Italian economy are also typical of most LDCs.
The coexistence of oligopolistic structures and market exploitation is ironical
for poorer countries. It must make comprehensive studies of industries in
these economies even more imperative. If the argument is that some of these
economies are so unlike the western economies where the SCP has often been
applied, analysis might start with the implications of those differences on
predicted results.
Some of these differences, such as those related to the prominence of
government regulation and problems of input availability, are discussed in
Chapter 4 with a view to identifying features of LDCs that might be important
in estimated models and the interpretation of the results. 3efore this some
theoretical models are discussed in the following chapter, after which a review




1. These take into account all costs including imputed interest cost on equity
capital.
2. Two such models are discussed in the next chapter against the background
of Bain's and Sylos-Labini's earlier insights.
3. Eg. geographical dispersion of markets, import competition and so on. Most
of these are given further attention in Chapter 3.
4. In Chenery's(1960) influencial model, for instance, growth of industrial output
is a function of exogenous demand factors and it makes little difference
whether domestic output grows from increased competition via new entry or
from the growth of established firms.
5. The page reference is for the reprint in Kamerschen ed.(1969).
CHAPTER 2
SOME RELEVANT MODELS OF OLIGOPOLY
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter has laid out some of the basic concepts and relationships
at the center of empirical studies in industrial economics including the
influential concentration - profits hypothesis.
It has been suggested, largely on the basis of empirical results that deny a
significant positive concentration - profits relationship, that the theoretical
foundations of the hypothesis are weak (Demsetz,l973). Weiss (1974) replied to
this with a review of the predictions of the main oligopoly theories and of
empirical results. On the theory his conclusions were:
"The common expectation that profits will be higher in
concentrated industries is not nonsense - it is worth testing -
but it is not unequivocally predicted by theory either". p193
The persistent doubts about this relationship have given rise to some attempts
at reformulation of the theoretical models, based on distinctive behavioural
assumptions. Before looking at two such models and their implications for
empirical investigation, it is instructive to revisit the relatively older
Bain-Sylos-Labini limit-price theory which still serves as the main source of
empirically testable hypotheses. This theory can also serve as a useful point of
reference in the discussion of the two more recent models.
THE LIMIT-PRICE MODEL
Holding demand and cost conditions constant, the degree of concentration may
still not be sufficient to determine the average levels of profits. Existing
producers may not price their products regardless of the long run
consequences. For instance, continued profitability through high rates of
growth of sales are likely to depend on current pricing policies which might
attract new entrants. Since potential entrants' ability to actually enter depends
on the ease of entry, existing firms could also use this fact in their pricing
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decisions: the higher the barriers to entry for the potential entrants, the less
concerned are the existing firms that current high prices would attract effective
entry, and vice versa.
Entry barriers
The main barriers to entry can be discussed under three categories; economies
of scale, product differentiation, and absolute cost advatages of existing firms
relative to prospective entrants.
a) Economies of scale:
Economies of scale can be a barrier to entry if the minimum optimal scale of
plant is large relative to market size, and if entry at sub-optimal scale is faced
with high costs. The latter would be the case the steeper is the long run
average cost curve below the minimum optimal scale. When the minimum
optimal scale is large relative to market size, new entry at that scale could
significantly depress post-entry price, making the venture less attractive. The
cost-minimising industry size-structure and therefore the one that would tend
to be most stable under these conditions, would be where the industry output
is produced by plants of minimum optimal size or larger (in the case where the
long run average cost curve levels out).
b) Product differentiation:
Entry barriers are said to exist when new entrants incur relatively high selling
expenses to overcome brand loyalty for the products of existing producers.
This is expected to be the case particularly with inexpensive consumer goods.
Here each consumer accounts for a tiny fraction of the market and is less
knowledgeable about products than when for instance the consumers are also
producers each accounting for a significant fraction of the market.
c) Absolute cost advantages:
New entrants could face high costs relative to established firms because of the
latteTs superior production techniques, ownership of patent rights to processes
or products, and advantaged access to factors of production.
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The limit pricing approach
The limit price model which relies heavily on the concept of barriers to entry is
associated with Bain (1956) and Syios-Labini (1957) but was given sharper focus
by Modigliani (1958). The limit price, PL is the highest price that existing firms
can charge without attracting entry. It is entry preventing in that if entry
actually took place, it would not be profitable for the new entrant(s). This
approach was the first attempt to give systematic attention in the analysis of
oligopoly, to the influence of potential entry on market outcomes.
in perfectly competitive equilibrium, the price Pc equals average cost and
therefore profits would be zero, which will be the situation if potential entrants
had been perfectly free to enter (ie. zero barriers), so that positive profits are
competed away. The difference between the limit price and Pc will directly
reflect the condition of entry, which is related to overall barriers. For instance,
if barriers are sufficiently high, it would not be necessary for firms to charge
low prices to prevent entry, and consequently PL would be high. The
relationships among barriers to entry, entry conditions, limit pricing and
profitability can be summarised as in the table below.
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Table 2.1
Limit Pricing and Entry Conditions
Barriers Entry Entry Relation of
to Entry Conditions Limiting Entry limit profits















Note:* and Ho are the present values of the discounted
streams of profits associated with entry limiting pricing and
non-entry limiting pricing respectively (ie. pursuit of
maximum short-run profits)1
From the table, limit-pricing is only necessary for and consistent with the
maximisation of long-run profits (see Note 1.) in situations where the present
value of profits associated with entry limitation TTU is greater than that
associated with non-entry limitation, TTo. This would be when barriers to entry
are not too high for entry to be blockaded nor too low for entry to be
ineffectively impeded. Situations where TTL = TTo would be where the entry
situation is such that firms may as well maximise short-run profits eg. when
barriers are very high and entry limiting is not necessary. Taking the case of
effectively impeded entry conditions, when entry lags are short, it may be
worthwhile to entry limit (ie. T\ > TTo). But when there are long entry lags,
maximising short-run profits during the long period before entry (and
eventually making reduced profits after entry), could achieve a better profit
position than entry limiting (ie. where entry is prevented) hence TTL < "^o. In
the case of ineffectively impeded entry, barriers are so low that limit price is
also very low and consequently the profit situation makes entry limiting not
worthwhile.
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With this, it is now possible to formally extend the analysis by linking limit
pricing behaviour to the degree of monopoly power, for which there is a widely
used measure.
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE,LIMIT PRICING AND THE DEGREE OF MONOPOLY
In Bain's formulation of the structure - performance hypothesis, cost, demand
and entry conditions were held constant. But in more recent empirical
applications researchers have been reluctant to be constrained by these
assumptions. In Table 2.1, one can see what is likely to happen to pricing when
entry conditions are varied, assuming limit pricing behaviour is relevant.
The following schematic diagram presents a way of looking at the way pricing
might be affected by the different factors.
STRUCTURE CONDUCT/PERFORMANCE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
In the figure, the elasticity of demand is separated from other 'structure'
variables for illustrative purposes only. Also, the broken line arrows linking
'pricing' and 'limit pricing' to monopoly power merely imply that the three are
connected, rather than causation. Entry conditions are directly relevant for
limit pricing because they determine whether and to what extent entry is likely.
Concentration is also not unimportant as it affects the technicalities of
implementation of the limit price. For instance, limit pricing behaviour may be
influenced by the possibility of collusion among existing firms with regard to
entry deterrence. The influence of the elasticity of demand on limit pricing will






There are two important observations that can be drawn from Fig 2.1. The first
is that cost conditions, entry conditions and concentration can be related in a
causal way. The second is that although pricing decisions can be analysed in a
way that distinguishes limit pricing as the special case it is from pricing
without allowance for entry, both are related to the degree of monopoly power
(which we shall take to be defined by the Lerner index, (P - MC)/P, where P is
price and MC is the marginal cost) in qualitatively the same way. From this we
can say that we could use the degree of monopoly power to represent
situations where limit pricing is relevant, as well as those where this is not the
case, as will be clear from the following discussion. Whereas the structure -
performance relationship is usually argued along the 'concentration-monopoly
power-pricing' lines, it is also possible to formalise an alternative line of
argument, that is 'cost conditions-entry conditions-(concentration)-monopoly
power-pricing'.
Assume Sylos' postulate, that existing firms hold their output in the face of
entry. Assume further that below the minimum efficient scale q the long-run
cost curve rises so sharply that entry can only be contemplated at a scale of q"




where PL is the limit price, Pc is perfectly competitive price, r) is the price
elasticity of demand (in the neighbourhood of Qc), Qc is the perfectly
competitive equilibrium output for the whole industry (an indication of the size
of the market), and q is the minimum optimal scale.
Osborne (I964) suggested that the 'value' of the entry condition into an industry
could be given as the percentage by which firms can maintain price above Pc
without attracting entry. Using PL as the relevant price maintained by existing
firms, the condition of entry can be given as




E would be high the higher are the barriers to entry (because the PL required
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to limit entry in that case would also be high). In the case of perfectly free
entry, with unconstraining barriers, E = 0. The expression (2.1) can be written in
terms of that for E that is
What is required is to obtain from (2.2) an expression for the degree of
monopoly as measured by the Lerner index defined above.
Where entry and long run profits are relevant for pricing decisions, the Lerner
index can itself be expressed in terms of PL and Pc thus
P. - MC -> PL " Pc
Or





By manipulating (2.2) to obtain l-Pc/P on the left hand side the following result
is obtained





+ l (2.3)u ' " IF7Ti Q„
= - h + 1
where h = {1/[(1/r|).(q /Qc) + 1]} < 1.
(2.4)
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From (2.3) and (2.4) assuming a negatively sloped demand curve the more
elastic is that demand curve and the larger the absolute value of rj, the larger
will be the absolute value of h. This lowers the RHS of (2.4) and therefore )j .
A high value of q relative to Qc lowers h and results in a high p. Market size
Qc has an effect on jj similar in direction to that of q. That is a larger or
growing market is associated with a lower degree of monopoly. So much for
the mechanical relationships between the right hand side variables and the
degree of monopoly power in (2.3). We should now be interested in seeing how
such a model can be operationalised and related to empirical investigation.
Since the distinguishing feature of (2.3) is the term q/Qc, which derives from
the assumptions relating to entry, we shall focus on that term.
In the discussion of scale economies barriers above, we indicated that the
larger the minimum efficient scale was relative to the market size (call this
relative MES), the more any effective new entry would depress the industry
price(s) thereby affecting all firms concerned including the new entrant himself.
This prospect was said to constitute a barrier to entry in that it discourages
effective entry. Coming back to expression (2.3) the term q/'Qc represents such
barriers to entry in that it is an explicit definition of relative MES. We should
also note that the association of (2.3) with the notion of barriers to entry
should not be surprising since the derivation of that expression has been based
on an entry assumption (that entry can only be worthwhile at MES or larger
scales). With this, the relationships traced out above between components of
q/Qc and the degree of monopoly power also apply to the scale economy
barriers.
We could look at the problem in terms of a cross-section model, where we are
interested in investigating the determinants of the degree of monopoly power
across industries. What we have here is that firms in industries characterised
by high relative MES will have higher scale economy barriers to entry and can
afford to charge higher limit prices and consequently enjoy higher profits (by
2.3)) than firms in industries with lower relative MES. We might even extend the
implications of entry barriers to an historical context by arguing that where
relative MES has always been low, the respective industries must have been
experiencing low past entry barriers, so that current competition would also be
high. Prices are therefore likely to be low from two sources high levels of
current competition, and low barriers to entry. The latter means that entry
limiting price would also need to be low to discourage entry.
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The introduction of dynamics by letting q vary (eg. through technological
change) or Qc (through market expansion or contraction) would lower or raise
barriers according to the net effects of such changes on q/Qc. The effect on
the monopoly power of each industry between two points in time, and subject
to such changes would be the same as in the cross-sectional comparison. If
relative MES falls because the market is growing faster than the MES is
growing, then barriers would be lower and entry would be easier, unless prices
are lowered to discourage it. Thus a lowering of barriers will be associated
with a lowering of the limit price and ultimately a lowering of the degree of
monopoly power.
From this, we are able to say that barrier effects are related to limit pricing and
ultimately monopoly power in exactly the same way, whether we are dealing
with a temporal model or a cross-section model. That is, the expectation in
either case is (dp/d(q/Qc)} > 0 . In empirical investigation, and following
Comanor and Wilson (1967), the relative MES term is now usually proxied by
statistical measures as opposed to subjective assessments of the height of
barriers, which had been used earlier.
The steeper the average cost curve is to the left of MES, the more difficult it is
for potential entrants to enter with plants smaller than MES because average
costs rise steeply the smaller the scale. (This is of course the assumption on
which we based the discussion centering on relative MES as a barrier.) On the
other hand, if the cost curve is shallow at less than MES, then costs do not
rise so sharply with smaller scale. From this we can say that at scales smaller
than MES, the barriers to entry are higher the higher the average cost relative
to those at MES or beyond. This can be described as the cost disadvantage of
entry at below q.
Caves, Shirazi and Porter (I975) have suggested a statistical measure for this,
the cost disadvantage ratio (CDR), proxied by the reciprocal of the ratio of
average productivity of labour for plants or firms of less than MES to the
average productivity of labour for plants or firms of MES or larger. The
rationale for using the productivity ratios is the fact that higher relative
productivity represents lower average costs, assuming similar wages. The
smaller is the average labour productivity of smaller scale producers compared
to those of MES or larger, the more disadvantaged is entry at less than MES.
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In the study by Caves et a! MES and CDR were initially seen as two interacting
variables representing scale economy barriers to entry. For example they
hypothesised that the interaction would be such that large relative MES would
be a source of barriers only when CDR was significant. The converse to this,
that cost disadvantage at less than MES would be a barrier when MES is not,
would seem hard to justify because entry could be expected to be effected at
the small relative MES. However Caves at al established in their empirical
results, that CDR and MES could be regarded as independent. In such a case, it
might be argued that some potential entrants would be interested in entry at
only small scales (ie. less than MES), in which case CDR represents a barrier
while relative MES is made redundant. An appropriate expression for (2.3) with
CDR can be obtained by substituting CDR for MES. Again (dp/dCDR) > 0. Since
we now have a situation where for some industries MES represents the scale
economy barriers, while for others this is done by CDR, it becomes more
appropriate to represent both situations by a general barrier term, B}as in
y -
- B„ + 1
+ 1 (2,5)
where B-, stands for scale economy barriers, which are a subset of overall
barriers, B, representing all possible barrier effects.
It ought to be remembered that in deriving (2.5) cost conditions have been
taken into account in the manner indicated in Fig.2.1 by taking into
consideration variables relating to the shape of the long-run average cost
curve, that is CDR and MES. To the extent that (2.5) implies the degree of
concentration (refer to Fig 2.1) that expression represents in a general way the
possibilities that can be considered in empirical modelling. This is because it
includes all relevant considerations (cost, demand, structural and behavioural) in
the determination of the degree of monopoly power. In addition, explicit
prominence is given to entry barriers which have become a permanent feature
of empirical models. What is perhaps of great importance from the point of
view of conduct is the fact that (2.5) is neutral to the specific assumption of
limit pricing which lead to its derivation. That is although we have initially
assumed that firms are influenced by potential entry in their pricing decisions,
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empirical investigation could still be based on the determination of monopoly
power, measured by the usual Lerner index. The major difference with
formulations which do not consider entry is in the appearance of the barrier
term on the right hand side.
From (2.5) it could be argued that although the relationship between margins
and the barriers to entry is a non-linear one the expression could be
approximated locally by a linear function using a Taylor expansion (and ignoring
higher order terms) with a sign preserving property on the derivative. From this
we would have dp/dB-| =1/q(1/q.Bi + 1)~2 > 0 which leaves a positive
relationship between margins and barriers.
In the previous chapter and the beginning of this one, it was seen that the
degree of concentration has often been considered to be such a prominent
structural variable as to make it legitimate to investigate the concentration -
profits relationship. This has lead to modelling whose results establish an
explicit connection between concentration and the degree of monopoly, though
not in isolation from other important variables.2 Two such models have become
well known are due to Saving (I970) and Cowling and Waterson (I976). They
are briefly discussed next and their implications for empirical purposes
assessed.
A PRICE LEADERSHIP OLIGOPOLY MODEL
Assuming profit maximising behaviour, homogeneous products, and a k -
dominant firm cartel, Saving (I970) first established a direct link between the
k-firm concentration index CRk and the Lerner index of the degree of monopoly
power, p. The degree of concentration here represents the likelihood and
effectiveness of collusion within the dominant firm model. In addition to this
the model establishes that p is inversely related to q the market elasticity of
demand, to £, the elasticity of supply of the remaining n-k smaller firms, which
may be jointly called a competitive fringe.
In the Saving model the output decisions of the firms in the cartel are
constrained by the output of the fringe. From the possibility of allowing for the
inclusion of potential entrants in the fringe the model has lent itself to dynamic
considerations. It also allows for the possibility of entry deterring pricing since
£ is a function of barriers to entry. The model differs qualitatively from (2.5)
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only in the explicit place of concentration and the cartel/fringe dichotomisation
of the industry.
The model had provided fresh justification for testing the concentration -
profits relationship using the more readily available k-firm concentration index.
But it did not satisfy everybody. Ornstein (I975) and Phillips (I976) have argued
that the number of firms itself is likely to be an important independent
influence on behaviour because it facilitates communication and CRk gives a
very poor representation of this.3 Secondly, the established relationships are
not necessarily causal and do not justify the usually implied concentration - to
- profits line of causality. Cowling (I982) has also expressed doubts that
dominant firms can allow their behaviour to be constrained by the output of
small firms. Would they not simply buy out the smaller firms or adopt
aggressive policies to eliminate them? With this line of argument, the
industrial structures characterised by dominant firms and a fringe would be
unstable and transient.
The first problem, relating to the possible role of the number of firms could be
taken care of by a model which has better representation of the number of
firms apart from the concentration index.3 The second problem suggests that
the concentration-profits link is complex and can empirically be better handled
with simultaneity considerations. This is looked into in the section dealing with
empirical models, as are Cowling's questions relating to dominant firms/fringe
industrial structures.
A CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS APPROACH
In the Saving model collusion is partial in the sense that it involves only part
of an industry. Cowling & Waterson (I976) have derived results that extend
collusion to cover all firms in an industry. Like Saving, they also assume profit
maximising behaviour, a homogeneous product and allow for different cost
conditions among firms, reflected in firms' marginal costs. Entry is implicitly
assumed to be blockaded so that the number of firms is well defined and firms
do not have to worry about potential entrants.
Their model is an extension of Stigler's (1968) which relates the Lerner index of
monopoly power to an index of the effectiveness of collusion, and to the price
elasticity of demand. Changing notation slightly their model expresses the
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profits (TT) to sales (R) ratio as
n = H (I - a) (2.6,
.H n
where 75 = I Sj2 Xi/ISj2, Sj is the ith firm's market share (q/Q), where q; is firm
i's output and Q is the total industrial output. H is ESj2, the Herfindahl index of
concentration and Xi = dQ/dq, is the conjectural variations term. Q( is the total
output of the other firms which are firm i's rivals. In a monopolistic industry H
= I and the price-cost margin would depend on q and 75. At the other extreme
is the case of a perfectly competitive industry where collusion is not necessary
and H = 0, in which case the value of the long-run Lerner index is also
expected to be zero.
The absence of recognition of interdependence (X = 0) implies a Cournot
outcome (which depends on H, and q). Another point to note, concerns the
interaction term H8. It represents the expectation that as H rises (falls) with
increasing (falling) concentration, TT/R is also expected to be directly
(positively) related to those changes which are influenced by the degree of
collusion.
Turning to the question of importance of the number of firms (cf. the criticism
at the end of the previous section), it is easy to verify that in (2.6) the
conjectural variations term is sensitive to the number of firms.5 Suppose that
the expected response of each rival is the same. Then for each firm the
conjectural variations term is Xi = (n-1)dqi'/dqi, where (n-1) is the number of
rivals and i' ^ i. Clearly the number of firms will now directly influence the
conjectures.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ESTIMATED MODELS
Cowling's questions regarding the appropriateness of the dominant firms/
competitive fringe industrial structures can only ultimately be answered by an
assessment of empirical evidence. But the questions also relate to the
appropriateness of using CRk as opposed to H in empirical analyses. CRk
rather than H is often the measure that is used because of data availability. In
order to answer some of Cowling's questions it is suggested here that
increasing size inequalities within industries are likely to be characterised by
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greater polarisation of the interests of the firms concerned. Also, this is likely
to show through as polarisation in their contacts or association according to
the similar interests.
Similar interests can result from similar circumstances with respect to
technology, levels and types of costs, regulatory constraints and so on. The
tendency towards polarisation based on these factors can be more readily
visualised by reference to the Lorenz curve, where greater inequality widens
the gap between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality and two
distinct 'similar-interest' groups of firms become conceivable. The industries
would be characterised by one form of price leadership or another according to
the composition of the two groups and their relative importance. With this
possibility, one might well ask why larger firms should find it desirable for
arrangements that always involve all firms in the industry in the manner
implied in the H index. Phillips (1972) in investigating what he called the
'homogeneity of values' noted that 'there is evidence that different groups of
firms have found that special organizations are more effective in dealing with
their own special problems'. Neumann, Bobel and Haid (1985) have argued that
membership of a dominant group, and the difference in behaviour between that
group and the fringe reflects barriers to entry into the former. As long as such
barriers exist, it may therefore be expected that the dominant firms market
structures will exist, and it can be argued that the relevant barriers include the
usual Bain-type barriers to entry.
Apart from these barrier effects, the Saving type of structure may not only
exist but it could also persist for a number of reasons despite the desire by the
dominant firms to eliminate the fringe. The first is that even slight product
differentiation can afford the fringe firms some degree of insulation from the
larger firms' aggressive market policies. The second reason is that with
reasonably large numbers involved in the fringe, takeovers en masse or even
sequentially but done persistently, would easily attract the attention of th9
authorities or the public, who may see this as undesirable6. Even where
antitrust legislation is absent (as in most LDCs) it does not mean that the
public and the authorities are indifferent to monopoly power and the prospect
of its increase with takeovers. After all, systems of price controls such as
those existing in most LDCs, are there to counter monopoly power. The third
reason is that takeover of fringe producers could be costly. If the takeovers
involve subsequent operation of the 'taken-over' plants, this could involve
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substantial managerial diseconomies due to spatial separation etc. If the
takeover is simply followed by discarding of the 'taken-over7 plants, this would
represent waste, and in any case, there is no guarantee that following
takeovers, the problem of the fringe will not crop up again.
With these considerations one must not discount the Saving type of industrial
structure and the appropriateness of CRk. This is especially so because in
empirical applications no particular period of time may be considered to
represent long-run equilibrium for all industries. Only in such circumstances,
might it be claimed that the observed industrial structures are a result of a
complete rationalisation process. This leads to the interesting observation that
in LDC manufacturing where industries are still characterised by youthfulness,
size inequalities are often widespread and marked to the point where the
'modern sector'/'informal sector' duality is well recognised, and where the
former is taken to include large-scale firms while the latter corresponds to
'cottage' producers. This is the impression one gets for instance from an
analysis of Malawian industrial structures examined in Chapter 5. Even the
authorities there recognise this, hence licencing of firms is according to size
criteria.
Going back to the Saving and CW models, the application of either is likely to
proceed on the basis of availability of data. Thus other variables X and Y
might be substituted for q and E in the Saving model on the assumption that
= n(X) and E =e(Y,...). In the CW model & might be given as & = l(CR,Y~1,...)
where CR is the degree of concentration. For instance, entry barriers in Y can
be seen as having an inverse effect on expectations (and the need for
collusion) with respect to potential entrants. In that case the formulation (2.5)
which assumes entry limiting behaviour would also be implied in a Cowling and
Waterson-type model but this time with barriers to entry taken into account. If
as is rarely done, there is the possibility of inclusion of a separate collusion
variable (e.g. Phillips I972) the resulting model cannot be associated exclusively
with the CW since the dominant group models are not incompatible with a
separable collusion variable.
Next, given the qualitative similarities between the two models as far as
empirical investigation is concerned, it is a simple matter to link them to the
formulation (2.5). Let the degree of concentration represent historical and
current conditions of entry i.e. CR = f(B) where CR is some appropriate measure
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of concentration and B is a set of barriers which need not be confined to scale
economy barriers.
With this (2.5) becomes
y - -
i {f(B), B} + 1
or
y - -
{CRj B} + 1
(2.7)
which now gives explicit mention of the degree of seller concentration. It will
be noticed in the following chapter that many empirical models have several
features deriving from the type of formulation represented by (2.7). Moreover
its limit price foundations go some way towards meeting the major
requirement of long run profits view that is characteristic of dynamic analyses.
As Jacquemin and Thisse (1972) admitted, it is impossible to come up with a
model that simultaneously achieves broad generalisations and at the same time
generate sharply focused predictions. At the same time, the generality of (2.7)
should not be over-emphasised. Like the Saving and CW models (2.7) ignores
the multiple dimensions of conduct and performance. Jacquemin and Thisse's
own generalised dynamic model not only allows for these, but also
multidirectional causality, strongly suggesting the appropriateness of
simultaneity considerations. Unfortunately, it is not easy to incorporate multiple
dimensions of conduct and performance in empirically investigated models
because the requisite data are generally not available unless these are
intentionally generated eg. through surveys.
A structural aspect that has recently been generating a lot of interest and
which is associated with CR in (2.7) is conventional import competition as
suggested by Bain (1951) and formalised by Esposito and Esposito (1971). Even
if it is supposed that this can be allowed for in the measurement of CR, there
are theoretical and empirical grounds for considering the possibility of imports
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controlled by the domestic manufacturers. For instance the products may be
from subsidiaries or associate companies abroad in which case the imports are
no longer just a structural dimension but become a conduct one too. import
penetration in this case will not necessarily lead to a fall in the degree of
monopoly (Sugden, 1983).
Data availability and sample size usually impose limits on the size of models
and the form of the variables that can be included. On the whole, studies that
use H are extremely rare for the understandable reason that they require
detailed information about individual industries. CR is widely used and
implicitly the dominant firm(s) market structure is assumed. However, it is
thought that the results of using either H or CR are similar since it has been
indicated that the two tend to be highly correlated (Baily and Boyle, 1971; Curry
and George, 1983).
On a more general level, empirical models have tended to expand by inclusion
of more relevant variables, of which entry barriers and international
competitiveness are increasingly popular. But the approach of including
additional variables in a seemingly ad hoc manner has been criticised by
Sawyer(1982). In Chapter 4 a model of performance will be suggested, following
a discussion of some of the issues that help to justify it. But before getting to




1.Note that these definitions are best interpreted in terms of firms' adjustment
towards long-run equilibrium, and that at any given point in time the profits
from short-run profit maximisation are the maximum attainable.
2.Brief expositions of models based on different assumptions can be found in
Sawyer (1979).
3. This criticism can be seen in the same vein as Scitovsky's, quoted in the
previous chapter about the fact that the concentration indices try to represent
too many structural features.
4. Despite the name, the concept of 'numbers equivalent' does not answer the
Ornstein / Phillips criticism either. The numbers equivalent for a concentration
index relates the value the index to the number of equal-sized firms which
would give the same value of the index as the measured one. For the k-firm
concentration ratio this would be given by k divided by the value of the
concentration ratio ie. the reciprocal of the average share of industrial output
of the k firms. The 'numbers equivalent' is therefore hypothetical while the
problem here relates to communication among actually existing firms.
5. In this case, one could incorporate the communication problem into how
firms formulate their conjectures but this complicates the analysis considerably.
But it could be argued that the smaller the firms the less they matter in the
communication network, in which case we resort to the idea behind
concentration, where firms' shares are of great importance.
6. In some countries eg. Malawi the relevant 'authorities' might be the
government ministry responsible for overseeing industrial development, while in
others it might be public watchdogs such as monopolies commissions etc.
CHAPTER 3
A SURVEY OF PREVIOUS ESTIMATED MODELS
TOWARDS EMPIRICAL MODELLING
Bain (1951) went to elaborate lengths to single out the effects that might
distort the empirical concentration-profits relationship, in particular he was
concerned that the measures of profit and concentration were the ones
required by theory and correctly applied.
There are potentially numerous other structural elements that could lead to
distorted representation of industrial concentration. In short. Bain's approach
could be described as
where
ft = profit rates
CR* = concentration index, for industries in a closed economy,
catering for national markets, where firms have symetrical
diversification or single products,
X = firm size, proportion of overhead costs,
importance of capital assets, durability
of good,nature of buyers,...
The conditions accompanying CR*
are usually not satisfied in real life. We might then want
to take account of this fact by looking at the factors (discussed below)
represent the divergence of the osberved concentration measure, CR,
from CR* ie.
CR-CR* = g(Z) = g(cross elasticity of demand among the
industry's products, import competition/export intensity
localisation of the markets, degree of diversification)
where CR is the observed or calculated concentration ratios and the factors
listed on the right-hand side account for the divergence of CR from CR*. We
could then write the above function as
IT = F (CR*, X ) (3-1)
tr = F( ( CR - g(Z) ) , X] (3.2)
and assuming separability
IT = <j) (CR,X) + p(Z) (3.3)
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Bain dealt with the factors IjJ(Z) by simply excluding culprit industries from the
sample (ie. those which included products with low cross-elasticities of
demand, high import competition, localised markets, etc.).
n = f(CR, x) (3.4)
The substitutability principle (in defining an industry and hence the
measurement of the variables) requires account to be taken of competing
imports and geographical extent of the market. In the former case, if imports
are not considered, the result would be overstated CRs. In the latter case,
taking geographically dispersed producers as if they were supplying the same
market and competing, can understate true CRs. This is because distance and
transportation costs make products supplied from certain points, more distant
substitutes.
The problem which is posed by diversification arises when the nature of
available data is such that the industrial groupings used, include products
which are not close substitutes and there is imbalanced diversification (or there
is specialisation) by firms among the different products. The ideal situation
would be where each firm in the industry accounts for the same proportion of
output of every product, in which case the concentration index based on the
output for the industry would be the same as that for any of the products.
This correspondence ceases to hold when there is asymetrical diversification or
when there is specialisation. As an axample of the type of problem, suppose an
industry has three firms, firm 1 producing 100 percent of product a, firm 2
producing 100 percent of b, and firm 3 producing 100 percent of c. The
aggregate 'industry' concentration measure based on the output of the whole
industry, would be an underestimate (since for example the one firm
concentration ratio would be less than 100 percent for the 'industry', whereas
an appropriately weighted measure should be 100 percent, ie. as in the
component industries of the different products). Imbalanced diversification in
general, poses the problem of misrepresentation of the concentration for one
or more of the component products.
The usual procedure for taking account of these problems in many of the
recent empirical studies has been to use industries defined at a uniform level
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of disaggregation, preferably at 4—digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
and to control for the factors Z listed above by using appropriate variables(eg.
measures of diversification, localisation of markets, import intensity, and export
intensity).
A systematic way of dealing with X is to classify the factors according to the
nature of their influence like entry barriers, characteristics of the product and
cost conditions. The number of variables that are included to represent these
influences usually depends on 'their roles in the SCP paradigm, their use in
previous studies and the availability of relevant and usable data' (Intriligator,
1978).
Other equations besides that for rr may also be considered according to the
interest in them or the perceived simultaneity in the profitability relationship.
Most of the variables that have been used in empirical models are discussed
next. But since some of the variables discussed here will be redefined and
discussed again in the context of Malawian data in Chapter 6, we shall avoid
repetition by confining the discussion of this chapter to theoretical issues and
some problems which are general, while Chapter 6 will deal with problems
specific to Malawian application.
Price-cost margins (M)
As has already been seen in Chapter 2, an appropriate performance index for
the effects of competition on pricing behaviour is the Lerner index. In
empirical applications the average cost curve and marginal cost curves are
assumed to be constant and equal over the relevant range of output. This
solves the problem of estimating marginal cost.
The majority of the concentration-profits studies have been carried out for the
USA and most of these since Bain's study have used rates of return on equity
after tax (Weiss, 1974). it appears that the readily available data for this
measure may have lead to some confusion about the profitability variable with
users trying to justify the formulations they use.
Mann (1966, p296) probably contributed to this when he restated the
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predictions of 'conventional price theory' as that firms in more highly
concentrated industries earn higher rates of return on the owner's investment
than the opportunity cost of the equity capital. This is despite the fact that his
study was intended to verify Bain's earlier results and that Bain's concentration
- profits hypothesis had been in terms of profit rates on sales:
"As the hypothesis is developed to this point, the predicted
profit-rate differences are explicitly differences in ratios of
excess profit to sales". (Bain 1951 p 296)
Bain's use of the rate of return on equity was on the grounds of availability of
data and that the hypothesis should roughly hold, with a source of distortion
being differences among industries, in sales to equity ratios. For Bain the rate
of return on equity was proxying for the rate of return on sales which was the
more acceptable variable, rather than the other way round.
The rate of return on sales that has come to be widely used is the price-cost
margin, M = [(S-RM-W)/S] where S is the value of sales, RM, the cost of
materials and W the payroll. Its advantage over rate of return on equity is in
that 'oligopoly theory really predicts high prices and not necessarily high
profits' since profits could be affected by excess capacity after resources have
responded to high prices. (Weiss, 1974 p199). This and the relative reliability
of margins data as well as some inherent biases introduced in the return on
assets measure have persuaded some of the former advocates of the latter
about the superiority of price-cost margins (cf Weiss, 1971 and Weiss 1974;
also Ornstein, 1975, and Hay and Morris, 1979, p210 n.20).
Usually the numerator of M is measured as profits plus various costs such as
'advertising, central office expenses including research and development,
depreciation expenses and taxes' (Weiss, 1974). To the extent that most of
these other costs represent elements of fixed costs empirical results could be
affected by differences in these costs, which might be related to concentration.
Ornstein (1975) argued that for instance a firm with zero such fixed costs could
register the same M as one with zero profits but positive fixed costs. The
implied procedure is therefore exclusion of all such costs from the numerator
of M (see also Phillips, 1976).
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Concentration (CR)
Concentration is taken to represent the influence of the number and size
distribution of firms in an industry on the behaviour of those firms. This is
usually done by using a measure of concentration as a summary statistic to
represent these features.
There have been several measures of concentration which have been proposed
and used. A few of the measures1 are now rarely used for measuring the
degree of concentration as they can best be described as measures of size
inequality rather than concentration as such, and the two are not always
closely related. For example measures of inequality are very sensitive to the
number of firms and will therefore give importance to say the entry of very
small firms (which would lead to increased inequality) whereas measures of
concentration would attach little significance to such entry.
The two most referred to measures of concentration are the k-firm
concentration ratio, CRk and the Herfindahl index (H) defined in the previous
chapter. We also discussed in that chapter how different theoretical models,
based on different behavioural assumptions, can lead to the use of a particular
concentration index. In practice however, there is no guarantee that any
particular measure adopted will represent the relevant structural aspects
adequately, and we have already examined some of the criticisms that could be
levelled against certain behavioural assumptions. Against such an uncertain
background about the appropriate measure to adopt, and going back to
oligopoly theory, the basic requirement is that the measure adopted should
describe industrial structure in such a way as to indicate the extent to which a
few firms dominate a market, and to distinguish atomistically competitive from
oligopolistic structures.
Hannah and Kay (1977) suggested a set of properties which a measure of
concentration should posses in order for it to correctly represent the
behavioural tendencies. Curry and George (1983) have investigated the
behaviour of a number of indices with respect to some of the theoretically
desirable properties. H satisfies all the properties suggested by Hannah and
Kay but CRk has the potential of violating the principle of transfer since it is
not sensitive to changes among the smaller firms or changes within the
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k-dominant firms. This deficiency of the CRk means that the measure could
remain constant when a change should be indicated eg. when the shares of
some firms within the dominant group rise at the expense of those of other
firms within the group. Hannah and Kay have given an illustration of how an
inequality measure can have an even worse property, where the indication is
that concentration might have declined, when it has actually increased. The
weaknesses of CRk are usually considered to be quite minor considering its
advantages which apart from doing the basic job, include its use of readily
available information such as information on firms' size distributions. The H in
contrast, requires information on individual firms and the gains are not
regarded as drastic. As Curry & George (1983) put it, 'it is, however, mildly
reassuring to know that if one's chosen ideal measure cannot be computed
because of data limitations the use of simpler measures such as concentration
ratio may well yield similar results'. (p211) But before leaving this discussion it
is worth pointing out that there still are problems associated with the
measurement of CRk and these specifically relate to the choice of k, the
accuracy of representation when small producers are cut-off from the data set,
and the economic variable which should be used to measure CRk.
The k used in research often depends on published information. Sometimes
(especially in Western industrialised economies) CRk are actually published and
usually k takes the value of 3 or 4 and the criterion of choice is usually the
preservation of confidentiality. But just because the value of k seems arbitrary
from an economic point of view, does not mean that any particular value of k
can be criticised on the grounds of arbitrariness. This is because oligopoly
theory itself is silent on the question of how many firms constitute oligopoly.
But it might well be worthwhile, where circumstances permit, to experiment
with a number of alternative values of k. Some studies have done this, but they
are in the minority.
As indicated above CRk like other true measures of concentration (as opposed
to measures of inequality) gives less weight to smaller firms. For CRk the
effect of smaller firms outside the k-dominant group is picked by the
denominator (total industrial output). The smaller the firms, the smaller will
their impact on the magnitude of total industrial output. This property of CRk
reduces considerably the problem associated with most industrial data, that
they reiate to larger firms, where the smaller ones are cut-off by some
minimum size criterion. But of course the crucial consideration is the size of
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the cut-off tail of the exluded producers in terms of their output contribution,
which in empirical work should be given some mention.
Finally, it should be clear that the relevant economic variable for measurement
of concentration should be output. In economies where labour is
heterogeneous according to the nature of the employer (eg. large scale vs.
small scale producer) the suggestion that the economic variable used makes
little difference (Aaronovitch and Sawyer, 1975, p66) , will no longer apply. If
for example the smaller scale producers are associated with lower quality
labour in terms of educational or skill attainment, than the larger producers,
then the use of employment figures rather than output ones would tend to
understate true concentration levels. This is likely to be more of a problem in
LDCs where there is considerable labour heterogeneity because of educational
inequalities, and where small producers account for significant proportions of
manufacturing output.
Import intensity (IMPS) and export intensity (EXPS)
Esposito & Esposito (1971) formalised the influence of imports in moderating
that of concentration on domestic pricing by considering the former as a type
of entry or potential entry.
Assuming that import quotas are not used, it is suggested that imports are
also subject to conventional barriers to entry but that the overall barriers tend
to be lower for foreign entrants than domestic ones. Foreign entrants come
from a wide range of environments, some of which are likely to be
characterised by much lower factor prices, superior technologies, management
skills and so on. They are therefore in a position to exert the most immediate
threat of entry, the antitrust implication being that less restrictive trade policies
encourage more competitive pricing.
Import competition is often represented by import intensity (IMPS) measured as
the ratio of the level of imports to domestic supply and dM/dlMPS < 0.
Sometimes this is taken into account in the calculation of the concentration
indices (e.g. Shepherd, 1972; House, 1973), where the total industrial output
used in the calculation of the indices includes imports. The use of IMPS rather
than some other variable in the price-cost margin equation has some problems
of interpretation which usually do not receive attention.
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Esposito and Esposito's prediction that dM/dlMPS < 0, was based on the
import ratio being a representation of price competitiveness of foreign imports
and the overall barriers facing the foreign imports, which include all the
conventional barriers but applied to an international context, as well as
international trade restrictions on imports (ie. physical, transportation costs as
well as tariff based restrictions). But what is one to make of the possibility that
low domestic prices and high levels of imports could coexist as a result of
failure of the low prices of domestic firms to restrict imports?
The answer to this question must lie in the reasons why the domestic firms
would continue to maintain iow prices if they were ineffective in stemming
imports in the first place. The persistence of low domestic prices and high
import ratio must indicate that the low prices are worthwhile to the domestic
firms, and one reason why this might be the case is that the domestic firms
might not be interested in reducing imports as such, but merely to maintain
their market shares in the face of competition from privileged competitors.
Given the diversity of potential sources of imports and their potentially highly
elastic supply, this might be a sensible strategy than attempting to deter entry
altogether. Thus the import restriction failure argument easily gives way to that
of entry regulation (or what ultimately amounts to the same thing, own market
share maintenance) so that high imports will still be associated with low prices
for domestic firms for the same reason as before, that imports are a threat to
domestic firms' long-run profitability.
In the same vein of considering the import ratio as representing barriers to
entry, it could also be argued that where domestic prices and import ratio are
both high, the situation could be similar to that of ineffectively impeded entry
(in the analysis of barriers with respect to domestic competition). In such a
situation, barriers would be so low that domestic firms may as well get the
highest margins they can get, without bothering with entry and its effects on
their future market shares. A similar domestic prices/imports relationship
might also arise where domestic demand is growing fast, or where there is
considerable product differentiation between the domestic and imported
products, or a combination of these factors. [This implies that if we were to
have variables representing these factors in a domestic pricing equation, we
might expect some interactions between the variables and the import ratio.]
Like in the Bain-Sylos-Labini entry limiting model discussed in Chapter 2,
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situations where entry is ineffectively impeded present special problems when
it comes to empirical analyses. This is because the situation might mean that
the price/imports relationship is non-linear unless the industries with
ineffectively impeded entry can be identified and excluded from the sample. An
alternative approach would be to include this possibility in the modelling.
Neither of these considerations are usually made. But there could yet be
another solution. Might all these problems not be better resolved by using a
variable better suited to capturing the relationship between domestic pricing
and import prices, which is how the threat of imports arises? Such variables
could for example take the form of measures of rates of protection (such as
nominal or effective rates of tariff protection) which are based on the relative
levels of domestic prices and import prices, and the levels of tariff barriers.
But on closer examination, the question relating to the use of a
domestic/import pricing variable as opposed to the import ratio, is the same as
that for using potential post-entry prices rather than barriers to entry variables,
where the latter indirectly represent potential post-entry price via potential
output. The problem with such price variables is that they are more difficult to
derive and require too much information some of it involving hypothetical
situations. Such variables are therefore liable to serious measurement errors
while , in some cases, presenting no improvement on the implicit pricing
variables based on an assessment of barriers to entry. Moreover the direct
price related variables do not reflect some potentially important barriers such
as physical import restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions, etc.. In situations
where these exist and are prominant, the difference between domestic prices
and the prices of imports will itself be irrelevant in influencing domestic prices.
Take the Fig 3.1 below. Suppose that because of favourable production
conditions abroad relative to domestic ones (hence low market determined
barriers to entry for imports) the 'cost, insurance, and freight' import prices
could be as low as PI where all domestic requirements, Q1 could be supplied
from imports. If there are import restrictions such that only Q2 can be supplied
from imports and the remainder of the domestic market is to be supplied by












supply curve. [Note that in the case of tariff protection the same level of
import restriction could be achieved by an import tariff of P2-P1 per unit of
imports.] The further to the right Q2 is (that is the higher the import volume
allowed relative to the domestic market) the lower are the maximum prices the
domestic firms can hope to obtain because of the downward sloping demand
curve. Here it is the direct import volume restrictions rather than their relative
prices which influences the potential profitability of domestic firms. That is the
level of tariffs may well be zero and yet domestic firms could still be protected
by other forms of import restrictions. Such situations are characteristic of
LDCs where trade regulation has a higher profile but the current protectionist
wars among Western economies indicate that the phenomenon is not confined
to LDCs. The use of import ratio rather than measures of pricing differentials
would be a general way of dealing with these problems.
Export Intensity
Industries the larger proportion of whose output is exported, are expected to
be operating under stiffly competitive conditions and their pricing to be
appropriately competitive. Such considerations may be very important where
domestic markets are small and minimum efficient scales are large relative to
that market so that some or all producers are compelled to sell on the
international market. For the industrialised economies where such market
considerations are not necessary, it has been suggested that if export activities
were not highly profitable, then firms would not bother to surmount the
problems associated with exporting, namely risk, marketing problems, tariff and
transport cost barriers (Shirazi, 1974). The influence of export intensity
(export-sales ratio) on performance is therefore likely to be subject to opposite
interpretations.
Growth rate of sales (G)
Like export intensity, the influence of G on price-cost margins is not
unambiguous. On the one hand it might be expected that fast growing sales
imply less pressure that might lead to a breakdown of collusive discipline. G
would in this case be positively related to M. On the other hand the desire for
larger market shares in the growing market might make firms resist increases
in prices. The net result of these two effects might be a positive though weak
coefficient for the G variable in a profitability equation. But because of the first
reason it is usually assumed to have a coefficient with a positive sign.
G is usually measured as the percentage change in sales and this raises some
serious problems if there were supply-side problems that constrain production.
Suppose we have a year when production was seriously disrupted by say,
strikes, followed by a year of normal production. What would the rate of
change of sales between the two years be actually measuring? Is it as the
models presume, strength of demand or growth in the rate of production? This
problem is generalisable to other situations where there are likely to be
production constraints which make production lag behind demand. But of
course one might insist that the variable can still measure the right effects
since G is usually measured in terms of value of sales rather than quantity, in
which case with freedom of pricing, this would respond to the gap between
demand and production. But then the input problems would mean that firms'
output decisions are restricted and it might no longer be possible to talk about
profit-maximising behaviour if this were possible under normal conditions. This
is a situation which might call for the inclusion in a profitability equation or in
some other equation within the system, of variables which account for
constraints on production due to input problems.
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Minimum efficient scale (MES) and cost disadvantage at less than MES (CDR)
As indicated in Chapter 2, both these variables have to do with scale
economies barriers to entry. Approximations to MES are often based on the
average size of the largest plants in use, in terms of output. When this is
expressed as a percentage of market size, it is assumed to give an indication
of the size of plant (relative to the market) required for efficient entry. CDR on
the other hand indicates the cost disadvantage of operating below the
minimum efficient size. This is expressed as the ratio of average costs of
operating below MES to those of operating at estimated MES or over. MES and
CDR therefore describe the shape of an 'industry's' long-run average cost
curve, at minimum optimal size, and at below this. Suboptimal entry is less
disadvantaged with respect to efficiency, if this curve is shallow below MES.
Not all studies can afford to include both of these variables and sometimes
neither is included because of data problems. Several 'new' measures have
been suggested for MES and CDR to take advantage of whatever data may be
available. Fuss and Gupta (1981) have suggested a statistical cost curve
approach that only makes use of supposedly readily available plant variable
costs and output data. The statistical cost curve approach basically tries to
estimate the average cost curve using information on costs and rates of
production supplied by the firms. But the use of money value of output as a
convenient way of avoiding the problems of product heterogeneity, introduces
the problem that the money value of output may well pick up monopoly power
(through the use of prices). The other problem is that the requirement is that
the cost curve represents the full technical efficiency while the use of the
usual regression techniques would only give 'best-fit' curves, where 'frontier7
type estimates would be called for ie. so that the observed points are
enveloped from below. But a potentially more serious problem with this
approach, (to the extent that it makes all the above considerations irrelevant) is
that large numbers of observations are required so that each industry must
have a large number of firms/plants already in existence. Thus the problem
with the Fuss and Gupta approach is that it still requires large numbers of
observations despite their insistence that this problem is alleviated by the
possible use of pooled cross-section and time-series observations. For
example, the fewer the cross-section units the longer we would need the time
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series to be, and the shorter the time-series observations, the more
cross-section units we would require.
Lyons (1980) has suggested an MES measure based on the probability of
multiplant operations and their actual occurance. The basic argument in Lyon's
measure is the association of MES with the point at which multiplants are
contemplated, the reasoning being that firms operating plants below MES do
not need more than one plant. Caves, Shirazi, Porter (1975) suggested a
measure of CDR that could be used with data from the same size-distributions
used for CR estimates. CDR is proxied by the average labour productivity in
smaller firms producing the bottom 50% of industry output as a proportion of
the average labour productivity in larger firms.
Advertising intensity (AS)
This is usually measured as the ratio of advertising expenditure to sales. One
widely held view is that advertising expenditures can be regarded as both a
symptom and a source of product differentiation in the industry (Comanor and
Wilson 1967). To the extent that established firms enjoy economies of scale in
advertising and that new firms are required to more than match current
advertising by established firms to overcome brand loyalty, advertising is said
to constitute an entry barrier. This view is however increasingly being
questioned. Take Stigler's (1968) definition of entry barriers as a cost which
must be borne by a potential entrant but not by established firms. It has been
argued that just as new firms might be expected to incur penetration costs
now, established ones must also have incured them at an earlier time. Cost
differentials are therefore questionable on this aspect (Reekie and Bhoyrub,
1981). Bloch (1980) has cited a number of studies whose findings could be
interpreted as weakening if not negating the advertising barrier view. This is
especially the case when proper account is taken of current advertising as
creating an intangible asset which is not necessarily short-lived.
These and other issues in the use of AS and the interpretation of results have
been aired in a debate in a recent Journal of Economic Literature (1980). What
emerges from this debate is that the data used for AS generally do not relate
to sufficiently homogeneous products nor take into account other relevant
expenditures for sales promotion. Furthermore, it may be necessary to
consider capitalisation of advertising expenditures (depending on the presumed
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lives of the effects)2. The task of taking these issues into account has hardly
begun and is not likely to be an easy one given the data limitations including
the difficulty of determining the 'lives' of the intangible assets and the rate of
depreciation. The questions that have been raised must be seen as urging
caution in interpreting results based on AS and drawing generalisations from
them.
Consumer demand (CD)
The exercise of monopoly power depends on the buyers' power as will the
need for and intensity of sales promotion. Final consumers being many, and
generally less knowledgeable than say intermediate consumers (other
producers), the price elasticity of demand in the former market is likely to be
greater than in the latter. The possibilities and returns from product
differentiation are also likely to be greater. These distinctions are usually
achieved by using a dummy variable for the two types of market. Sometimes
e.g. Martin (1979) and Geroski (1982) the proportion of industry output going to
final consumers is used but such information is rarely available unless there
are inter-industry flows figures.
Industry diversification (DV)
This is a relatively new variable as far as explicit inclusion in empirical
econometric models is concerned. Diversification is the extent to which
enterprises are engaged in secondary activities apart from their primary ones.
Firms can use it as a strategy to improve the return-risk trade-off or avoid
gambler's ruin situations. The latter is the situation where, 'while the average
return of the entity may be satisfactory, fluctuations in the average return may
give rise to a series of losses or negative cash-flow causing bankruptcy for the
operating entity' (Weston, 1970 n1).
Improvements in the return-risk trade-off are partly achieved by lowering
demand-side and supply-side risks. The former is achieved via multiproduct
production while the latter is achieved by having many firms supply inputs for
the many products thus lowering high inter-firm dependence (Beattie, 1980).
The implications of diversification to market structure is that competition can
be reduced or prevented from increasing by cross- subsidisation of predatory
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rivalry. This can be done via price-cutting, high sales promotion expenditures
etc. of prolonged duration (Berry, 1970). It is in that case expected to have a
positive effect on long-run monopoly power. Since this is a concept associated
with enterprises one requires suitable measurement for using it at the industry
level. One suggestion is
"... for enterprises with establishments classified in more
than one industry group, their diversification may be measured
by comparing their non-primary with their total output... (the
composite industry measure) can be derived as weighted
averages for the component industry groups of the secondary
share in total output ..." (Utton, 1979,p83, brackets added)
Diversification into an industry, is a special type of entry into those industries
since it tends to nullify the entry barriers there (Hines, 1957; Yip, 1982).
Outside specialised studies cn diversification, this aspect has not influenced
many empirical SCP models.
The problem with the diversification variable is that it is subject to an
alternative interpretation, that of controlling for the measurement problems
associated with concentration (discussed above in connection with Bain's work).
Although the role of this variable in studies which include it in the price-cost
margins equation is not usually indicated (cf. Shirazi, 1974; Geroski, 1982) we
suggest here that it is used as a control variable for the measurement of
concentration, while in studies which are interested in diversification as an
aspect of structure or conduct (Utton, 1979; Berry, 1970), the
cross-subsidisation aspect is directly relevant and is given prominence.
Geographical extent of market (REG)
Bain (1951) suggested that a homogeneous product by different producers
located in geographically dispersed areas may not be readily substitutable for
each other because of transportation costs. Concentration indices that do not
take this into account would be implicitly assuming that all markets are equally
accessible to all producers and tend to understate the proper degree of
concentration. Weiss (1972) has systematically looked at the problem of
measurement, identifying the two main approaches as distance shipped and
geographical dispersion of output;
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"In many cases, dispersion and distance shipped give
consistent evidence about market size. If plants producing a
given commodity are widely dispersed and the commodity is
seldom shipped long distances, geographical markets are clearly
small. Similarly, centralized output plus long shipments clearly
indicate geographically broad markets". p246
Few studies can resort to censuses of transportation for indices of
transportation costs and so dummy variables are sometimes used for
regional/national classifications. On other occasions, output dispersion indices
such as the number of states (in the USA) required to account for some
percentage of output have been used (Weiss, 1972 p 245)
SOME EMPIRICAL STUDIES
The concentration - profits relationship
Bain's test of the concentration - profits hypothesis on US manufacturing took
the specific form of investigating whether the relationship was continuous.
Tests were on a sample of 42 industries, for the relationship between CR8 and
1936-40 industry average profit rates after income tax (i.e. net profit after tax
as a percentage of net worth). The results gave no indication of a linear
relationship but showed a marked difference in profit rates above and below a
critical concentration of 70%.
Subsequent to Bain other studies have generally reported a continuous
relationship and all but a handful of studies for the US and other countries
found the relationship to be positive and significant, though weak. Most of the
earlier studies have been extensively reviewed by Weiss (1974) and others
including Rhoades and Cleaver (1973) and Meeham and Duchesneau (1973). At
the end of his review, Weiss(1974,p231) stated that the concentration-profits
relationship held up for various Western economies including Japan, despite
data problems which biased the relationship towards zero.
Most of the studies for the US used a return on capital as the dependent
variable. But other studies produced similar results with price-cost margins
(Collins and Preston, 1968; Quails, 1972). However, in a reconstruction of Bain's
(1951) and Stigler's (1964) earlier works with the same samples but for later
periods, Brozen (1970) found rather mixed results. The sample which Bain had
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applied to the 1936-1940 period yielded a weaker and non-significant relation
for 1953-1957 but a stronger and more significant one for 1962-1966. In the
Stigler case, the later period, (1962-1966) yielded a weaker and non significant
relation than Stigler had found for 1953-1957. Brozen found the diminished
effects of concentration on profits even in the industries whose concentration
remained high in the latter period. He suggested that the relationship might
have been stronger in the earlier periods because industries were out of
equilibrium then, implying that the relationship predicted by theory might not
hold in equilibrium after all. But others have expressed doubts as to which
periods related to equilibrium for all industries (Shaw and Sutton, 1976). Weiss
(1974) has suggested other possible reasons, including increasing
diversification which reduces the correlation between firms profits and CR in
the industries in which they are classified.
Demsetz (1973) and others, including Collins and Preston (1969), Shepherd
(1972) have found that the concentration - profits relation is strongest for
largest or leading firms and that for smaller firms it may be weak or even
negative. Demsetz (1974) has interpreted this to be an indication of the
superior efficiency and products of the larger firms relative to smaller ones.
-There is also the possibility that the leading firms might seek prices that
maximise their own profits whatever the consequences would be for the
smaller firms (Weiss, 1974). This interpretation suggests that collusion might
be effected along the lines suggested in the previous chapter ie. where it could
only involve the dominant firms.
Barrier effects
Simple regressions of price-cost margins on concentration seem to typically
find a significant concentration coefficient but the significance is lessened or
disappears when other variables are introduced, particularly entry barrier
variables. Barring the cases where entry barriers are very high, when entry is
most likely to be blockaded, price would be positively associated with the level
of barriers.
Bain (1956) and later Mann (1966) tested this hypothesis on industries classified
according to barriers that were very high, substantial to moderate, and
moderate to low. Bain's results for 1936-1940 and 1947-1951 revealed an
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independent significant influence of barriers on profit rates. A distinct
difference was found between those industries in the 'substantial' and
'moderate to low' categories.
Mann, with a larger sample, extended Bain's analysis to 1950-1960 to see
whether Bain's results were influenced by the Great Depression or rapid
post-war inflation. His results corroborated Bain's in that highly concentrated
industries with very high barriers performed better than highly concentrated
industries with lower barriers.
The simultaneity problem
Many early studies as well as recent ones have been carried out on the implicit
assumption of a unidirectional relationship in which performance is a static
function of industry structure and conduct, which are themselves assumed to
be exogenous (Phillips, 1972). Even when it is realised that the resulting single
equations are part of a bigger system with numerous feedback effects, these
are either ignored or it is assumed that long lags permit the analysis of
specific relationships in isolation (Cowling, 1976: Geroski, 1982).
Bain (1951 p 311, 1956 p 191) had recognised that while concentration and
conditions of entry can influence performance, concentration itself is
endogenous, being influenced by entry which would itself be influenced by
performance and by the barriers to entry. The argument has been extended to
other aspects of the performance equation. This has lead to the common
three-equation specification with performance, advertising and concentration as
the endogenous variables (Comanor & Wilson, 1974; Strickland & Weiss, 1976;
Martin 1979).
Martin (1979) has improved on the earlier simultaneous model by Strickland &
Weiss (1976). The choice of the traditional variables was based on theoretical
considerations such as those relating to the elasticity of demand, barriers to
entry, and imports. The model was specified in such a way that identification
requirements were fulfilled. The equation system (rearranged, with dotted
spaces denoting non-relevant variables) is given as follows;
M = f,CR4 CD,G,BCR,...,IMPS,REG,AS,MES,CDR,KS)
CR4= <3 ( • . / M| / • • • ,CR4|. 9 • • • /CD^G/ / REG r AS 9 MSS / CDR / • • )
AS = h( M,..,CR4, CR24,CD,G,BCR,DUR,IMPS,)
where BCR is buyer concentration, DUR is a durable goods dummy and the rest
of the variables are as defined in the previous section. The commoness of the
variables among the equations illustrates a likely source of identification
problems in similar specifications. Martin overcame these partly through the
use of lagged variables specified with the subscript I.
The model was estimated using the Three Stage Least Squares method (3SLS)
on 209 4 - digit US industries classified according to the consumer/ producer
goods distinction. The main results briefly were as follows. His results for the
M equation were similar to the Strickland & Weiss ones. The latter reported
2SLS results with barely significant AS, MES, coeffiecients but significant for
G,KS, REG. The concentration coefficient was suspected to have been
influenced by collinearity with the scale economy variables. In the CR4
equation CR4( was the most significant with a coefficient of less than unity
which was taken to indicate stable adjustment towards long-run levels. MES
and CDR were also significant but M, was negative and not significant. For the
AS equation M and CR were the most significant. None of the demand
characteristics variables were significant for the consumer goods sample but
CD, IMPS and BCR were significant in the producer goods sample.
Some consequences of endogeneity specification
There are clearly explanatory variables that are now considered standard for
inclusion in the margins equation. A number of studies that have dealt with
simultaneous equations specifications have noted the sensitivity of regression
results to endogeneity assumptions for a number of the explanatory variables.
For instance, Geroski (1982) using UK data has estimated the model
M = f(CR,AS,KS,DV,G, IMPS,EXPS)
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Firstly Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was used and then 2SLS. The signs of the
coefficients for DV and EXPS were reversed, whiie several t-statistics were
either drastically reduced or increased in the 2SLS estimates. Specific tests for
the OLS estimates revealed that not all of the six explanatory variables were
exogenous. The results showed sensitivity to endogeneity assumptions
particularly for the trade variables. In the preferred non-linear specifications,
CR had a negative coefficient, and although AS appeared to play a significant
role in the M equation, it was not endogenous. The latter casts a shadow on
earlier preoccupation with the endogeneity of AS (e.g. previously cited studies
by Strickland & Weiss, Comanor & Wilson, Martin). It also suggests that the
attention could have been better employed, focusing instead on trade variables
- at least for the UK where trade variables have been found to be important.
In their large six-equation simultaneous equations model for the US.,
Intriligator, Weston and de Angelo (1975) [reviewed in Intriligator (1978)] similar
switches as in the Geroski study were also recorded in moving from OLS to
2LS . Moreover, they were not confined to the margins equation. Their results
question the central role accorded to concentration in SCP and the influence of
advertising on concentration.
Generally, if simultaneity considerations are desirable, the previous studies
indicate that there is some choice of approach to the problem. The
alternatives are either structural equations models e.g. Comanor 8i Wilson
(1967), Strickland 8t Weiss, (1976) and Martin (1979) or a one equation model
with simultaneity considerations (Geroski, 1982). The difference is in that the
former is explicit, allowing for interest in relationships surrounding more than
one endogenous variable. The price to pay for this is of course that more
attention is required for the specification and identification of the extra
equations (cf Martin, 1979). The consoling aspect in either approach is that
neither requires to be exhaustive (see Geroski, 1982 p198; Intriligator, 1978
pp477-78; Judge et a I, 1981, pp531-33).
STUDIES FOR LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Unlike many empirical studies for the industrialised western economies, the few
that exist for LDCs have been reviewed less often, making researchers less
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familiar with them. It is for this reason and that they are of special interest to
the present study that they are reviewed in greater detail here.
Although numerous studies have been done on general problems of
industrialisation in LDCs very few have adopted the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm. The countries for which such studies have been
published are diverse in terms of sizes of the economies and their levels of
industrialisation. They include India (Gupta, 1968), Kenya (House, 1973; 1976),
Korea (Nam, 1975), Malaysia (Gan and Tham, 1977; Gan, 1978), Pakistan (White,
1974).3
Some published studies, e.g. Gupta's do not strictly investigate the SCP but are
nevertheless influenced by the ideas and literature relating to it. The following
review includes those studies that at least investigated the
concentration-profits relationship.
KENYA
House (1973, 1976) has investigated the structure-performance relationship for
Kenya at two points in time, 1963 and 1973. In addition to investigating the
distinct break hypothesis he also estimated the price-cost margin equation,
M= f(CR'3,KS,EXPS)
where M was alternately measured gross and net of depreciation, KS was used
as a proxy for capital requirements and CR'3 was CR3 adjusted for competing
imports.
The 1963 sample comprised 31 3—digit SIC industries and data for KS related to
1961. Tests for the distinct break hypothesis established a critical CR'3 of 40%.
The difference between net margins of industries with concentration levels
above and below this level was found to be significant.
For the hypothesis specifying a continuous relationship he obtained (t-statistics
in brackets),
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M = 3.858 + 0.22ICR'3 + 14.738KS - 0.063EXPS R2 = 0.387
(1.09) (2.56) (2.91) (1.03)
All the signs of the coefficients are as expected. The F-test for the three
explanatory variables showed that they were jointly significant at the 1 percent
level. CR'3 and KS were significant at 2 percent and 1 percent levels
respectively while EXPS was not significant. A comparison of regressions with
CR3 adjusted and not adjusted for imports showed that the adjustment resulted
in the significance of that variable, yielding greater explanatory power.
Comparing the equation above with that for net margins suggested that the
significance of KS in the former may have been because of its explanation of
depreciation, which is part of the 'normal' profits in M.
The study using 1976 data yielded results similar to those for 1963 implying
structural stability although the critical level of concentration was this time
higher at 50%.
KOREA
Nam (1975) was motivated by the possibility that while concentration could be
associated with resource misallocation, an increase in concentration may be a
result of realisation of economies of scale which could be viewed positively.
This could mean that firms are bigger and could be more disposed towards
greater activity in R & D and innovations generally.
A cross-section study sought to identify the major determinants of CR for 234
4—digit industries using data for 1968. The hypothesised relationship was
CR8 = F(MES, AS, KS, G, GT, RMS, IMPS, EXPS)
MES was proxied by average size of firms measured as real gross output in an
industry divided by number of firms. GT was intended to represent
government's role in financing and was measured as
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(Total long-term bank loans + Foreign Loans) %
Total Liability
RMS (The intensity of use of imported raw materials), IMPS, EXPS were all
measured as dummies for critical values of 30% and reflected trade policies
and their effects on different industries. MES was the most significant variable,
followed by G and the dummies of an industry's characteristics.
Using Bain's 70% critical value for concentration, Nam also found like Bain, that
the average profit rates for the above 70% category was consistently higher
than those for below. This was for 1968 and 1969, and for CR4 and CR8. A
similar approach applied to capital utilisation found it to be lower in the highly
concentrated industries than in those with lower degrees of concentration.
From a welfare point of view, the coexistence of excess capacity and monopoly
power in the highly concentrated industries could be an indication that the
burden of excess capacity could well be passed on to consumers. It certainly
would not support Demsetz's view about the efficiency of larger firms in terms
of realisation of economies of scale.
Unfortunately, the reasons for the excess capacity were not explored. Could it
for instance have been related to rationing of foreign exchange for industries
with high RMS? The existence of monopoly power implies that the reasons for
the excess capacity could not have been demand problems.
MALAYSIA
Using a sample of 42 4—digit industries for data relating largely to 197Q-1971
Gan and Tham (1977) estimated a more comprehensive model. The following
is their estimated equation (1a) for gross margins (t-statistics in brackets)
M=0.109 + 0.817CR + 0.241KS + 0.649MES + 0.005ACR +
(0.570) (8.373)** (6.289)** (93.109)**
+ 1.369AS - 0.006EXPS + 0.0003ERP + 0.042FDI
(5.065)** (2.308)* (1.851)* (1.288)
+ 0.023G + 0.070GT
(2.112)* (2.504)** R1" = 0.793
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where ERP is effective tariff protection, FDI is proportion of industry output
produced by foreign firms, GT is a dummy separating 'closed' industries from
the rest. Double asteriks represent significance at the 1 percent level, while a
single one is for the 5 percent level. CR8 only became significant at 10 percent
level after excluding FDI and ACR suggesting colinearity with one of them.
The influence of buyer characteristics was investigated by estimating the
relationship for subsets of industries according to the consumer/ producer
goods distinction. Fewer variables were significant. AS however emerged as
the most significant determinant of M in the consumer goods industries but
was not significant for producer goods. A probable explanation for this is that
product differentiation is more important in the former, as expected. But the
F-test could not lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the two
subsets of parameters were from the same structure.
Finally the influence of barriers on CR was investigated in the relationship;
where ACR is absolute capital requirements for entry at optimal scale (=MES x
KS). They found the barriers to be jointly significant at the 5% level.
Gan (1978) tested the concentration-profits hypothesis for 1971 using the same
sample as the 1977 study. CR4 was used and M was calculated as averages
for the 1968-1971 period. KS was also included to control for effects of capital
intensity. The results support the concentration-performance hypothesis, with
a critical concentration level of 85%, which is higher than that found by Bain
for the US (70%) and far much higher than the 40-50% levels for Kenya.
To derive estimated equations for Pakistan, White (1974) took into account
factors that may be summarised as;
-government controlled firms were under as much pressure
as other firms to achieve high profitability. The fact that they
were as vocal as others in demanding protection from imports
CR8 = f (MES, ACR, AS )
PAKISTAN
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was revealing in this respect.
-collusion, which was not prohibited, must have been highly
probable even for low levels of concentration. This was because
of interlocking directorates and trade associations. Another
reason was the dependence on imported material inputs which
were controlled by few firms which were therefore in a position
to exert enormous power.
-imported inputs were subject to rationing so that games of
price competition (backed by threat of output expansion) would
not be practical.
-imported goods were subject to licencing implying that
they were less restraining on the exercise of market power.
The performance model that was investigated was
M = f(CR4 , LCM, LIM)
where LCM and LIM are the stringency of licences for competing imports and
imported material inputs respectively. DM, the percentage by which domestic
prices exceeded CIF import prices, was used as a proxy for LCM. LIM was
proxied by capacity utilisation, CU whose relationship with m was hypothesised
to correspond to the inverted parabola shape. The dependent variable was
weighted averages for firms' net profit before taxes as a percentage of net
worth. CR was entered as a dummy variable for concentration levels above a
critical ratio of 33.3%, which is lower than the 40% suggested as the threshold
of oligopoly in the US by Scherer (1970 p3).
The following estimates were obtained:
1. M = -0.37 + 0.16CR + 0.08DM + 1.19CU - 0.81CU2 R2 =0.42
(0.68) (1.74) (2.25) (0.73) (0.70)
2. M = -0.55 + 0.15CR DUMMY + 0.07DM + 1.80CU - 1.27CU2
(1.91) (2.09) (2.19) (1.08) (1.07)
R2 = 0.47
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All the coefficients had expected signs though the results were not wholly
satisfactory. They however indicate that at least the basic tendencies were
there. The coefficients for CU and CU2 indicate that maximum profit rates
were reached at capacity utilisation levels of 70%-75%.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The theoretical models described in Chapter 2 and the empirical studies
reviewed in this chapter reveal that some advances have been made in both
directions since Bain's earlier work. But Bain's concentration - performance
hypothesis as weil as concepts from the Bain - Labini limit price theory are stiil
central to empirical models applied to industrialised western economies as well
as the less developed economies.
The mixed results of LDCs studies on critical levels of concentration suggest
that typification of these according to level of industrialisation should be based
on a larger sample of LDC studies than is currently available. But White's
hypothesis of lower oligopoly thresholds for LDCs seems to hold more than
intuitive appeal. Some of the studies reviewed here cast some doubt on the
importance of concentration ratios for profitability and the barrier effects of
advertising intensity. A possible statistical reason for the former is coilinearity
with other variables. But one might well ask why the observed effects should
always be to reduce the influence of CR rather than the other way round.
A major limiting factor in the empirical studies has been poor data or worse
stiil their non-avaiiability. One result of this has been that of the very few
studies that have been carried out for the less developed countries only one
published one has attempted to take into account other relevant features of
those economies apart from trade variables. Another consequence of data
problems may have been the avoidance of dealing with the simultaneity
problem especially since it has long been suspected to be relevant. The
reason for avoidance in this case could be the numhor of variables required for
identification of the system. With a few exceptions the derivation of estimated
models has usually been left unexplained, leaving unanswered questions
relating to the underlying theoretical models(Sawyer,1982). In the following
chapter some attention is given to problems of specification before a
performance model is suggested for estimation with Malawian data.
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NOTES
1. Some of these are discussed in Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975), Curry and
George (1983), and Hannah and Kay (1977).
2. See for example Ayanian's (1975) paper on this issue.
3. Others in the form of unpublished Ph.D. theses include Alawin (1978),
Mooney (1982), de Guimaras (1982).
CHAPTER 4
FURTHER ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE SPECIFICATION OF
A PERFORMANCE MODEL
INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to do four things, namely;
- to explore the implications of input constraints on
firms' pricing behaviour.
_ to briefly look at whether it is necessary
to introduce separate cost considerations into
estimated models.
_ address the problem of government intervention in
pricing decisions and its likely effect on the
results of estimated SCP models.
_ suggest a performance model to be estimated with
Malawian data.
Generally speaking, structure-perfomance models have been silent on the
implications of input supply conditions on firms' behaviour and therefore their
possible influence on performance. In his study of Pakistan manufacturing.
White (1974) suggested that problems of input availability would make
unpractical, price competition backed by threats of output expansion. That is,
whereas in normal circumstances firms could sustain price-cuts by expanded
output, where there are input problems the prospects of increased output
would be constrained, and in severe cases would not even be possible.
Price-cuts as in price wars could not be sustained over long periods of time,
and therefore bringing into question the use of price wars in inter-firm rivalry.
Although in the case of Pakistan, White saw the problem mainly in terms of the
constraints imposed by imported material inputs which were affected by
foreign exchange rationing, the problem could be generalisable to situations
where other inputs are rationed, or are in restricted supply for other reasons,
eg. be materials, finance, or labour supplied under monopolistic conditions.
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The section below attempts to explore some of the consequences of such
problems, where collusive tendencies is an important possibility thus making
these problems an input in structure-conduct-perfomance relationships.
The second problem of this chapter, concerns the reconciliation between what
seem to be two parallel traditions, one investigating the structure-performance
relationship and the other investigating the responsiveness of pricing to cost
changes. A number of econometric studies in the latter tradition are reviewed
in Hay and Morris(1979,pp126-135).These lay emphasis on the influence of cost
changes on pricing,and relatively much less emphasis or none at all on the
influences of structural variables . The interest in this stems first from evidence
such as that reported by Hall and Hitch's(1939) study, that large firms tend to
add a fairly constant percentage markup over average cost to determine price.
Secondly, and probably resulting from the previous point is the fact that
whenever there is government intervention over pricing, it seems to be guided
implicitly or explicitly by the same markup rules. For instance a widely applied
rule for nationalised industries is a maximum markup of around 10 percent.
The question is whether such rules lead to fundamental changes in the
specification of SCP models.
The third problem relates to what ought to be expected of institutional
interference in pricing. Bain(1949) for instance suggested that this problem
would be analytically similar to that of threatened entry. Again one would like
to know exactly what this means and whether it would lead to fundamental
changes in the the basic structure-performance predictions.
In what follows,these three problems are discussed and some rules suggested
for taking care of them in model specification. As a follow-up to the
discussion of these problems and in view of what has already been discussed
in earlier chapters, a performance model is suggested for application to Malawi.
1. PROBLEMS OF SPECIFICATION WHEN INPUT SUPPLY IS INELASTIC
The problem of production-related variables can be analysed by starting from
the case where market imperfections in the input markets are represented by
the influence of the buying firms, that is oligopsony. Assume profit maximising
behaviour with one product and one factor input. The profit equation for an
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oligopolist/oligopsonist firm could be given as
TTi = p( Q )qt - w(w.)w. (4<1)
where TC; = profit, P= industry price of product, Q = is industry output, qj = the
output of the ith firm, W; = is the input say labour, and w = the price of the
input.
Let W,* be the level of input utilisation corresponding to profit maximising
output, qj*. When there are problems with input availability such that desired
levels of production eg. qj*(Wj*) are not feasible ie. q^W,) < qj*(Wj*), the firm
could be said to be faced with two choice variables, output, qj and the input
quantities (via the production function with output determined by input or vice
versa) and where the latter is subject to availability constraints. For instance it
could be envisaged that below optimal levels of output the firm might be
compelled to produce what the available inputs will allow, in which case output
as such would not really be a choice variable. When such problems do not
arise, however output would be a legitimate choice variable determining the
levels of inputs. These different patterns could apply to different industries or
the same industry in different time periods. This is why it has been decided
here to use the assumption of two choice variables (unlike for instance in the
Cowling and Waterson formulation where output is the only choice variable).
With this we take the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to
the factor input to' obtain,
BHi „ d qi ap , .. aw x n
=
dV.P + qi*dWi ~ +
^qi qi .dp w Wi .dw = 0
dW^ + P 8V.P P P dW^
Multiplying the second term by dqj/dqj and the fourth term by w/w and
rearranging
qi 3p w "i dw w = 0
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f (1 - 5) = 0
where q = (dqj/dP).(P/qj) and ur = (dW/dw).(w/Wi) are partial elasticities. The
potential constraints of input availability on output (and ultimately on marginal
profitability since dfTj/dqj can be given as [(dTCydq^Wj)]) would be represented
by the elasticity of supply of input, W in
_ « H—LjZ' (4.2)







where o<.= 1 + 1/q and 3=1 + 1/<aT
When r\ = iaT = 00, ot = 3 = 1 and
^!Ii = - (4.1)
p
which is a first order condition for a price-taking firm in both the product and
input markets.
Usually, models of the SCP implicitly assume perfect competition to rule in all
input markets, so that no account is taken of the elasticity term W (or the
composite term 3)- The question is that if oligopolistic structures are so well
accepted in the product markets, why are market imperfections for both the
factor and the non-factor inputs (such as other manufactures) not taken into
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account?
Equation (4.3) in the above model, which can be regarded as a slight
generalisation of the usual result (cf. Waterson, 1980) represents the situation
which would obtain if the input supply curve is continuous for all firms in an
industry. That is there is no complete constraint on input availability. A case
can be made for the direct inclusion of all input variables in the performance
equation. This is when it is hypothesised that input availability influences
pricing behaviour. For instance problems with inputs could mean that after a
certain level the input supply curve becomes perfectly inelastic, in which case
the output decisions of some or all firms could be affected. Here we argue that
this situation would tend to influence the recognition of interdependence
among firms, and ultimately the way they behave towards each other.
In order to discuss the impact of such problems, there are a number of
situations which could arise. These are
1. no input constraints for all firms
2. input problems affect one or more firms but not all firms
3. input problems affect all firms
The model described above corresponds to situation 1). Situations 2) and 3)
can be seen to be directly relevant to the formation of firms' conjectural
variations. This can be illustrated by writing each firm's profits function as
where Qj is the output of all other firms except i. For firm i we would then
have the first-order condition
11 p Qihi - c (O U-5)
i
+ ^P. • ~ cLc = 0 (4.6)
where dQ/dqj represents the reaction of other firms to firm i's output
decisions, and this would of course depend on how the other firms are affected
60
by the input constraints.
Taking the situation 2) and supposing firm i's output is unconstrained while the
rest of the firms' total output is constrained, then dQ/dqi = 0 for reactions
involving output expansion. We would have a Cournot situation where there is
only one reaction function, corresponding to firm i , which would then
maximise its profits given the fixed outputs of its rivals. Industry price would
be affected according to dP/dqj. The picture regarding action and reaction gets
rather mixed when we have more than one firm with unconstrained output. But
we might expect that for different industries different situations might arise
according to how the constraints affect different firms and the number and size
distribution of the constrained and unconstrained firms, which will for example
influence dP/dqj.
The important point here is that both of the situations 2) and 3) are conducive
to more ready recognition of interdependence due to the effect dP/dQj and this
could well lead to collusive agreements. Both the collusive tendency and the
output constraints could then be taken into account to illustrate constrained
optimisation under collusion. Let each firm's output be subject to the constraint
that q-, > qs. Then, the profits function for the colluding firms would be
IT - R (l q.) - I c. (q.) + 6± ( q± - (4-7)
where R is the industry revenue, and d is the Lagrangean multiplier. From the
first-order condition we would have
R'(l qi) "J cT (qi) + <ii (4.8)
which would be the same as that for a constrained multiplant monopolist. If the
input constraint does not bind for all firms then dj = 0 and the outcome would
be the same as that for the usual collusion model. If the constraint is binding
for some but not all firms, we have collusion under situation 2) and if all firms
are constrained, we have collusion under 3). Collusion results in a smaller
output at a higher price for a larger total profit than independent behaviour eg.
under Cournot, where dQ/dq; = 0. (This point is illustrated in Henderson and
Quandt (1971) pp226, 228.)
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Given that firms are bound to learn from experience and can base their actions
on forecasts about the future, it is also possible that potential problems with
inputs (where this is based on past experience or an assessment of current and
future conditions) can also influence firms' behaviour in the manner suggested
here. Dealing with variables representing existing or potential input problems
would be an easy way of incorporating conjectural variations and therefore the
collusive tendencies associated with them in a profitability model.
2.COST CHANGES AND PRICING
The view that cost changes can influence pricing decisions can be easily
reconcilled with the mainstream SCP approaches. In order to do this, one need
only ask whether cost-plus pricing makes a difference to these models.
Assuming that marginal cost is constant over relevant ranges of output, the
method of percentage mark-up may be equivalent to profit maximization since
under profit maximisation P = MC/(1 + 1/ri) = AC/(1 + 1/rj) or (P-MC)/P =-1/r|.The
percentage margin over cost can be directly derived from this as
I1/(1 + 1/ri)-1]100.
As rj gets larger, the margin over cost will be closer to zero, which is again a
qualitatively similar result to that of profit maximisation. The assumption that
prices might respond to cost changes will therefore leave unaffected, the role
of price elasticity of demand in conventional SCP models as well as the
predictions of those models.
A number of remarks can now be made by way of concluding this section:
a) The use of production related variables is valid in the estimation of the
performance relationship provided appropriate considerations are made and
relevant distance in terms of their direct involvement in that equation is
maintained. Two rules are suggested;
i) if the production variables (such as those implied by input constraints) are
hypothesised to modify pricing behaviour (e.g. White, 1974) then they should be
accounted for directly in the performance equation.
ii) if the production variables are hypothesised to merely constrain output (and
they are not considered to significantly infuence pricing behaviour) they can
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only play an indirect role e.g. as a possible source of extra exogenous variables
in an incompletely specified simultaneous equations model (from an explicit or
implicit production function)(eg. Geroski, 1982).
b) Depending on what factors are thought to influence the 'plus', cost-plus
pricing behaviour does not necessarily lead to changes in SCP specifications. In
effect, factors which are thought to influence the 'plus' on cost (eg.
concentration) are usually included.
3.PRICE CONTROLS AND THE STRUCTURE-PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP
Price controls over manufacturers in one form or another is not as insignificant
as is often supposed even in the Western economies if one takes into account
the value of gross output of the industries concerned as a proportion of total
manufacturing output. The most significant way this manifests itself is in the
form of countervailing power where the public sector is the major buyer e.g. in
the armament industries and, for the U.K. the pharmaceuticals industries.
In the industrialised western economies price controls over manufacturers are
often ignored in economic analyses because they are confined to a very small
range of goods relative to the manufacturing sectors as a whole. In LDCs, with
lower incomes and higher degrees of income inequalities, more comprehensive
price controls are often considered necessary. This is because the industries
there have a tendency towards high levels of concentration. Sometimes,the
monopolistic market structures are sanctioned by the governments from the
need to induce foreign direct investment by giving guarantees of monopoly
status for limited periods of time. In some cases the firms concerned are
expected to agree to consultations with the authorities in their pricing
decisions especially price increases.
Accountability over pricing and the fear of intervention may actually force firms
to behave as they would in the case of threatened entry. Bain (1949 pp 449
n3) suggested that the analysis of threatened government interference could be
handled in the same manner as entry. The implication is that with such
intervention, high industrial concentration may not lead to much higher prices
over costs than in less concentrated industries if the concentrated industries
are the target of intervention. This seemingly straightforward prediction is
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made on the presumption that the government interference is constraining or
thought to be constraining. This is less straightforward to demonstrate. For
instance could the firms affected by intervention still maximise profits or
achieve levels of performance they would in the absence of that intervention?
In other words, is it possible to have non-constraining intervention as far as
the firms are concerned, inspite of what the authorities may believe? Hadar
(1971) analysed this question by setting it up as a nonlinear programing
problem. The procedure of his analysis is summarised in the Appendix to this
chapter.
It is assumed that there is a monopolist who in the absence of a price ceiling
would set his (profit maximising) price P* greater than the ceiling price, Po.
Secondly, an interior solution is also assumed so that both price and output
are positive. Under these conditions, there are only four possibilities:
1) excess demand and excess price ceiling;
2) zero excess demand with excess
price ceiling;
3) excess demand and zero excess price ceiling;
4) zero excess demand and zero excess price ceiling.
The situation of excess demand for the monopolist would be where he is
forced to adopt a price below where marginal cost equals average revenue ie.
below P2 in Fig. 4.1, in which case his 'prefered' output would be where price
equals marginal cost, which output would be less than the quantity demanded
at that price. Excess price ceiling is the situation where the ceiling price is
geater than the price charged by the monopolist, ie. Po > P while zero excess
price ceiling would be when the monopolist sets his price, P (not the profit
maximising price if the price ceiling is binding) equal to Po ie. P = Po. The
demand curve facing the monopolist would effectively be truncated at Po. For
example in Fig. 4.1 at P = P3, the demand curve would be P3AR and the
corresponding marginal revenue curve would be P3MR'.
Of these only 3) and 4) do not violate the prior assumptions which are
desirable for meaningful price controls (ie. an interior solution and P* > Po).
In the case 3), the monopolist sets price equal to marginal cost, making this
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correspond to the purely competitive firm. But the existence of excess demand
means that there is upward pressure on price which would involve by some
form of rationing. In the case 4) the monopolist sets price equal to the ceiling
price and the output chosen is equal to quantity demanded at the chosen price.
Case 4) includes the optimum solution that is where P* = Po and q* = q. where
the price controls may be described as just redundant. These two cases are
illustrated in Fig 4.1.
Since if the price controls are to be meaningful P* > Po then P* should be the
upper limit for Po. What Fig 4.1 indicates is that lower price ceilings (case 3)
can be achieved at the price of rationing while higher ceilings (case 4) face the
possibility of being non-binding (ie. where Po = P*). A significant point about
the two different cases is as Hader points out, that one cannot tell in advance
which of the two applies i.e. one with a solution that achieves the purely







Under the cost conditions indicated by the average variable cost curve AVC, in
Fig.4.2 ail solutions fall under case 4 with the lower bound set by shut-down
conditions (price too low eg. P2 ). A consequence of lower bounds such as P2
is the possibility that price controls can kill off the industry altogether.An
extension of the argument is that P2 is analogous to a limit price. In fact, given
that the conditions described by AVC are those that face a potential entrant
and given that the government desires the ceiling P2, that ceiling could well be
self enforced by the monopolist since it would also be entry limiting.
What emerges from the foregoing discussion is that normal profit maximisation
solution can still be achieved with price controls, but in very special
circumstances. In general, then, the intuitive prediction that price controls
lower the monopolist's profits must be accepted. The tendency towards
non-signficance of a concentration variable in the performance equation is to
be expected if the stringency of the price controls is positively related to the
degree of concentration. But there are two moderating factors against ceilings
that are too low. These are, the burdens of rationing in the case of excess
demand, and the fear of killing off the industry, where cost conditions relative
to price ceiling, are adverse.
Assuming that price controls are effective and that they are meant to counter
monopoly power, they might be expected to be related to the degree of
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concentration. We would then expect that in a price-cost margin equation the
effects of concentration would be weakened. In addition, the effects of the
controls in constraining pricing behaviour could also affect the influence of
other variables on pricing, depending on how extensive the controls are over
the manufacturing sector and how they are related the degree of concentration.
But to the extent that the stringency of the controls is directly related to the
degree of concentration and to the extent that other variables are independent
of both of the controls and concentration, then the influence of the other
variables would also be independent of the two.
In regression analysis, the significance of the concentration coefficient in a
structure-performance model could be taken as an indication of the empirical
validity of the concentration-profits relationship just as in any other situation
without price controls. But it is possible to argue that if conditions are such
that a significant concentration coefficient would be expected, then the
significance or non-significance of the coefficient could be taken as a test of
the effects of the price controls, given that the controls are related to
concentration in the manner suggested above. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 we
indicate that the conditions in Malawi would be ideal for a strong
concentration-profitability relationship.These are the monopolistic nature of
concentrated industries, and the absence of anti-monopoly legislation, which
would mean that for concentrated industries, pricing collusion would be easy.
4.AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF PERFORMANCE
The major point of focus in the estimation of Chapter7 will be the performance
equation. Going by theoretical models referred to in Chapter2, the number of
relevant variables is quite small, whether long-run or short-run profit
maximisation is assumed. The variables include a measure of concentration,
price elasticity of demand, and perhaps a measure of overall barriers to entry
and a conjectural variations term.
As far as empirical investigation is concerned , the problems of including only
'relevant' variables is compounded by those of measurement of those variables.
For instance, the price elasticity term could be replaced in an estimated model
by variables representing factors that affect that elasticity (Sawyer,!982). Bain
recognised these measurement problems so well that much of his 1951 paper
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on the concentration-profits relationship was taken up with controlling for
measurement and definitional problems, the most vexing of which was defining
what constitutes an 'industry' and then finding data to correspond to it.
In the model that is to be used on Malawian data the above problems have
been translated into the need to achieve some theoretical coherence and at the
same time making some concessions for measurement problems. The latter is
tackled by including some control variables. It may be noted in this context,
that Bain(1970) advised (against his earlier convictions) against controlling for
everything possible as this would make nonsense of the whole exercise of
empirical testing even of basic hypotheses such as the concentration-profits
one.
It is assumed here that firms are aware of potential entry and seek to influence
the dynamics of the structures of their industries. That is, it is assumed that
firms are concerned about the prospects of long-run profit maximisation. The
theoretical model would therefore correspond to that represented in equation
(2.6) in Chapter 2 or, in a dynamic context the models by Jacquemin and
Thisse(1972) and the Encaoua and Jacquemin(1980). In addition, factors that
may influence conjectural variations, which in turn can influence collussive
behaviour along the lines discussed earlier in this chapter, are also allowed for.
These are explained bellow.
Let the theoretical reiationship be derivable from a priori assumptions such as
those that lead to the Cowling and Waterson model with entry considerations




p* = Lerner index of monopoly power
CR* = concentration ratio
X* = conjectural variations term
rj* = price-elasticity of demand
B* = measure of overall height of
barriers to entry.
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The asteriks represent 'ideal' variables, measured according to accepted
definitions of those variables and corresponding to industries that also conform
to an accepted definition eg. as discussed by Bain(1951).
As indicated above, when it comes to implementation, ail these ideally
measured variables are untenable. It may therefore be appropriate to talk about
'blocks' or 'vectors' of measurable variables to represent the ideal ones.
As before let
M = price cost margins
CR = three firm concentration ratios
IMPS = import intensity
EXPS = export intensity
MES = minimum efficient scale
CDR = cost disadvantage at less than MES
AS - advertising intensity
G = growth of industry sales
KS = capital intensity
DV = index of diversification for firms in an industry
RMS = reliance on imported materials inputs
SKLL = skilled labour intensity
FIN = working capital ratio (ie.short-term
assets short-term liabilities)
The representative vectors of variables are as follows;
p = Cm}
cr = [cr3, imps, exps}
a = {rms, skll, fin}
n = {g}
b = {mes, cdr, as}
The control variables for M and cr are
-KS, controlling for capital intensity
-DV, controlling for enterprise
diversification, which affects
the measurement of concentration.
The 'empirical' model may therefore be given as
M = f[CR3, IMPS, EXPS; RMS, SKLL, FIN; G; MES, CDR, AS; KS, DV]
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The expected signs of the coefficients (discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3)
are given below the variables. As indicated above, KS and DV control for
measurent of M and CR respectively.
Ideally M should be measured as 'net return on sales' ie. after accounting for
return on capital (to cover depreciation, interest and a risk premium). KS is
supposed to account for differences in the usually available gross measure for
M, due to differences in capital intensity. But this is not the only interpretation.
For instance KS has been used as a capital requirements (barrier effect)
variable (House, 1973) largely because of data problems.
As was seen in the previous chapter, DV has been interpreted in terms
cross-subsidisation of predatory behaviour (eg.Berry,1975; Utton,1979). Berry
and Utton's argument is that firms associated with diversified enterprises could
have recourse to resources enabling them to survive prolonged periods of loss
making due to predatory strategies. Their independent competitors on the other
hand may not find it easy to raise such funds and may be competed out of
business as a result. Outside the context of dynamics (where firms can be
seen to be trying to influence their market structures by competing for
dominance) DV could account for the possibility that measured concentration
for industries defined in the data sources, are affected by imbalanced
diversification by firms among products with low cross-elasticity of demand.
This was discussed in the context of Bain's preoccupation with theoretical
definition of industry vs those permited by statistical sources.
As far as the sign of the coefficient for concentration is concerned, the
traditional view is the one that is said to be reinforced by the Saving and
Cowling and Waterson models. This is that higher concentration might be
expected to be associated with easier recognition of interdependence by firms
and greater effectiveness of collusion. This leads to a positive relationship
between CR and M. The analysis presented here dealt with the situation where
price controls are exercised in such a way that they may be considered to be
filling in the role of antitrust legislation. That is price controls are most likely
to be related to concentration and has an effect on pricing opposite in
direction to that of concentration. But the net effect is unlikely to be negative
but merely tend towards zero.
The implementation of price controls in the Malawian context is discussed in
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Chapters 5 and 7. What is important to bear in mind here is that although no
variables have been assigned the task of explicitly accounting for price
controls, their effects should be deducable from the empirical results, given the
relationship that is supposed to exist between the controls and the structural
variables. Explicit treatment of these controls in empirical models is left until
Chapter 8, when a measurable variable is devised and used in regression
analyses.
The second variable which might have an ambiguous sign is EXPS. Assuming
inability to practice international price discrimination, higher export dependence
makes it less important to recognise interdependence on the domestic market
(Caves, 1974). Lower profitability might therefore be expected in those
industries. Allowing for price discrimination could lead to opposite predictions
(Pagoulatos and Sorensen, 1981).
The expectation of a negative coefficient for Malawi derives from an argument
developed in the following chapters, that export activity is largely confined to a
few industries and that the firms are price-takers on the international market.
Since domestic sales are only a small proportion of the total sales of these
industries, international price discrimination is not an important consideration.
This leaves the argument that given higher price elasticity of demand on the
international market, higher export dependence will be associated with lower
price-cost margins.
Before embarking on the estimation of the model, conditions prevailing in the





A BACKGROUND TO MALAWIAN MANUFACTURING
INTRODUCTION
According to Mason, reviewed in Chapter 1, virtually anything that could be
expected to influence firms' behaviour can be regarded as an element of the
firms' market structures. This chapter discusses factual evidence with respect
to a few important structural elements in the Malawian manufacturing sector.
These include government regulation on pricing and entry of new competitors,
the level of existing and potential competition, the characteristics of product
differentiation, and the potential constraints on levels of production. But before
embarking on this task, a general economic background of the Malawian
economy is presented in the following section.
MALAWI: A GENERAL ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Malawi is a landlocked country with a population of about 6 million people in
1983, about 90% of whom are rural-based. The economy is primarily
agricultural, with a large subsistence sector, accounting for a quarter of GDP.
Having no mineral wealth in commercial quantities has contributed to making
Malawi have a per capita income of only about 200 US dollars in 1979.
Despite these features the country has achieved remarkable performance during
the 1970s, based on an agriculture- oriented development strategy. GDP grew
at an average rate of over 6 per cent per annum between 1964 and 1970 in
real terms, while fixed investment grew from 16 to 23 per cent of GDP and
domestic savings from 4 to 12 per cent. Exports (90 per cent of which are
agricultural) rose at an average annual rate of 9.5 per cent. In fact much of the
economy's performance is said to have derived from the relatively favourable
position of the exports, whose value in absolute terms almost doubled between
1964 and 1970, from MK 23.0 million to MK 40.6 million.1
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The manufacturing sector had a share of just 12 per cent in GDP in 1980. The
sector also enjoyed high growth rates of 6.5 per cent between 1970 and 1979.
As a policy overview for the industrial sector consider the following
assessment from a recent World Bank report;
'The approach to industry has been far from laissez-faire -
the Government has provided protection for infant industries and
has actively promoted industry through parastatal investment -
but strict limits have been set on industrial promotion. There is a
moderate tariff, which ranges from 7.5 to 40 per cent-
quantitative restrictions have not been used to restrict imports
nor to protect industry, and the exchange rate has been kept at a
level that not only encourages exports growth but also maintains
external balance."(IBRD, 1981, p92)
Between 1968 and 1977 total industrial value added grew at a faster rate than
agriculture (6.5% vs 4.5%) and this has been attributed to the policies listed
above, as well as the kind of industries that have developed and a wage policy
that has held down urban wages. One result of this has been growth of
manufacturing employment at a rate of 6.5% per cent per annum between 1968
and 1977, which few African countries suppased (IBRD, 1981, p92).
Despite these earlier successes, however, by 1979 things had begun to sour as
a result of a host of factors including export and import prices, disruptions in
the transportation route to the sea as well as bad policies and poor
management. GDP registered a barely positive rate of 0.2 per cent between
1979 and 1980, while many sectors actually had negative growth. Although the
manufacturing sector still enjoyed a healthy rate of growth of 3.9 per cent
during that period, the general economic picture was considered to be bad
enough to warrant major policy overhauling.
The new policies were drawn up for an 'international conference of partners in
economic development' in a two-volume document of the same title. The
conference was held in 1984 under the auspicies of the United Nations
Development Programme. The main thrust of the policy changes affecting
manufacturing, concerned the removal of "rigidities in the system of
administered prices, wages and salaries." (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning Division, 1983, p21)
Price liberalisation for manufactures was first announced in 1983 with a list of
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products which would be immediately affected. The above documents indicated
that the process of liberalisation would be gradually extended to other
products.
Other reforms affecting the manufacturing sector involved the activities of the
Malawi Development Corporation (MDC) and Press Holding Ltd. which between
them had extensive interests in the manufacturing sector. The former is a
parastatal charged with fostering industrial development by providing finance
through equity participation or through the provision of loans for industrial
projects. Press Holdings Ltd. is a private holding company which began as
Malawi Press in 1960 to publish Malawi News as a publicity instrument of the
Malawi Congress Party (UNIDO, 1981, p36). By the early 1980s Press had 17
subsidiaries and 30 associate companies in many sectors. Considering its
origins it is not surprising that it developed interests almost rivalling those of
MDC.
The new measures directed at these two were basically that both should keep
a lower profile and limit their activities to viable ventures and for the Press
group, this meant some major restructuring of its assets.
SOME PERFORMANCE INDICATORS: IMPORT SUBSTITUTION AND EXPORT
PERFORMANCE
It has been suggested that one major motivation for investment in LDCs
appears to be the threat to former exporters to the LDCs if their competitors
set up local production capacity (Rweyemamu, 1979 p3). Many LDCs are
thought to have used protectionist import tariffs as a barrier against imports,
to act as an incentive for the former exporters to establish local capacity or
risk the loss of that market.
The implications are that if the policies are effective they should be followed
by a rapid rate of industrialisation based on import substitution. As far as such
economies are concerned rapid import substitution would be a desirable
dimension of performance. The other effect is that the absolute volume of the
corresponding imports would be reduced because of the price effects of the
tariffs even if domestic production fails to fill in the gap. This effect on
imports denies local producers the pricing and efficiency descipline that would
otherwise be imposed by import competition. Without good data on changes
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in tariff structures, it is difficult to investigate their effects on imports.2 It was
however not too difficult to get data that indicates trends in import
substitution.
The method of analysis is derived from Chenery's (1960) model of growth of
manufacturing industries and caters for the analysis of export performance.3
Basically the model says that although industrial output can grow from changes
in the composition of demand as income rises, changes in supply factors can
lead to growth based on import substitution which is itself based on improved
comparative advantage.
According to the figures in Table 5.1 the growth of many of Malawi's industries
between 1964 and 1975 was mainly due to the growth of domestic demand
and import substitution. One group of exceptions (grain, tea and tobacco) are
Malawi's traditional export industries which owed a substantial proportion of
their growth to exports. Noteworthy in Table 5.1 is the fact that apart from
these industries, export activity in the rest of the manufacturing sector is
minor. It may therefore be quite sensible to assume as we do in Chapter 7, that
the levels of export activity may not be particularly responsive to competition
or profitability in the domestic market. Import substitution has been significant
in textiles, clothing and footwear and metal products which are nearly all the
industries whose shares bear some close resemblance to Nigeria's for the
earlier period.
The industry groups that show negative contribution of import substitution are
among the long established ones. This could therefore mean greater
proportions of imports than before. In this context, it is necessary to
remember that the calculations have been based on two years rather than
averages over a number of years, and can therefore be affected by the
peculiarities of those years. This is especially true for the structural clay
industry group which is dominated by the cement industry whose production
experienced disruptions around 1975.
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Table 5.1
Percentage Contribution of Three
Sources of Growth in
Manufacturing by Industry Group 1964-1975
hr







Grain millg. 75.4 31.1 -6.5
Bakery prods. 100.0 0.0 0.0
Tea 60.8 42.0 -2.8
Meat,dairy,fish
sugar,beverages 26.7 12.0 61.3
Tobacco 55.6 64.3 19.9
Textiles 12.7( 4.5) 0.3 ( 0.0) 87.0(95.5)
Clothing
& footwear 44.5 (1.3) 6.9 ( 0.0) 48.6(99.0)
Sawmill prods.
& furniture 103.2(77.3) 0.9 ( 5.8) -9.1(16.9)
Paper &
printg.s pub. 108.2( 0.1) 0.3 ( 0.0) -8.5(99.9)
Chemical &
allied prods. 77.7(63.5) 0.5( 0.0) 21.8(36.5)
Structural clay
cement etc. 175.2( 9.0) 0.0( 0.0) -75.2(91.0)
Metal prods. 34.5( 8.4) 1.8 ( 0.1) 63.7(91.5)
Notes. The equation for the calculations (from
Chenery, 1960 ) is DP=DPo.Zl DD + DPo.&ED +[DP, - DPojTS,
TSo TSo jjTS, TSoJ
G
Where DP is domestic production; TS is total supply;
DD is domestic demand; ED is export demand and
DP i - DEy TS, is import substitut ion.The subscripts 0 and 1 stand
TS, TSa)
for base and terminal years respectively.
b)The figures for Nigeria are for the 1957-1967 period.
Sources;Malawi figures calculated from AES and ASET(see
Chapter6).Nigerian figures are from (Oyejide, 1975).
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ELEMENTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
1) THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
a) Price Controls
Between the late 1960s and late 1983 when price liberalisation was announced,
domestic manufactures in Malawi were subject to a system of price controls.
An important question to ask is what prices were affected and to what extent
they were subjected to these controls. Also, were the controls in such a way
as to neutralise some commercial considerations in pricing decisions? In other
words can the usually assumed structure-performance relationships be still
observable?
The Malawian price control legislation is contained in the Control of Goods Act,
1968, Ch. 18.08. It was established as a limited price control system with
maximum retail prices prescribed for eight essential consumer goods. These
were sugar, meat, matches, petrol, medicines, hoes, milk and infant foods and
bottled beer. Cement and fertilizers were later added to the list. As a means
of monitoring the performance of the industrial sector an informal control
system evolved to cover most of the other local manufactures. Prices for
these were simply recommended by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and
although not legally binding were generally observed.
All these prices whether prescribed or recommended were subject to a review
process (in the case of proposed price increases) which took into account
changes in costs. The prices were set at a cost plus 12 to 18 percent with the
lower mark-up for those industries deemed to be enjoying relatively secure
markets (Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning Division, 1983).
To approach the problem of the implications of Malawian price controls on the
structure-performance relationship, a number of assumptions are made. These
are that costs are an important consideration in pricing regardless of the type
of industrial structure. For instance, even if the industry is characterised by
price leadership, the relevant costs can be those of the price leader, who may
be both output and technologically dominant (Reid, 1979). Next assume that
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price revisions are generally infrequent even in the absence of controls.
With these, the fact that the price controls were carried out through infrequent
review processes which took costs into consideration, makes it possible that
the control system was simply fulfilling a normal pricing role as if it was
internal to the industries. That is normal pricing behaviour was indifferent to
price controls or, what amounts to the same thing, that price controls had a
neutral effect on prices. This raises the chance that the usually predicted
structure-performance relationships might still hold inspite of the controls
since, as suggested in Chapter 4, cost considerations in pricing need not affect
the predictions.
Under the criterion for Malawian price controls the industries that can be
thought to have 'secure markets' would most likely be those having little
domestic competition and strong demand, resulting in good prospects for profit
rates. The institution of price controls implies that profitability (actual or
potential) would be the basis for judging performance. Here we shall take this
to be represented by price-cost margins. Going by the evidence of actual
performance (see Appendix), and excluding the export industries, the most
secure industries would be those which experience high average price-cost
margins. In addition, security of market would imply the low variability of the
price-cost margins, in which case we would have industries such as food
(including beverages) and textiles being described as having secure markets.
These also tend to have the highest concentration ratios and together they
account for much parastatal involvement and granted monopoly status.
Significantly they also accounted for nearly all formally controlled prices. At the
same time comparing their high average price-cost margins with those of
other industries one wonders whether the controls could have narrowed the
performance range, if this were a desirable goal. On the other hand the poorer
performance of industries without formal controls implies that the maximum
recommended prices for them were probably redundant.
Moderate price-cost margins and their low variability are observed in the
competitive industries such as bakery products and furniture. The moderate
profitability represents the influence of competition while that competition may
be a result of entry in response to the lower risk in those industries plus lower
barriers since they are characterised by sizeable fringes.
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This discussion suggests that SCP relationships can still be observed inspite of
price controls, because the control system allows for them implicitly or
because demand factors nullify the effect of the controls. But in general, the
existence of the controls is likely to add to Bain's (1951) and Weiss' (1974) lists
of factors that bias the concentration-profits relationship towards zero.
b) Institutional Barriers to Entry
If potential entrants were free to respond to economic stimuli whenever they
liked then the usual economic barriers to entry could be relied upon to regulate
actual entry. But for some reasons governments may excercise the ultimate
control over entry. Typically this is done through licencing of manufacturing
activities. This is viewed as a way a government can keep track of and exert
influence over the pattern of industrialisation.
Malawi manufacturing licences are required for all establishments employing
ten or more persons or using power of twenty-five horsepower or more. The
general working rule is said to be that all licence applications are granted
unless there are good reasons for not doing so. The possible reasons for
refusal have been given as follows:-
"a) if the capital, technical skill or raw materials are, in the
opinion of the Minister, inadequate to secure the successful
establishment and operation of the particular enterprise in which
the applicant proposes to engage; and if the failure of the
applicant's enterprise would likely prejudice the successful
development of the industry concerned.
b) if the place at which the applicant proposes to establish
a manufacturing establishment is not a suitable situation for the
industry concerned;
c) if the granting of such a licence would not, in the opinion
of the Minister, be in the best interest of the economy or public
weal of Malawi or of the particular industry concerned". (Ministry
of Trade, Industry and Tourism, I973 pp5-6)
In short the rule seeks to protect not only the industry concerned but also the
potential entrants where they may possess over-optimistic impressions about
conditions in their chosen industries. The latter is an informative role which
the government fulfils by keeping abreast with developments in the industries
through the process of price controls and the rules of entry , both of which
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require firms to supply information about themselves and about their industries.
The entry process involves rules set out under the industrial Development Act
(1966). These require the prospective entrant to publish some of the
information that is required in the licence application namely the exact nature
of the product(s), location and proposed trade name. Existing firms which feel
threatened by new entry in a way they consider to be unreasonable, are then
invited to make representations against the new licence applications.
In exceptional circumstances the government has granted monopolies for a
period of up to five years in the first instance, and reviewed after that period.
According to the Malawi Economic Planning Division (1971) its use "is reserved
as an additional incentive for major enterprises, whose initial investment is
large in relation to the existing size of the market". Again the granting of a
monopoly could be seen as playing an informative role to potential competitors
about the possibility or the current existence of excess capacity.
The question that remains is whether evidence can be gathered to show or at
least hint that government licencing is frequently more than merely informative.
That is have institutional barriers been set up when economic conditions say
otherwise? In other words are there instances where licencing can be said to
be simply protecting established firms?
In attempting to answer these questions an examination was made of some
recent quarterly reports by the Ministry of Trade and Industry on licencing.
The information examined was for the period 1978 to 1981 and included a
number of licence applications that were rejected. These were the ones that
were scrutinised. During that period, a total of 78 applications were approved
while only 9 were rejected. The reasons for rejection of two of them (meat
processing) and (wooden musical instruments) was inadequate raw materials.
The latter could have meant the establishment of an industry that would have
been completely new to the country. The former industry has a giant
parastatal. Cold Storage Commission of Malawi, with a large number of small
competing firms which confine their business to basic meat products. As for
the remaining 7 rejections it is possible to speculate about the possible
reasons.
The only rejection in 1980 involved products across seven 4-—digit SIC
industries ranging from SIC 3560 (PVC products) to 3829 (metal products).
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Since it involved foreign funding a likely reason for the rejection must be the
existence of many other producers of the same products in the location
chosen, Blantyre. The rest of the rejections were made in 1981 and involved
blanket manufacturing, bakery products, furniture manufacturing, paints, and
nuts and bolts. The rejections for bakery products and furniture were almost
certainly related to the localised nature of the industries and the fact that the
chosen location (Lilongwe) was considered to be adequately served. The paint,
blanket and metal products industries, all of which are well established might
also be considered to be adequately served. A 1967 survey of capacity
utilisation by the National Statistical Office suggested that these industries
were among those experiencing much excess capacity. But for all we know,
rather than arising from demand deficiency, the excess capacity could have
been through deliberate investment in fixed assets for reasons of pre-empting
a growing market and exclusion of potential rivals.
Rejections of licence applications have been very few relative to total
applications and there seems to be some ready economic reasons for the
rejections. It could therefore be said that entry is not unduly subject to high
institutional barriers which are unwarranted by economic conditions. The
following quotation of a letter to the Malawi Daily Times 6 January, 1984,
serves as an interesting statement about one existing firms' view of the "open
door" policy:
"We refer to the article on page 3 of the 'Daily Times" on
February 1 headed 'Hand Knitting Yarn to be made in Malawi.
We wish to point out that this company has held an
industrial licence No 21/82 since August 1982 and we have the
equipment already in Malawi to manufacture knitting yam locally,
and this yarn is now being marketed under the name of 'Kalulu'.
We have spent a considerable amount of money through the
medium of your newspaper promoting this product.
At the moment our machine is standing idle due to lack of
raw materials, and we have objected to Consolidated Textiles
(Malawi) Limited's application as we have the capacity to satisfy
the Malawi market and also a surplus for export.
It, therefore, seems a waste of foreign exchange to us to
allow another manufacturer to come into the market when we
are being frustrated through lack of materials."
Excess capacity, in this case due to lack of imported raw materials, seems to
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be a major theme of the letter. It suggests that installed excess capacity might
be used as an entry deterrent by refering to its existence when representations
are made against new licence applicants. In the above example installed
capacity- whether or not it reflected the minimum efficient scale - was larger
than the domestic market. But this example and the small number of rejections
of licence applications examined earlier indicate that representations are not
usually successful. This does not mean that they cannot be used as a means of
gaining time for other strategies.
A likely consequence of failure to influence rejection of a licence application
could be that existing firms resort to economic strategies such as advertising
as in the above example, or some pricing strategies.
These can be reasonable courses of action especially since the granting of a
licence (or failure to prevent it ) does not necessarily lead to immediate entry.
In fact entry could be deferred indefinitely and the licencing lists contain many
such cases. There would therefore be little reason for existing firms not
adopting appropriate strategies if they can. Economic strategies are therefore
still a possible avenue for exploitation despite the granting of a licence.
In general what can be said is that the Malawi entry regulations act as an early
warning system for existing firms about intended entry and they could start
implementing appropriate strategies. It can also be said that where economic
conditions are ideal for entry, the onus of entry deterence lies with the
incumbent firms. Conventional strategies would be used where entry is
'effectively impeded' in the Bain terminology, that is where barriers are not high
enough for entry to be 'blockaded' nor too low for any strategy to be
ineffective.
2) EXISTING AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION
a) The number of firms and fringe competition
The numbers of firms in different 4—digit SIC industries in Malawi (Table 5.2)
strongly suggest that most industries are highly concentrated. In fact the
numbers are often so small as to make collusive pricing arrangements seem
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easy to arrange and maintain, given the absense of anti-monopoly legislation.
There is even a high proportion of monopolistic industries which might be
characterised by monopolistic pricing. Assuming that the number of large firms
in the industries represents trends of both concentration and the tightness of
collusive arrangements, then we might expect the concentration-profits
relationship to be strong. But this will of course be conditional on whether or
not price controls effectively hinder the achievement of higher prices and
whether or not the stringency of the application of the controls is related to
the degree of concentration.
In LDCs at a low level of industrialisation, observed oligopolistic structures at
any point in time are more likely to be a transitory stage towards greater
competition from monopoly than in industrialised countries. This is because
LDCs have relatively large proportions of newly establishing industries. The
tendency towards oligopoly is therefore not unidirectional and in a dynamic
context knowing the direction helps to indicate either increasing or decreasing
concentration, which means that conduct is being modified accordingly. Also,
in a situation where government intervention is more likely for one direction of
change as opposed to the other, the direction can indicate the existing or
potential government position. For instance the constant number of firms in
certain industries such as the beverages industry is due to monopolies granted.
On the other hand the declining numbers in grain milling is due to the
government's sanctioning of a near monopoly in an old and previously highly
atomistic industry.
While Table 5.2 gives us a fairly good picture about the relative representation
of numbers of firms in different industries, the fact that the numbers relate
only to the larger firms means that the picture is not a complete one. Table 5.3
indicates that for some industrial groups, particularly 'wood products and
furniture', 'clothing' and 'metal products', competition from small firms is likely
to be intense. Except for 'metal products', these industries are characterised by
low average minimum efficient scales relative to market sizes, and low skill
requirement. These two characteristics would explain the existence of small
producers in the industries concerned.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 in conjuction would lead us to the observation that while the
number of large firms (Table 5.2) tend to be small. Table 5.3 indicates that
generally they tend to contribute large proportions of industrial output in most
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Table 5.2
Structure of Malawian Manu.lnds.
Number of Firms
Year(19')
SIC. Products 67' 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
3111 Meat prods. 1 1 ]_ 1 1 1 1 1 1
3112 Dairy 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - -
3113 Fruit 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3116 Grain millg. prods. 6 5 6 6 5 7 3 2 2
3117 Bakery prods. 6 6 6 9 9 9 9 8 8
3118 Sugar 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1
3121 Tea 21 21 21 18 18 18 18 19 19
3131 Potable spirits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3133 Malt liquors - 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3134 Soft drinks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3140 Tobacco 7 7 7 8 8 8 7 6 5
3211 Ginning,spinning etc. 6 6 6 6 8 4 4 2 2
3212 Blankets - - - - - 2 3 2 2
3213 Knitting prods. - - - - . - 3 3 2 2
3215 Rope & netting 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
3220 Clothing 11 12 13 11 14 16 14 14 15
3233 Leather - - 1 1 1 1 1
3240 Footwear 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
3311 Sawmill 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
3320 Furniture 6 6 6 6 8 6 9 3 3
3312
3419 Paper - - - - - 3 3 3 3
3420 Printing s, pub. 10 11 10 12 12 9 9 5 5
3512 Fertilizers - - - 1 1 1 1 2 2
3521 Paints & varnishes 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3522 Drugs & medicines - - - - - 1 1 1 1
3523 Soaps,polishes etc. 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3
3529 Other chem. prods. 3 - - - - 1 - - -
3529 Match - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3551 Tyre retreading 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3560 Rubber & plastic - - - 1 2 1 1 3 3
3691 Bricks & structrl clay 3 3 3 4 7 5 1 2 2
3692 Cement 1 1 1 1 1 1Jm 1 1 1
.
3699 Concrete prods. 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 2
3812 Furniture(metal) - - - - - 1 1 1 1
3813 Metal(structural) 5 9 9 9 9 4 2 1 1
3819 Metal(other non-machine ) ~ - - - - 3 4 4 4
3822 Farm implements 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3824 Industrial products - - - - - 2 - - -
3829 Other machinery - - - 2 2 1 2 2 2
3832 Radio assembly 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3843 Motor vehicle ass. — 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total 110 117 1 20 127 134 139 130 115 115
Note . Large firms are those that qualify for the





Relative Importance of Small Firms
(by Number and Share of Employment)
cU
All Firms Large Small
(Census) & self emplyd
No. No. % No. %
l.Food & tobacco 36,600 17,900 (49) 18,700 (51)
2.Textiies,clothg.,
footwear 19,200 5,500 (29) 13,700 (71)
3.Wood prods.
& furniture 14,700 1,500 (10) 13,200 (90)
4.Paper & paper prods.
S.Printg. & Pub. 1,300 1,000 (77) 300 (23)
6.Chemicals etc. incl.
Plastic prods. 1, 700 1,500 (88) 200 (12)
7.Non-metallic min.
prods. 4, 300 1,900 (44) 2,400 (56)
8.Fabricated metal prods.
machinery & equip. 4, 400 1,800 (41) 2,600 (59)
9 .Other^ 200 200 (100 )
J
Total 82,400 31,300 (38) —'51,100 (62)
Notes.a) Employing 20 or more people
b) Residual estimate
c) Adjusted to exclude 'mining and quarrying1
d) Quarterly Employment Enquiry (Old Series)= 31,400
ie. for larger firms only.
Source:Kaluwa(1984)
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of the industries. This plus the fact that small producers in Malawi tend to be
really small, makes it highly probable that the dominant firms/competitive
fringe type of market structure is common among Malawian industries.
Consider the following.
In LDC manufacturing, enterprises are generally categorised as follows:
1) Large scale enterprises which use modern technology and are
usually located in urban areas where there are agglomeration
economies (due to highly developed infrastructure, services,
existence of pools of labour whether skilled or unskilled,
and so on);
2) Modern small-to medium-scale enterprises which use intermediate
levels of technology and are located mainly in urban areas;
3) Small enterprises and artisan workshops which use traditional
or slightly more sophisticated technologies, and which are
located in both rural and urban areas.
The third category is often comprised of household-based producers where
production is labour-intensive and relies on local raw materials. This is the
category that is often termed the 'informal sector' because of the lower levels
of organisational requirements. This sector usually dominates the whole
manufacturing sector at lower levels of economic development, both in terms
of total number of production units and the total number of people engaged.
But because of the sector's low levels of labour productivity it is still
dominated by the larger enterprises in terms of their relative contribution to
total manufacturing value added. For example, in a comparison of 12 countries
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Allal and Chuta (1982) reported employment
contribution of the informal sector as ranging between 50 to 98% while its
share in manufacturing value added only ranged from 6 to 59%. With economic
development there is a general shift in emphasis of size, from the small scale
to larger and larger scale production.
In the case of Malawi the second category has been almost non-existent until
recently when efforts have been made to more actively encourage its
development. For example, estimates of GDP by scale of production by the NSO
in National Accounts Report 1973-1978, indicate that while large scale
producers contributed 69% of total manufacturing output on average between
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1975 and 1978, medium scale producers (corresponding to category 2)) only
contributed 4% and the ones corresponding to category 3) contributed 27%.
This suggests that there are large size disparities between large firms and the
small producers, which are bound to affect their behaviour towards each other
or their reactions to each others' actions. In fact the typical size of a small
producer in Malawi is said to be one employing less than three persons, and in
the majority of cases these can hardly even warrant the term 'firm'. The
following quotation (brackets added) suggests that the pattern of
interdependence might be characterised by price leadership relationships
whereby the larger firm(s) lead and the informal sector producers follow with
lower prices (suggestive of high cross-elasticities of demand);
"Competition is acute for SSEs (small scale enterprises) who
are the losers in their struggle with the larger enterprises. 60%
of the interviewed SSEs sell at prices lower than their larger
competitors, cutting profit margins to a minimum."(IBRD, Sept.,
1978)
b) Geographical Dispersion of Firms
Measuring industrial concentration by reference to national figures can grossly
understate the true concentration if an industry is characterised by markets
that are dispersed and served by localised firms.
Figures presented in the appendix show that Malawian industrial location for
the most part follows the urban hierarchy with by far the largest number of
firms located in Blantyre, the primate city. Many of these firms do not have
competitors located or locating anywhere else, implying that their markets are
national as opposed to regional. According to the geographical distribution of
firms, it should suffice to analyse the issue of geographical markets in terms of
relative location of firms among Blantyre, Lilongwe and Thyolo/ Mulanje
because they represent the largest concentrations.
Thyolo/Mulanje provides location mainly for supply-based industries particularly
tea, which accounts for the majority of firms there. Virtually all of these firms
represent vertical integration by the tea growers and most of the industry's
output is for the export market. Although the latter can also be said to distort
the representativeness of concentration ratios, it does so in a way that is not
of concern here. It can and is explicitly taken care of in the estimated models.
This leaves Lilongwe as a possible source of distortion for concentration
figures. But about fifty percent of the few firms with licences for Lilongwe are
branches of firms already established in Blantyre thereby reducing further the
danger of distortion. The industries that might still present a problem are
tobacco, clothing and furniture. The first involves export processing while in
the second, production is for the national market. Some distortion is likely to
occur in the furniture industry but it may be reduced by the fact that one large
producer, Press Furniture sells in both cities thereby neutralising some of the
effects of the localised market.
Overall, the foregoing analysis suggests that the geographic size of markets is
not likely to be an important structural element in the analysis of Malawian
manufacturing. But doubtlessly its effects will be present in a few industries
though to a much smaller extent than would have been suggested by the
shape of the country, which hints at geographically spread markets.
c) Entry and Entry Lags
In Malawi, for the whole manufacturing sector, effective net entry is negligible.
In view of the relatively large number of new licences granted, this deficiency
of effective entry might be explained in terms of entry lags.
Entry lags among the larger firms can be used as a barometer for those
applying to the whole industry. A method was devised to obtain rough
estimates of the average lengths of these lags in different industries. It
involved matching the dates when a manufacturing licence was first granted
and the date when a return was first completed for National Statistical Office's
Annual Economic Survey which is indicative of earliest "operational" status. In
the cases where licences were first granted before 1967 only "greater than"
estimates could be made because no licencing information was available for
earlier dates. These figures are shown in the Appendix. Instances of
immediate entry (which are few) are associated with already established
enterprises that is entry by diversification. In most cases entry lags averaging
three or more years are common.
There is probably no easy answer as to the reason for the lags and different
reasons may apply to different industries. It is possible that among the reasons
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would be the deliberate strategies of existing firms to frustrate effective new
entry. Some of these strategies will be analysed in Chapter 8, and include
product quality improvements, and product promotion. From what we have
seen, deliberate investment in excess capacity also seems to be a possible
reason.
d) Takeovers, Mergers and Exit
In Malawi exit that completely withdraws production capacity is very rare.
What happens in most cases is that companies that are in the process of
winding up are bought out or are offered a lifeline in the form mergers or
equity participation. The industry that has been active in terms of takeovers
and mergers is the clothing industry.
Takeover, merger and exit are as likely to occur in concentrated as in
unconcentrated industries. The motive of takeovers and mergers seems to be
diversification and the desire to invest in activities where capital assets already
exist.
The Press group, whose activities we have discussed above, has been quite
active in mergers and take-overs Recently, these activities have taken their toll
and threatened the conglomerates' very existence after finding itself
over-investing and over-borrowing. Moves since 1984 to sell off some of the
ventures are a direct result of this.
3) LEVELS OF ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
The level of advertising has been seen both as a source of barriers to entry as
well as a symptom of the differentiability of a product. The former influences
the structure of a market while the latter describes it. The aim here is to try
to find out the characteristic of the industries with high advertising levels. The
advertising figures that were available are those for radio advertising, which are
by detailed product.
These data were obtained from the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation which is
the national radio station and the only one. The data consist of percentages of
the Corporation's advertising revenues attributed to clients and broken down by
89
product. It was however only possible to obtain data covering the first
quarters 1977 to the first quarter 1982, excluding the second quarter 1980 and
the first and second quarters 1981.
In analysing these data and drawing inferences from them about general
advertising behaviour, there are two main underlying assumptions. The first is
that radio advertising is used by all industries that have heavily differentiated
products and are also heavy advertisers generally. The second is that the
intensity of radio advertising reflects the intensity of all other product
promotional activities. These are not unreasonable assumptions for a country
where radio is the most important and probably the most effective - mass
medium.
The questions for which answers are being sought are what industries have
heavily advertised products and whether the implied product differentiation
involves locally produced products.
Table 5.4 presents an analysis of the data. Column 2 indicates the number of
radio advertising clients for each type of product, according to whether the
clients were local manufacturers themselves. That is it indicates the extent to
which local manufacturers handle their own advertising. Column 3 indicates the
number of radio advertising clients other than the local manufacturers. That is
these are either foreign manufacturers representing their own products, or
'middlemen' representing either foreign manufacturers or the local ones. This
column gives a rough indication of industries in which we might expect foreign
competition which is characterised by intensive sales promotion. The obvious
exceptions are the industries which do not register anything under this column
, namely soft drinks, textiles, knitwear, clothing, furniture, and metal products.
On the other hand advertising for foreign products may be expected to be
heavy among dairy products, tobacco, insecticides, medicines, soaps, and tyres.
The rest of the table to the right of column 4 shows the extent to which the
SIC industries are represented by the largest advertising clients ranked by size
of expenditure. For instance,, the largest advertising agent (Column 5)
represented products in 6 SIC categories; dairy, edible oils, beer, insecticides,
medicines and soaps. Among the six largest advertisers, the smallest two were
local manufacturers, representing their own specialised products. As a group,
these largest six advertisers accounted for 60% of the radio station's total
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Table 5.4
An Analysis of Radio Advertising
Number & Nature of Representation of Products
Radio among the
Advert ising Clients Top Six Advertisers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Local Other Tot. I II III IV
SIC Products manu
3112 Dairy - 3 3 ■k
3115 Edible oils - 2 2 *
3121 Tea 1 1 2
3131 Spirits - 1 1 *
3133 Beer 2 1 3 *
3134 Soft drinks 1 - 1
3140 Tobacco 1 3 4 ★
3211 Textiles 1 - 1
3213 Knitwear 1 - 1
3220 Clothing 3 - 3
3240 Footwear 2 2 4 *
3320 Furniture 3 - 3
3512 Insectcide 1 6 7 * ★
3521 Paints - 1 1
3522 Medicines 1 9 10 * * *
3523 Soaps etc. 3 8 11 * ★ * ★
3529 Match - 3 3 *
3551 Tyres 3 3
3819 Metal prods. 1 - 1
3824 Industrial prods . 1 2 3
3839 Bat teries 2 7 9 * *





Totals 25 54 79 6 4
Notes:The top radio advertising clients are ranked from I to VI
according to advertising expenditures. The names of the
top advertisers are;
I) Lintas Ad.Ltd.;II) International Ad.Ltd.;III) Graphic Ad. Ltd.
IV) Marketing Services; V) Union Carbide VI) Southern Bottlers
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revenue from advertising in the relevant period.
The most differentiated industries (according to their representation among the
top six advertisers) are toiletries (SIC 3523), pharmaceuticals (3522), batteries
(3839) and pesticides (3512). It is not entirely unexpected that the first two
have been among the most dynamic in recent years in terms of entry or
potential entry according to licencing information. All four industries are
characterised by numerous brands of products and heavy import presence.
Both these observations tend to be supported by figures of Column 3 and their
representation among the top advertisers. What can be inferred from this is
that product differentiation might be closely related to import competition.
This could mean that some industries which are competitive locally are also
subject to international competition as a further moderating influence on
pricing. Another important observation relates to the high incidence of
diversification involving three of these industries SICs 3512, 3522, 3523, with
the addition of 3529. This is likely to be a result of a common base in the
processes and material inputs so that the diversification arises out of the
possibilities of joint production.
Among the wholly local industries with a prominent advertising presence are
soft drinks and beers (3131 and 3133), clothing (3220), shoes (3240) and
furniture (3320). Except for SIC 3240, large firms in these industries face
considerable domestic competition and their industries involve sizeable fringes
producing differentiated but competing products.
The other remaining prominant advertisers, milk powders (3112), cigarettes




Following Spence (1977) Cowling (1982) has made further considerations about
the possible uses of excess capacity as an entry detering strategy. In the
Spence sense existing firms could deliberately invest in excess capacity to
meet future needs. For instance with threatened entry where existing firms
have excess capacity, the latter could simply increase their output and thereby
force prices down. Cowling has argued that excess capacity can be and often
is a fact of life and may be unrelated to strategy. But its very existence could
still facilitate entry deterence. In Malawi, the problem of relative 'visibility'
between deterence based on pricing compared to that based on excess
capacity is resolved by the fact that existing firms could just inform the
government and the latter would inform prospective entrants.
In a survey on excess capacity involving 40 firms in neighbouring Tanzania,
Wangwe (1979) found that 58% of the firms did not use more than 70% of
optimal levels of capacity utilisation, and all firms did not use more than 90%.
Supply factors particularly shortage of raw materials emerged as more
dominant factors than demand factors.
Though the Malawian figures on capacity utilisation are now dated, they can
still be of some use. Actual output as a percentage of potential output (when
machines are worked at 100% capacity) was about 80%. Actual output was
estimated to be 90% of what would have been achieved without problems with
availability of skilled labour. Unfortunately, apart from implying that skilled
labour could have contributed to the underutiiisation of machinery, these
figures do not tell us anything about the factors which give rise to excess
capacity and yet this may be an important aspect in the influence excess
capacity might have on pricing behaviour. From the discussion of Chapter 4
one could argue that whether excess capacity results from demand deficiency
or whether it results from shortages of inputs makes a lot of difference. In the
former case it would mean that firms have less power over raising of pricing,
since they could do so at the cost of increased excess capacity. In this case
collusive agreements to raise prises would tend to be irrelevant. In the case of
input shortages rather than demand deficiency, we have suggested in Chapter
4, that this could lead to collusive pricing. In Chapter 8 we shall examine data
which will allow us to say not only whether excess capacity is common in
Malawi, and what the likely causes are, but also to indicate the effect on
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pricing.
NON STRATEGY CAUSES OF EXCESS CAPACITY
Supply factors that lead to excess capacity do so by imposing constraints on
production. Working capital ratio, imported raw materials intensity and skilled
labour intensity are variables that have been included in the Malawian model as
a concession to their possible effects on pricing behaviour. Here we describe
briefly the Malawian conditions with respect to these variables.
a) Working Capital
An analysis of ratios of end-of-year stocks of finished products to net output
in Annual Survey of Economic Activity (AES), 1967 lead to the conclusion that
short-term investment in inventories constitute a major type of investment in
most sectors except agriculture. The overall average ratio was 91% mainly
accounted for by the distribution sector with 305% and manufacturing with
85%.
An analysis of short-term assets and liabilities over 1974 and 1975 reveals that
'stocks' and 'trade debtors' constitute very high proportions of current assets
while 'cash' and 'intercompany debts' amount to only a small fraction. On the
liabilities side there is a more even spread across the three categories,
'suppliers' credit', 'intercompany debts' and 'advances or overdrafts' implying
that all sources of finance for working capital are important. The ratio of
current assets to current liabilities which is sometimes known in financial
analysis as the working capital ratio can be taken as an indication of the extent
to which the firms operate under pressure of liquidity. The corresponding ratio
for the two years is 143%, implying that liquidity is not constraining generally.
But industry differences in this variable may be more interesting and worth
considering in an econometric model. This is done in Chapter 7.
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b) Imported Raw Materials
It has been suggested that much LDC manufacturing depends on imported
material inputs. Malawian manufacturing is no exception, although like much
else this varies across industries. In all industries concerned, by far the larger
proportion of value of imported inputs is made up of manufactures and a
sizeable proportion of this is made up of fuels. The share of imported
materials in gross industrial output in Malawi dropped from an average of
about 37% per cent over the 1964-1969 period to 27% over the 1969-1972
period. This indicates its fall in relative importance although the absolute value
of the imported inputs was actually rising over the entire period.
Although foreign exchange rationing in Malawi is not as extensive as in other
African countries, the fact that it is there means that industries are vulnerable
according to their dependence on imported inputs. The danger of using the
ratio of the value of imported inputs to total consumption of material inputs in
analysing this phenomenon is of course that production can be disrupted even
if this value were minimal, if the input in question is vital, as in the case of
spare parts for machinery lack of which could mean no production at all.
However it might be expected that in general the foreign exchange constraint
and the variability of import prices, are likely to affect a particular industry in a
milder way the lower is the relative value of the imports to total material
inputs.
Figures for imported raw materials are available in ASEA up to 1972. The
values of imported goods and materials used as inputs as a percentage of total
consumption of goods and materials show that in general agro- and
forestry-based industries (food, and sawmill and furniture) have the lowest
dependence on imported raw materials. These have average percentages of
less than 20%. The exceptions are bakery products and non-metalic mineral
products which have each around 80%. In the former case this is because of
imported wheat, while in the latter case fuel (coal), gypsum and packaging
materials constitute the major imported inputs. For all the rest of the
industries, textiles, clothing and footwear, paper products and printing and
publishing, chemical and allied, and metal products, the average import
dependency is over 80%. Import dependency is therefore a possible
constraining factor in production.
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c) Skilled Labour
From the results of the 1967 survey of excess capacity, it was suggested that
the supply of skilled labour was less of a constraint in highly mechanised
processes (ASEA, 1967, p. iv). It was further suggested on a speculative basis
due to lack of data, that this supply posed a serious constraint in 'footwear and
clothing', and durable goods.
Since Malawi has always had a free earnings repatriation scheme, the
international labour market is open to manufacturers. The only constraint with
recruitment on this market is the relatively high price they have to pay,
including requisite inducements, compared to recruiting local personnel even if
this involved the financing of training. It can be hypothesised that recruitment
of skilled labour will depend on the production process involved and also on
the productivity of that labour. Thus some industries will require higher levels
of skills (however defined) than others. But the level of employment of those
will depend on the employer's ability and willingness to pay which is related to
the expected productivity of the labour.
Although it is true that labour productivity will depend on the value of
investment per employee, an analysis of average earnings and net output per
employee could allow a rough investigation of the hypothesis on the
employment of skilled labour. These earnings, averaged between 1974 and
1975, reveal the following. Chemical and allied products; paper products,
printing and publishing; metal products (including machinery and motor vehicle
assembly) among them had the highest average earnings. Considering the
types of industries that have established in Malawi, these industries are among
those that might be expected to have relatively high proportions of skilled
labour and high average net output per employee. The bottom industrial
groups were clothing and footwear, tea and tobacco processing. Generally,
average capital/labour ratios were more remotely related to average earnings,
reflecting different new investment and capital renewals patterns among
industries. The pattern of skilled labour requirements is therefore likely to differ




The economic conditions existing in Malawi, and particularly the limited size of
the market and scarcity of investment funds have resulted in low levels of
competition in most industries. Although some industries owe their very
existence to active government inducement in the form of granted monopoly
status involving subsequently barred entry, the evidence analysed here
indicates that incidents of either are relatively very few. For practical purposes
the entry conditions as far as institutional barriers are concerned, may be
described as free in the sense that in the very few cases where entry has been
barred, the reasons have largely been economic, such as existing excess
capacity. In other cases there are hints of the desire by existing firms to
influence their industrial structures via entry deterence by either using existing
or deliberately investing in excess capacity, and by advertising.
High degrees of concentration are most likely to be found among industries
that are expected to have high economic barriers to entry in terms of minimum
efficient plant scale and skill intensity of the production process. Lower
barriers in other industries, typically clothing, wooden products and furniture,
have resulted in much competition from 'competitive fringes'.
Two factors that are likely to have exposed domestic firms to strong
moderating influence on pricing and perhaps behaviour generally are price
controls and easy entry of competing imports. These could play an overriding
role in influencing performance in the industries.
It appears that problems with input availability, and particularly imported
materials, have the potential of seriously constraining production decisions and
could therefore influence behaviour and consequently performance. It has been
more difficult to derive any such prediction with respect to the other inputs
such as working capital and skilled labour. But it may well be that they present
much less of a problem compared to imported materials.
It will be possible at a later stage to investigate in the form of testable
hypotheses, many of the aspects of structure/conduct that have been handled
rather informally here, and for which neither this chapter nor the next two can
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provide more definite answers. For instance, we shall be able to look more
directly at such questions as, How prevelant is excess capacity ? What are the
causes ? Do firms really seek to deter entry and what are the important
strategies ?.
In conclusion, the above discussion permits us to make several remarks in
anticipation of econometric results. Firstly, it may be said that the
concentration-profits relationship is likely to be weak for Malawi because of
price controls. Secondly, other structural factors, particularly foreign trade and
growth of domestic market are expected to be important in determining
profitability. The former is due to Malawi's liberal position regarding
international competition. Thirdly, as expected, scale economy barriers to entry
can be expected to be important in the determination of industrial
concentration, and perhaps in the determination of profitability, via pricing
behaviour. Lastly, on advertising, apart from saying that this tends to reflect
product differentiability and possibilities of intra 4-digic SIC industry
diversification even on the international level, no definite hypothesis can be
postulated with regard to its relationship with profitability.
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NOTES
I.The absolute value of exports rose even more dramatically between 1970 and
1979 to MK 184.5 million. It should however be noted that the change between
1964 and 1970 represented a fall (though a small one) in the share of exports
in GDP. In 1964 this was 16% while in 1970 it was 15%. Despite this fail, the
fact that the proportion only fell by a small margin could still mean a
worthwhile achievement for a country exporting only primary products.
2.0ne can still approximate the actual import duties by taking the ratio of
import duties to the 'cost, insurance and freight' value of imports which figures
can be obtained in the more readily available Annual Statement of External
Trade But since in a study of this nature it would be important to do some
sort of time-series analysis including the investigation of lagged responses, the
number of observations is limited by the fact that prior to 1975, import duty
and surtax figures were combined. Even so, a useful study could still be done
but we do not embark on it here. In Chapter 8 we shall investigate a
hypothesis which involves the effects of import duties, under a variable which
represents overall barriers to entry for imports.
3.Chenery has since extended his classic model to incorporate technological
change (see Chenery, 1979). But for our purposes here the earlier model will
suffice.
4.Nigerian figures have been used in this table because they were available. But
they also serve to contrast Malawian manufacturing with that of a larger
economy.
5.For a price-cost margins equation this might be a case for arguing that there
is likely to be interaction between the import intensity and the advertising
intensity variables.
CHAPTER 6
MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLES AND MALAWIAN DATA
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is concerned with describing the form of the variables that are to
be used in the estimated models of Chapter 7. The approaches that have been
adopted to deal with the more serious problems are also discussed in some
detail.
The period of analysis is 1969 to 1972. The choice of this period was prompted
by two data considerations. The first was that some of the published data for
earlier periods were by industrial groupings which are too broad. The second
reason was that for later periods although data were published according to
more disaggregated industries than the 1969-1972 period, the questionnaire did
not cater for information relevant for the derivation of certain important
variables.
One advantage of basing the study on the 1969-1972 period is that this period
just avoids some of the unusual problems associated with the post-1972 oil
price increases. But this could also be a source of criticism in that it could be
argued that in the post-1972 period conditions had since become the norm, so
that the milder conditions of the earlier period could now be regarded as
unrepresentative. But even though this criticism may well be valid, a period
relatively free from wild economic changes such as rampant inflation could be
an ideal one for analysing the effects of economic policies on behaviour of
firms.
The variables described here are derived from time-series data in two main
sources. Both are publications of the Malawi National Statistical Office (NSO).
They are Annua! Survey of Economic ActivityfASEA] [later changed to Annual
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Economic Survey (AESj\ and Annual Statement of External Trade (ASET).
Another source was unpublished Ministry of Trade and Industry's working lists
for licencing of manufacturing activities. In addition, access to individual firms'
files for ASEA returns, was obtained from the NSO.
ideally the access to the firms' ASEA returns should have meant that we would
be in a position to construct our own data series and thus be able to use
industries disaggregated to levels of our choice. However two problems
prevented this. The first was that some files for firms which had existed during
the study period were missing. The second reason was that since we were
examining the original completed questionnaires some had been heavily edited
in the course of updating and cross-checking of the information. This often
made it difficult to ascertain which figures were the correct ones. This affected
some variables more than others and in certain cases the questionnaire itself
provided a means of checking, eg. from the fact that total sales figures must
be the sum total of component sales figures. As might be expected, the
information found to be quite reliable and relatively free of editing, was that
regarding employment and this was probably also the easiest for the firms to
supply.
Despite these two problems with information from the ASEA returns, it must be
stated that the approach to that source proved quite invaluable. Without the
detailed information from this source the task of deriving some of the
important variables used in this study would have been very problematic. This
point will be demonstrated in examples given below.
Before discussing the derivation of the variables, a number of concepts require
to be explained.
The Sample Firms for ASEA
The sample firms for which data are reported in ASEA are the largest in each
industry. For the period of study, the size criterion for inclusion was
employment of twenty or more persons. Since a licence is required for
manufacturing employing ten or more persons, or using machinery of at least
25 horse-power, it means that the ASEA firms are ail licenced. That is the
ASEA firms are a subset of all licenced firms. The total number of firms
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excluded from ASEA reporting for each industry comprises smaller producers of
what may be termed the competitive fringe, whose size depends on the
technological possibilities in the respective industries.
From Chapter 5, we saw that there is a tendency in Malawian manufacturing,
for the small producers of the fringe to be associated with only a few low
barrier industries. This would mean that the problem of misrepresentation due
to cut-off smaller producers would be worse, compared to a situation where
for example all industries had the same proportion of these small producers (in
terms of output) cut-off. At the same time we also saw that there were factors
that also tend to reduce the impact of the excluded small producers. These
factors include the fact that the small producers are typically very small and
producing inferior products compared to the larger firms, and this reduces the
cross-elasticity of demand between the products of large and small firms and
this in turn reduces interdependency of decisions between the two groups of
firms. But the fact that we are talking about 'reduction' rather than 'elimination',
means that some problems of misrepresentation are bound to remain. But we
shall see below, that for some important variables this problem is lessened
further by the fact that they attach less importance to the smaller producers.
'Plants' vs 'firms'
Ideally the unit of coverage for the ASEA is supposed to be the establishment
or plant. This is the individual workshop or factory in a single type of
manufacturing activity. But the returns for the survey are typically by 'firms',
where for instance multiplant firms complete and return only one questionnaire
each.
The ASEA Industries
The data in AES are published according to industry groups which combine
4—digit SIC titles according to the inputs and processes involved. One of the
reasons for this is compliance with disclosure rules, which do not permit the
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publication of information relating to less than three firms.
The result of the grouping is that many of the groups correspond to those
used elsewhere like Industrial Orders for the United Kingdom. A notable
difference is that for the 1964-1975 period the group 'food, drink and tobacco'
was disaggregated to reflect the type of demand, that is whether it is mainly
domestic or foreign.
THE VARIABLES
The following variables are defined and measured at the industry level.
Price-cost margins
This is defined for the i th industry as
M = (S - AVC)
I
where S is the revenue from sales and AVC is the average variable costs. M is
therefore a rate of return on sales.
The exact nature of the variable and its satisfactoriness in empirical studies has
depended a great deal on the nature of the available cost data. This problem
is stated in detail by Ornstein (1975):
"The typical procedure using census data is to subtract
material and payroll costs from sales to estimate price minus
these costs relative to sales. The price-cost margin so
measured does not account for other expenditures such as
advertising, research and development, taxes, depreciation,
distribution expenses and components of overhead costs".(p107)
What is achieved in these circumstances is profits plus these other expenses,
103
which mainly comprise elements of overhead costs, divided by sales. Phillips
(1975) has raised objections against measures of M which do not exclude at
least some of these expenditures. A very similar measure can be obtained from
ASEA by defining
M = (Gross Output - costs) = Net Output - Wages & Salaries
Gross Output Gross Output
Gross Output at factor cost (because sales figures are net of indirect taxes) =
total receipts from goods sold and resold, and/or services rendered. Net Output
= Gross Output - value of current goods and services consumed, and rent and
interest paid. Net Output is the fund from which wages and salaries, direct
taxes, dividends, profits and depreciation must be met. Note that since we want
M to approximate [(price x quantity - average cost x quantity)/price x quantity]
the use of Net Output in the denominator rather than Gross Output, would be
inappropriate. This is because the former would be further removed from the
notion of 'price x quantity', by the subtraction of the costs of materials.
Apart from resold goods, whose values are usually minor, M includes in Gross
Output or Net Output, some inappropriate items, 'value of capitalised work
done' . This is defined as the "amount paid in wages and salaries to own
employees engaged on work of a capital nature, e.g. new roads, installation of
machinery, erection of new buildings, etc." (ASEA, 1970, p6). The crucial point is
that such output would be credited to gross fixed capital formation and should
have little to do with margins since the output is not sold and does not involve
any pricing decisions. The inclusion of the value of net changes in stocks of
finished products would also be inappropriate because they involve net
additions to unsold output.1
Finally Costs include depreciation. It has been suggested that this should be
excluded from M (Phillips, 1976).
After these considerations, the measure that is adopted is
M = (Total sales receipts - costs of sales and operations - wages and
salaries and other employment benefits - interest - rent -
depreciation)/Total sales receipts.
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where the total sales figures exclude 'capitalised work done'. The 'costs of
sales and operations' include materials , electricity, work given out, transport
services, insurance, bank charges, audit fees, and advertising, (ASEA, 1970 pp.
6-7).
The numerator of M is an approximation of profits gross of direct taxes and
dividends. It is an approximation because the depreciation used for accounting
and tax purposes may not reflect true utilisation of capital assets. The total
depreciation figures are composed of depreciation charged against different
categories of fixed assets; factory buildings, plant and machinery, vehicles, and
'other'. The inter-industry differences in the total depreciation are likely to
account for differences in the composition of the fixed assets and therefore the
level of fixed costs among industries.
Three-firm concentration ratios CR3
The problem of missing files means that we also missed an opportunity to
derive and use the Herfindahl index of concentration. The k-firm concentration
ratio was considered because of this.
The k-firm concentration ratio is the proportion of an industry's output supplied
by the k largest firms in that industry. In related studies for the industrialised
and larger economies k is usually larger than three because of information
disclosure rules. For this study, alternative values of k have been used namely k
= 1, k = 2, and k = 3. This was of course made possible in most cases, by the
use of information from the ASEA returns.
The grouped data from which the concentration ratios were derived, are
contained in the firm size distributions published by the NSO. They represent
all the firms that were operational during the study period and therefore
provide a good basis for the complementary use of the ASEA returns
information. The size of the firms is given by employment, which is also where
the ASEA returns information was most reliable.
The two major problems encountered with this variable were in some cases,
the industry aggregation levels and in other cases how to determine what
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employment was accounted lor by the largest one, two, or three firms. We next
illustrate how the information from the returns was used in conjunction with
published size-distribution tables to achieve higher levels of disaggregation and
CR indices corresponding to alternative values of k. Note that this discussion is
also relevant for the derivation of the scale economy variables discussed
below.
Table 6.1
Illustration of Firm Size Distribution by Employment
for 'Ginning, Spinning, and Weaving' and 'Netting Products'
(ie. SICs 3211; 3213, 3215)
20 - 49 50 - 99 100 - 199 200 - 499/ 1000+ Total
Units Empl. Units Empl. Units Empl. Units Empl. Units' Empl.Units Empl.
2 75 3 238 2 275 2 583 1 1435 10 2606
[3215] 94 [3211] 113 [3212] 352 [3211] 1435
[ 3215 90 [3212] 231
54 162
The figures next to the SIC numbers in brackets in the bottom half of Table 6.1
are from the firms' returns, (except for the figures right at the bottom ie. 54
and 162 which are the remainders after subtracting from the total of each size
class, the employment figures from the returns. The NSO also published tables
with information on total employment by fairly disaggregated industries. From
this information and for the above example, the total number of units for
'netting products' SIC 3215 was 2 and total employment was 184. This
effectively accounts for that industry and from the file information we could
identify the two firms by their employment (ie. 94 + 90 = 184). We then know
that the rest of the size distribution must relate to 'ginning, spinning, and
weaving', and we can proceed to calculate the concentration ratios for two
industries, SIC 3215 and the combination of SICs 3211 and 3212. We note that
relying on only the information from the returns, we would have lost 4 firms,
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accounting for total employment of 291 (that is 75 + 54 + 162). On the other
hand without this information from the returns, it would have been impossible
to obtain concentration ratios corresponding to the disaggregated industries.
The next problem to illustrate relates to the cases where from the size
distributions it was not possible to allocate employment to the largest firms,
without resorting to extrapolation. Suppose that the information in the top haif
of the above table is for one industry at the 4—digit SIC level (eg. tea, tobacco,
bakery products, etc.) and suppose that we could not allocate the employment
in the '200-499' size class to the two firms. This would mean that we could
calculate CR1 and CR3 but not CR2. Bain (1966) described a method of
extrapolation that we found usefull. We need to get a statistical estimate of the
largest firm in the '200-499' size class. We proceed by obtaining the average of
the smallest statistically possible and the largest statistically possible as
follows:
a) The smallest statistically possible estimate is whem
both firms are of equal size, ie. 583 divided by 2 = 291.
b) The largest statistically possible is the minimum of the
following;
-remainder (from 583) after assigning the lower limit of the
size class (200) to the smaller firm
ie 200 x 1 (or 200 x number of smaller firms in the
case of more than one).
-the upper limit assigned to the largest firm(s), in this case
499 x 1.
From this we get
min [{583 - 1(200)}, {1x499}]
or min [383, 499]
= 383.
c) The arithmetic average of a) and b) give us the required
estimate which is 337 (cf 352).
Table 6.2 illustrates how 4—digit SIC Industries are grouped by the NSO. It also
compares the concentration ratios calculated for the 4—digit industries, with
those of the industry groups. The former include firms with more directly
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competing products, that is with high short-run cross-elasticities of demand
(or supply). Due to the high concentration of some 4—digit industries grouping
them leads to lower joint concentration ratios.
This is the type of problem that has prompted many economists to comment
on the meaningfulness of 'industry'. Shirazi notes "... the census industries
seldom correspond to the theoretical concept of industry in economics."p 71.
Phillips (1976) also expressed similar disillusions:
"Also industry definition is arbitrary in both product and
geographic dimensions, irrespective of the concentration ratio
concept that is used".
Stigler (1955) had earlier suggested that a rough solution would be to base the
industry groups on large long-run cross-elasticities of either supply or demand.
This, as has already been indicated, is roughly the criterion used by the NSO.
The concentration ratios that are derived are therefore rough, but Adelman
(1964) has defended their use:
"
though a concentration measure tells us little about a
given industry at a given time, groups of concentration ratios,
permitting comparison in time and space, do give us some solid
information and hence the most important use of concentration
is in comparison: over time; or among countries, or regions, or
industries at the same time".
In order to alleviate the problem of downward bias when CRk calculations are
based on aggregated industry groups (as opposed to 4—digit SIC industries) a
weighting system was used. The CRks were first of all calculated for the
disaggregated industries, and then these were weighted by their shares in the
total employment of their corresponding industry groups (that is the industry
groups corresponding to the way other industry data were published. The
composite weighted CRks for the industry groups were then obtained by
summing the individual weighted CRks.
The calculated concentration ratios do not take into account the contribution of
imports. Other researchers eg. Shepherd (1972) and House (1974) have
I uo
Table 6.2
The Effects of Grouping 4-digit SIC Industries on
Measured Concentration Ratios*: Malawian Manufacturing 1974
Product 4-digit No. of Concentration Ratios for
SIC Firms
4-digit SIC Industries Ind. Groups
CR1 CR2 CR3 CR3 CR3
l.Meat 3111 1 100 100
Fruit 3113 1 100 100
Fish 3114 1 100 100
Sugar 3118 1 100 100 77
Potable Spirits 3131 1 100 100
Malt Liquors 3133 2 57 100 100
Soft Drinks 3134 1 100 100
2.Grain Milling 3116 2 73 100 100
3.Bakery Prods. 3117 8 53 70 83 83 83
4 .Tea 3123 19 16 26 36 36 36
5.Tobacco 3140 6 29 54 75 75 75
6.Ginning 3211 2 91 100 100
Blankets 3212 2 58 100 100
Knittwear 3213 2 58 100 100 80
Rope & Netting 3215 2 69 100 100
7.Clothing 3220 17 15 30 39 39 39
Leather prods. 3240 1 100 100 '
8.Sawmill prods. 3311 4 61 79 92 92 92
Furniture 3340
9.Paper prods. 3412 3 63 85 100 100 69
Printg.s Pub. 3419/20 5 61 73 82 82
10.Ind. Chems. 3511 2 67 100 100
Paints etc. 3521 2 60 100 100
Pharmaceuticals 3522 1 100 100
Saops etc. 3523 1 89 95 100 100 64
Matches 3529 1 100 100
Tyre retreadg. 3551 2 71 100 100
Plastic prods. 3560 3 42 73 100 100
11.Clay prods. 3691 2 71 100 100
Cement 3692 1 100 100 95
Other non-met. 3699 2 64 100 100
12.Farm Imple. 3811 1 100 100
Furniture with
metal fixtures3812 1 100 100
Structural met. 3813 1 100 100
Other non-
machine met.
prods. 3819 4 56 83 93 93 54
Other non-elec.
machinery 3829 2 55 100 100
Radio assembly 3832 1 100 100
Motor Veh.ass. 3843 3 62 93 100 100
Note:* The economic variable for the measurement of concentration
is employment.
Source:Calculated from Annual Economic Survey firm-size distribution
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adjusted concentration ratios for imports. For the less developed countries
imports are indeed likely to be very important and account for large shares of
total domestic sales. The approach taken here has been to account for the
imports separately as has been done by a number of other researchers (Shirazi,
1974; Geroski, 1982). The reason for adopting this is that import competition
reflects interesting aspects of industrial structure such as barriers to
international competition, which are best dealt with separately for their policy
implications. A fuller discussion of the role of this variable in the
structure-performance models has already been presented in Chapter 3. At the
practical level this approach also gets round the problem due to the fact that
the size distributions on which the concentration ratios are based, are by
employment, while imports are given in value terms.
The next problem relates to the effect on the representativeness of the CRks,
of the cut-off smaller producers in certain industries due to the 20 employee
size criterion for ASEA data. Apart from the factors which we indicated above
as likely to reduce the problem of misrepresentation, it can also be expected
that the definition of CRk itself helps reduce the problem further. This is the
fact that small producers outside the k largest ones, are only represented in
the denominator, where they are likely to have a lower impact. Also, as
indicated in Chapter 5, although in some industries the small producers
contribute significantly to employment in those industries, their output
contribution is relatively much less.
Capital intensity (KS)
This is defined as
KS = (K^+ig/ GOUTt
where Kt_-, » book value of fixed assets at end of the previous year, = gross
fixed capital formation during the year, GOUTt = gross output during the year.
This is nearly the form that has been used in other studies, except for the use
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of gross output in the denominator rather than value of sales. If KS is to
measure the degree of capital intensity of production, then gross output must
be the better denominator, because the rate of production is not always equal
to sales. The series for Kt_v K,, and GOUT, are readily available.
Growth of industry sales (G)
This is a straghtforward variable and is defined as
G, = (St - St-O/St--,
where S = sales, and the subscripts t, t-1 denote time periods.
Import intensity (IMPS)
In line with the discussion of Chapter 3, this variable is taken here to be a
representation of the many types of barriers to entry for imports, which tend to
exist in LDCs, and some of whose effects would not be picked up by alternative
variables such as effective rate of protection. The variable has been measured
as
IMPS = (lmports)/(Total domestic sales)
The import series was constructed from trade statistics published in Annual
Statement of External Trade (ASET). This classifies items according to the
Brussels Trade Nomenclature (BTN) which does not correspond to SIC.2
Reclassification of imported items according to SIC - based industries is not as
problematic as deciding which of the imported items can be considered to be
competing with domestic products in the domestic markets. This problem is
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similar to that of deciding what products can be regarded as belonging to the
same industry. The solution is therefore similar, and can be based on Stigler's
suggestion noted earlier.
The requirement in this instance is high long-run cross-elasticities of demand
between imports and domestically produced substitutes. This was assumed to
be the case when similar products - in that they require similar levels of
technological sophistication - were already being produced in the country.
This implies that the country already had immediate capability of producing the
products.
On the whole, the list of excluded items by 8TN Chapter (2—digit level) is short.
It includes expected items such as mineral fuels, capital goods, products of
high precision industries, and basic metals.
Export intensity (EXPS)
This was measured as
EXPS = (Exports)/(Total sales)
The ASEA sales figures distinguish between domestic and export sales. The
EXPS series was constructed by adding the export figures under 'goods sold'
and those under 'services rendered and work done for others'. The latter is
usually zero or very minor.
Advertising Intensity, (AS)
The ASEA questionnaire has no separate provision for advertising statistics.
Although radio advertising data were obtained, which could be indicative of the
vigour of advertising within industries, these are for a later period.
In the published ASEA sources, advertising figures are included in the general
expenses item 'electricity, services, rent and interest'. The use of 'general
selling expenses' had good data been available would probably be more
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appropriate than advertising ones. Advertising expenses in industries with
highly differentiated products reflect only a small part of that differentiation
and there is no guarantee that this is even representative. For example, some
firms might prefer to give discounts to their distributors, who might then be
motivated to do their own advertising. As far as the manufacturers are
concerned, purely advertising expenses would not in such a case reflect the
discounts.
Another approach was to use figures for expenditure items that were as close
as possible to selling expenses. These were obtained from the firms' files with
returns for the ASEA and are under the title 'other non-industrial expenses'.
They include advertising, accounting, insurance, legal and other similar
expenses. But the availability of of the firms' files meant that the information
would relate mainly to the largest firms.
Two proxies for advertising intensity have been derived and used, one based
on 'non-industrial services', and other, a dummy variable based on radio
advertising data. The first proxy was measured as the ratio of expenses on
'non-industrial services' to total sales. The dummy variable was constructed
according to whether an industry could be regarded as being a heavy
advertiser or not. These judgements were in turn based on their relative
expenditures on radio advertising, that is whether this was above or below
average. Radio being the most accessible mass medium, radio advertising was
assumed to be representative of the ditribution of other selling expenses
among industries.
Diversification (DV)
Firm diversification has been described as the lateral expansion of firms which
is neither horizontal nor vertical integration 'but in the direction of other
different, but often broadly similar activities' (Robinson, 1958 p 114). A number
of measures that are in constant use have been reviewed and their properties
assessed by Gorecki (1974).
The form of this variable adopted for application to Malawi is similar to 'entry
by diversification' used by Utton (1979) and which can be measured by the
proportion of output or employment in an industry accounted for by firms
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classified under other industries. This would be one minus the coverage ratio,
where the latter 'measures the extent to which the products primary to an
industry are shipped by plants classified in that industry', and which measures
the inverse of potential entry from existing firms.
Much of the affiliation of manufacturing firms to parent enterprises in Malawi is
associated with horizontal as well as vertical integration. The more prevelent
form of diversification within the manufacturing sector ie. in the Robinson
sense is that associated with the convenience and possibility of joint
production and generally cannot be observed at the 4—digit SIC industries level
from the published sources.
Considering the important role played by reliance on private sources of capital
to finance investment in countries such as Malawi, it may not be appropriate to
ignore diversification. Where barriers to entry are high because of capital
requirement, entry associated with already established firms may be the most
probable form and this is especially so given that gearing in Malawian
companies is generally zero or negligible.3
The measure devised to reflect this diversification was derived from the ASEA
information, licencing lists and the organisational chart of the Malawi
Development Corporation (MDC) which has extensive equity participation in the
manufacturing sector.
DV was measured as the proportion of total employment in firms that are
subsidiaries of diversified enterprises, to the total employment of their
industries or industry groups.
The list of the subsidiaries comprised firms in which MDC had controlling
ownership plus subsidiaries of other enterprises. The latter were identified from
applications for manufacturing licence variations on the licencing working lists.
These relate only to enterprises which already had ongoing concerns in the
manufacturing sector. This is a limiting factor in that diversification of a purely
vertical integration kind is not represented. However, this disadvantage must be
reduced by the fact that most enterprises which are vertically integrated into
manufacturing, usually have more that one affiliates in that sector, in which
case vertical integration can be taken as being indirectly represented in DV.
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Market size (MKT)
This is defined as
MKT = Value of total domestic sales = Value of
domestic sales by domestic producers
+ value of imports
This is an estimate of the potential domestic market faced by domestic
producers. The imports also indicate the scope for import substitution. The data
for imports are the same as those described under IMPS and EXPS.
Minimum efficient plant scale (MES) and cost disadvantage ratio (CDR)
In the literature, a number of approaches have been proposed for variables
reflecting various aspects of the long-run average cost curves. For practical
purposes the important consideration in choosing among them is the nature of
the data that are available. For this reason, the approaches adopted by Lyons
(1980), and Fuss and Gupta (1981) were not considered for application to
Malawi. (Their problems have been discussed in Chapter 3 and relate mainly to
their data requirements in terms of number of production units which exist.)
But the MES proxy proposed by Comanor and Wilson (1967) , and the CDR
proxy proposed by Caves et at (1975) can both be derived from published
tables of size distribution of firms. Before discussing the procedure, one point
which needs to be made is that in view of what has been said about the
coverage of ASEA data, the variables derived from them relate to the larger
firms. This means that there would be a tendency for estimates of MES to
overstate while those of CDR understate the true industry values.
One solution to this problem which was considered, was to make use of
independently derived estimates for MES and CDR such as the engineering
estimates calculated and reported in Pratten (1971) for various UK industries.
Those which correspond to Malawian industries would then be 'adopted' to
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represent those industries. The major attraction of engineering estimates is that
they are not limited by the nature of existing firms and therefore are less
compromised by the existence of very few firms. However the idea of adopting
the Pratten measures was abandoned on two counts. First of all no estimates
are available for 'tea', 'grainmilling', 'tobacco', 'clothing', 'sawmill products', and
'furniture'. This would lead to the potential loss of 24 observations. Secondly,
and perhaps even more important than the first reason, there are almost no
grounds for justifying the use on Malawian industries, of estimates based on
UK manufacturing because their environments are different from the point of
view of market size, factor intensity, vintage of the technology, etc.. It can also
be noted that despite the similarities one might expect to find between UK and
her Western European neighbours, manufacturing conditions have been noted
to differ enough to affect labour productivity even within the same companies
in different European countries. Such differences would almost certainly affect
calculations of MES and CDR even among these countries.4 We are left with
the Caves et a! proxies for serious consideration despite the fact that they are
not without their problems in application to situations such as that of Malawi.
The two proxies for MES and CDR expressed in terms of gross output are
MESl = average size of the largest firms accounting
for 50% of industry output.
MES2 = MESl as a percentage of total industry output.
CDR = average output per worker in plants accounting
for the bottom 50% of industrial output,
divided by average output per worker in the
firms accounting for the top 50%.
MES2 is the relative measure of MES and is the one used in the estimates of
Chapter 7. It can be derived from size distributions based on employment,
which is the way they are published for Malawi from 1967 to 1975 excluding
1969 when none was published. The use of value-added would have been
preferable for the CDR proxy since we are concerned with relative labour
productivity, and this also happens to be the way Caves et al defined CDR. But
one might expect that the use of gross output figures will reflect the
value-added measure, fairly closely.
There are two major problems associated with the use of these measures on
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Malawian data.
First of ail there is again the problem of the exclusion of small producers
employing less than 20 persons from the data set. But then one of the
assumptions on which the Caves et a/ measures are based is that 'labour
quality and wage rates should not vary with scale', which assumption would
most certainly be violated if the fringe producers were included since the
relative quality of their labour and the wage rates tend to be very low.
Secondly, when number of firms are small there are such basic problems as for
instance how to measure MES when there is only one firm? In order to resolve
this problem we went back to ask what either variable was supposed to be
measuring and from this it would seem reasonable to say that the case where
only one firm exists in the industry could be taken to represent very high
barriers to entry and consequently MES and CDR should both be very high.
100% was therefore assigned in such cases. The other related problem was
that of the difficulty of dividing firms according to the 50% cut-off point for
industrial output. An industry with two firms the larger of which is twice as big
as the smaller one, would have the larger producing 66% of industrial output.
The question is whether poor approximation of the 50% cut-off point will
seriously affect the results. It is difficult to answer this question directly but it
can be said that if this problem affects only some industries and not others,
then some bias would result from the unequal treatment of the industries. But
then the scale economies situation represented by the two firms in the above
example could well correspond to the situation where there are many firms
(and where the 50% output cut-off can therefore be more closely
approximated), in which case the small number of existing firms does not lead
to bias. In practice we are usually not in a position to know what sort of bias
would result from the problem or indeed whether any bias would arise in any
particular situation.
Since CDR requires output information, there was need to generate estimates
for this for the size classes. With these estimates and other available
information, MES and CDR could then be derived for 4—digit SIC industries, after
which the same type of weighting system which was used for CR was also
used to obtain industry group MES and CDR.
One approach to the problem of missing information would have been to
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generate independent output figures for the size classes from the firms' files.
This was however abandoned because of missing files, a problem which mostly
affected firms which would be in the bottom ranges of the size distributions.
The indirect approach that has been adopted, involved estimating gross output
for the size classes by extrapolating from the output figures published for the
1970 and 1971 size distributions.
Extrapolating gross output
The procedure involves the average productivity of firms in each size class for
the years for which size class output information was available. That is.
st




where Q is the estimate of gross output, Q is actual gross output, L is actual
employment, s is the sth size class and t is the year (in this case 1969, 1970,
1971, and 1972).
Empty size classes in the two base years 1970 and 1971 but which were not
empty for some other year presented a special problem. This is one
consequence of small numbers of firms. It means that the appropriate labour
productivity for the size classes in the base years was not observable. In such
cases the productivity for the nearest years to 1970 and 1971 was used by
resorting to information from the ASEA returns. .
One interpretation of 6.1 is that it assumes that labour productivity in each size
class is constant over time (although the variables being measured wouid not
necessarily be constant). This implies similar technology associated with both
new entrants into a size class and the old firms. However, the effects of
changes in technology are reduced by the short period of study and having
base years in the middle. The effect of wide differences in technology due to
grouping of a wide range of SIC categories has been reduced by tracing and
separately accounting for the mobility of some individual firms across the size
classes. This was particularly essential for the industry group 'chemicals and
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allied products' which comprises six 4—digit SIC categories.
From the above discussion, the factors that are left to influence MES and CDR
are those that influence the structure of industries' size distributions. Such
factors are growth or decline of firms, and new entry or exit from the industry.
These change the relative employment in the size classes by changing their
composition.
The role of these effects can be illustrated by expressing MES and CDR
algebraically and relating them to 6.1. Letting Q stand for output and i, the ith
firm
where i = 1,...j. j+1,...n-1,n; (1/(n-1)) Ini=j+1Qi > 1/2 Zni=1Qi and
Suppose the largest firms are in the largest S-m size classes such that
S = 1 < ... < m < ... < S. Substituting 6.1 into
6.2 with the firms allocated into size-classes.







where cs is a constant for any size-class over time and j+1 is the
smallest plant in m. Change in MES over time can be expressed as
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MES = f[(Iss=mLs),Ls] (6.4)
which consists of changes that affect the composition of the S-m size
classes and those that only affect employment within certain size-classes.
If firm sizes in the size-classes are normally distributed, or negatively
skewed the former changes would be associated with the more dynamic forces
in an industry. It is therefore conceivable that such forces will be more
associated with creation of new capacity or exit. This however is not to
deny that both types of change may be part of the same process.
Similarly, CDR can be expressed in terms of estimated output and the
employment in the size classes.
CDR will therefore also be sensitive to changes in employment whether
this affects firms' size distributions or not.3 The important thing about
6.3 and 6.5 is that they
emphasise the two types of change that can affect MES and CDR.
Relative employment among size classes
in the industry must change, if the variables
are to be affected. This is not a weakness of the procedure that has just
been outlined, but is a feature of statistical measures of this types in
so far as they are based on the existing firms (as opposed to
say engineering estimates which can deal with hypothetical
sizes of firms or scales of production. In the derivation of the variables, MES
could be calculated directly from the size distribution tables, so that the output
estimates were only used in the calculation for CDR.
Table 6.3 indicates the significance of changes in the distribution of firms due
to growth or entry or both. The relative distribution of the firms in
size-classes are plotted in Fig. 6.1. The tendency of the proportion of the





Firm Size Distribution Changes due to Growth, Entry and Exit
20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000+ Total
1967 No.(%) 41(38) 27(25) 19(18) 17(15) 4(4) 0(0) 108(100)
1971 No.(%) 38(28) 40(30) 32(24) 19(14) 4(3) 1(1) 134(100)
1975 No.(%) 25(22) 28(24) 25(22) 23(20) 8(7) 6(5) 115(100)
Note:Size distributions are by employment.
Source:AES
Table 6.4
Changes in Average Firm Sizes in Size-classes
20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000+ Total
1967 30 69 139 330 895 - 138
1971 31 70 135 341 1201 1435 157
1975 34 68 142 284 642 1670 243




reflects these trends. Table 6.4 only shows what is happening to average sizes
of firms in each si2e class. It cannot support any view since average
employment can be affected by any type of change. For instance this can be
affected by whether entry or exit from a size class is by firms which are below
or above average size.
Generally, the proxies that have been derived could have been better the larger
the number of firms in each industry. This would have meant more size
classes and fewer empty ones. It would then have been possible to
approximate the size distributions with smooth curves, allowing for better
approximation in the cut-off size-classes for 50% of the output. A related
problem is due to uneven size-classes, getting broader in the upper ranges.
This means that movements in the bottom ranges are more easily detected and
picked up than those in the upper ranges.
Imported raw material intensity (RMS)
This has been measured as
RMS = Value of imported raw materials
Total consumption of goods and materials
'Goods and materials' include fuels and goods for resale. The denominator
includes stock adjustments.
Working capital ratio (FIN)
FIN = STASST = total short-term assets
STLB total short-term liabilities
where STASST =» stocks of goods + trade debtors + bank deposits +
intercompany debts + other, and STLB = supplier's credit + trade bills
discounted + bank advances + inter-company debts + other.
FIN is also known in financial ratio analyses as the current ratio and is used as
a measure of liquidity for firms' ability to survive in the short-term. Its role
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may not be insignificant in a capital scarce economy and may affect the type
of financial management as well as pricing behaviour in different industries.
Skilled labour intensity (SKLL)
There are no published data on skilled labour at the industry level, whatever
the criterion for 'skilled'. Although the NSO has used certain criteria in
collecting information that reflects this, none is usable for the present study.
For instance although the population censuses use better criteria their data are
not continuous and provide no industrial breakdown.
There were two contenders for a proxy of skill intensity. These are labour
productivity (labour/output ratio) and average earnings per employee.
In many respects, labour/output ratio is directly influenced by capital intensity,
which may or may not reflect skill requirement. On the other hand, there are
good reasons for believing that the levels of average earnings across industries
reflect all important aspects of skill, the general level of educational
requirement, experience and even the need to recruit from the relatively highly
priced international labour market. These are requirements of the nature of the
production process rather than a reflection of labour productivity, which is
influenced by capital intensity. Thus although many of the firms in the
'chemicals and allied products' are not obviously more capital intensive than
say those in 'paper products, printing and publishing', the former has the
highest average earnings among Malawian industries.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Some of the problems discussed in this chapter relating to the suitability of the
available data for variables which conform to the standard definitions are
generally not drastic and are not peculiar to Malawi. In other circumstances
they have not deterred the use of the derived variables. Most of the variables
that have been discussed here have conventional definitions and meanings.
They have involved mainly minor data-related modifications. The relatively
more serious problems might relate to advertising intensity (AS) association
with diversified enterprises (DV), and cost disadvantage at less than minimum
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efficient scale (CDR). These however are among the variables that are typically
problematic and are often left out in empirical studies.
On the more general level there are however two problems which we have
highlighted in the Malawian context. These relate to the industry grouping used
in the publication of the data, and the coverage of the data in terms of size of
units represented.
In some instances the combination of 4—digit industries has meant that the
industrial grouping in the Malawian context is further from the ideal than those
used in other studies. This has generally been a result of having few firms in
some industries, necessitating the combination of several 4—digit SIC industries
to preserve confidentiality. This problem was particularly pronounced in the
case of the food industries, chemical and allied industries, and metal industries.
In other studies a solution to this type of problem has been to exclude from
consideration industrial groups that are considered to be too inclusive. For
Malawi, the fact that the spread of industries is itself narrow, limits the use of
this solution, as it would drastically reduce the number of available
observations. We have therefore used a number of solutions to redress this
problem. These are;
- dropping one industrial group which is too inlusive.
- the use of both cross-section and time series data to
increase the number of observations, but restricting the
time period to one during which data were published
according to relatively disaggregated industries.
- basing the calculation of important variables on highly
disaggregated industries through the use of original source
data, and using weights to obtain variables corresponding to
the more aggregated industrial groups.
On the question of the restrictions of the coverage of NSO data to large firms
employing 20 or more persons we noted that this would have the potential of
leading to some bias due to misrepresentation. However we have noted a
number of considerations that will tend to reduce the impact of this problem.
The first is the difference between the products of small scale manufacturers
and those of larger ones, which make them somewhat distant substitutes for
125
each other. The second consideration is that some of the variables including
the important ones, concentration and the scale economy variables, are to
some extent insulated from the effect of excluded small producers by some of
the assumptions which accompany their use eg. high cross elasticity of
demand for products (in the case of concentration) and production similarities
with respect to labour (in the case of the scale economy variables).
In the following chapter results of regression analysis using the above variables
are presented. Where it was suspected that particular results may have been
influenced by measurement problems, this is indicated.
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NOTES
1. The stocks item is included in gross output as 'stocks of finished goods at
the end of year' minus 'stocks of finished goods at the beginning of year.'
2. This is subject of a special article in the Financial Times 23, Sept., 1983.
3. Note that the numerator and denominator of 6.5 are not constants. Mobility
of firms among size classes can make m variable, and Lst can also change due




The model suggested in Chapter 4 was to a large extent designed to reflect the
direction pointed by theory and measurement problems. None of its features
are exclusively peculiar to the conditions existing in either the developed
industrialised economies or the less industrialised ones. The rest of that
chapter provided sufficient guidelines about the treatment of peculiarities that
may well exist in any economy but may be more prevalent in LDCs such as the
roles likely to be played by problems of availability of inputs, and price contols.
The Malawian conditions described in Chapter 5 were not presented with much
formal reference to the basic model. It is now time to bring the two together
to establish a framework for empirical estimation and the interpretation of the
results. Given that the problem of simultaneity must be seriously considered,
some prior impressions must be obtained about the endogeneity/ exogeneity of
some variables in the Malawian context.
IMPLICATIONS OF MALAiWIAN CONDITIONS
The Malawian conditions with respect to a number of issues can be
summarised as follows:
1. THE ENTRY PROCESS.
Institutional barriers to entry are minimal and
generally conform to economic conditions such as
existence or potential existence of excess capacity.
2. INPUT AVAILABILITY.
In Malawi as in many other LDCs, rationing of both
foreign exchange for imported inputs and bank advances
for working capital is potentially constraining on
capacity utilisation. The supply of skilled labour
does not seem to be too much of a problem and
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consequently might be the least constraining on output.
3. PRICE CONTROL.
The system of formal and informal price controls tends
to impose pressure on pricing similar in direction to
that of competitive forces.
4. IMPORT POLICY.
Liberal import policies with no quantitative controls
and relatively mild tariff protection ensures a
tendency towards competitive pricing.
5. EXPORT INTENSITY.
In Malawi exports are generally associated with
traditionally export-oriented industries.
These are typically agro-based and are little
affected by domestic competition or government
price policies.The rest of the manufacturing
industries are oriented towards the domestic market.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ESTIMATED MODEL
Entry
The implications of 1) is simply that only the usual economic barriers to entry
need be considered. That is, there is no need to take special account of
institutional barriers to entry as did Gan and Tham (1977) in their Malaysian
study. The implications of the rules of the entry process on conduct have
been explored in Chapter 5 and will be taken up again in Chapter 8.
Input Availability
As argued before, if problems of input availability merely lead to constraints on
production and nothing more, they need not be considered directly for the
price-cost margins equation. But then it may be that such problems can have
the same effect on collusion (via their effect on conjectural variations) as
common membership in trade associations. This seems to be the more
general interpretation and is the view adopted here.
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Price controls and the concentration 2 profits relationship
According to the official documents cited in Chapter 5, under the Malawian
price control system, the basis for determining the markup over cost was said
to be 'security of markets' which we might take to mean the combination of
the level of demand and the degree of concentration. The former would mean
that capacity utilisation could be potentially high (unless it is affected by
supply problems or strategic reasons) and that the market could potentially
support higher prices. The latter would ensure that there is little competition to
bid down prices. These two are important factors in the exercise of monopoly
power so that the price control system can be viewed in terms of its
anti-monopoly effects. One of the reasons why this form of monopoly control
has been popular in LDCs is their tendencies to have more monopolistic
industries due to the barrier effects of small markets and the fact that the
proportion of new industries is relatively high so that the pioneers become
natural monopolists for some time.
The expected effect of price controls on the concentration-profits relationship
is, as was suggested in Chapter 4, that the positive relationship would be
dampened because of the restrictions on the exercise of monopoly power and
because these restrictions are effectively based on the degree of concentration.
Effect of Import policies
There are a number of industries, such as the non-resource based 'chemical
and allied' group, that are characterised by heavy import competition. The
pressure of import competition on pricing must already be indicated by the
fierce competition in those industries, which has manifested itself in heavy
radio advertising. But the implied positive correlation between import intensity
and advertising should not be allowed to influence the specification of the
estimated model. This is because the industries characterised by both high
import intensity and heavy advertising are too few, while some industries e.g
beverages with relatively little import competition are by nature of their
products heavy advertisers. This suggests that advertising and import
competition should retain independent treatment.
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The question of whether import intensity should be regarded as endogenous or
exogenous in the profitability equation depends on whether it might be
expected that levels of imports respond to domestic performance. Another
way of putting it would be to ask the extent to which prices of imports can be
said to depend on Malawian market conditions or whether these are
determined abroad leaving the Malawian importers to pay the going prices. For
a market the size of Malawi the iatter sounds the more reasonable. However,
were protective tariffs widespread, the former would apply. This is because in
order for the tariffs to be indeed protective they would themselves need to
respond to domestic prices regardless of what caused them to change in the
first instance1. Although in Malawi protective tariffs are said to be limited, the
fact that they exist, may require that we treat import intensity as endogenous.
(In Appendix CH 7A we report results of formal tests of exogeneity, which
indicate that import intensity can be treated as exogenous in the price-cost
margins equation.)
Effect of performance on export industries
In order for export intensity to be treated as endogenous in the profitability
equation, the question of whether profitability affects the levels of exports must
be answered in the affirmative.
In Malawi the tea, tobacco and to a lesser extent the grain industries are
heavily oriented towards the export market. These industries may be expected
to sell all they cared to export, at the going international market prices.
Domestic competition or the levels of concentration are of relatively little
importance to their output or pricing decisions. Combining this with the fact
that exports from 'non-export' industries are generally negligible, it should be
reasonable to consider export intensity as exogenous.
The foregoing discussion is summarised below:
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Table 7.1
Summary of Effects of Malawian Conditions























Institutional Barriers Barriers (neutral)
Concentration-profitability negative
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results presented in this chapter were obtained by using data for
the 1969-72 period because of their consistency in terms of continuity of the
series and definitions. There is also more published information for this period
in terms of the number of variables which could be derived from the Annual
Economic SurveyfAESj and allows for greater disaggregation of the industry
groups compared to the data for other periods. The estimation was based on
16 out of a possible 17 industry groups because one industry group was too
diverse in composition and that certain variables could not be derived.
Consequently a total of N x T (= 16 x 4 = 64) observations were possible for
each variable.
In the first instance, it was assumed that simultaneity and pooling of
cross-section and time-series data presented no serious problems. That is, we
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are assuming that the classical assumptions about the error term hold
(independence between the error term and explanatory variables, no
autocorrelation, no heteroscedasticity, etc.). In addition, we assume the stability
of the model over time and across industries. With this Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimates could be obtained by using the combined data set of NxT
observations and provided a basis for comparison with subsequent results
when these assumptions were relaxed.
Earlier exploratory analysis (with both OLS and Instrumental Variables)
concerning the measurement of AS and CDR and the role of MKT are worth
mentioning. Briefly, CDR and AS (measured as 'general expenses') both
resulted in high standard errors. It is possible that this could be indicative of
the measurement problems discussed in Chapter 6. It was decided to exclude
CDR from the structural equation and substitute AS estimates from a
sub-sample of firms whose data were obtainable from the firms' files at the
NSO. This way the list of items entering the general expenses could be
narrowed down to correspond more closely (though far from being exact) to
sales promotion-related ones. The MKT variable in the margins equation,
consistently had a relatively very small and non-significant coefficient. It was
also decided to exclude this from the margins equation. Though these
variables were excluded from the margins equation those that were believed to
be exogenous a priori were used as instruments in later stages of the
estimation. These were CDR, MKT and a dummy variable ASD for industries
characterised by 'heavy' radio advertising according to the evidence presented
earlier.
Table 7.2 presents OLS estimates of the full model with alternative values for k
in CRk. If the assumptions stated above hold, the results indicate that they are
little affected by the inclusion/exclusion of input variables FIN and SKLL. The
input variable most likely to have been directly relevant in the margins equation
is RMS.
With the exception of CRk and MES, the signs of the coefficients of the rest of
the variables are consistent and conform to expectations. The coefficients for
IMPS, DV, G and RMS are consistently significant at the 5 per cent level. One
might expect that these variables, with the possible addition of MES, are also
likely to be important in a suitably estimated model.
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Table 7.2
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Price-cost Margins Equation





















































































NotesNB. The definitions of the variables used here and
in subsequent regressions of this chapter are given
in Chapter 6.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
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The results of Table 7.2 correspond to a model like
Yit = a + bXit + uit
where i = 1,...,N industries
t = 1,...,T time periods
As indicated above, stacking of observations (T observations for each of the N
cross-section units) in the use of OLS in the regressions assumes that the
classical assumptions regarding the error term hold. But this may be the case
only in rare situations. An elementary way of investigating this would be to see
whether major changes result from estimation based on observations averaged
over time (avoiding the problem of serial correlation). The resulting model (in
the simple regression case) can be described as
Y; = a + bX; + Uj
where Yj = [ITt=1Yit]/T
X| = [ITt=1Xit]/T
Given the very few sample points (16) this was very restrictive on the degrees
of freedom but again the results should be instructive. The results also
indicate non-significance for CR3 . One of the regressions was2
M = 33.54 - 0.43 CR3 + 0.08 KS + 0.28 G - 0.08 IMPS - 0.56 EXPS
(1.02) (1.65) (0.91) (0.79) (2.12)
+ 0.27 MES + 0.79 DV - 0.72 FIN - 0.29 RMS + 38.04 SKLL
(0.70) (2.46) (2.16) (1.42) (2.06)
- 21.52 AS R2 = 0.65
(0.37)
Several earlier results are now reversed, and these affect the significance of G,
IMPS, EXPS, FIN, SKLL, AS, and the signs of the coefficients for RMS and FIN.
The results point to the possibility that the classical assumptions regarding the
errors might not hold after all, making OLS estimation on the pooled data
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inappropriate. This leads to bias and inefficiency, affecting the size of
coefficients, their significance and in certain cases, their signs.3 But the use of
averaged observations is itself highly questionable on grounds of serious loss
of degrees of freedom also leading to inefficient estimates. Before presenting
further results, the question of simultaneity is explored next.
SIMULTANEITY CONSIDERATIONS
It can be argued that feedback effects in the margins equation from M are
likely to affect variables related to domestic or foreign entry, eg. CRk, G, IMPS
and DV. Furthermore, joint determination of decision variables in the act of
profit maximisation could also affect AS, KS, EXPS, CR, and possibly G. But due
to long interaction lags with M, the variables DV and KS may be taken as
exogenous a priori, provided current capital formation is not used in the proxy
for KS.
In the case of Malawi, the grounds for taking EXPS as exogenous have already
been discussed. The input variables are clearly exogenous as they are process
oriented and are unlikely to be influenced by M. The same can be said about
the scale economy variables MES and CDR. With this, the following schema
can be postulated.
Endogenous Exogenous
M, CRk, IMPS, AS EXPS, KS, DV, MES, CDR, RMS, SKLL, FIN, G
There can be no harm in treating these as assumptions requiring to be tested.
CRk, AS are treated as endogenous because of indications to that effect in SCP
models and IMPS because of the likelihood noted earlier that its
responsiveness to domestic profitability might be influenced by protective tariff
rates.
Exogeneity tests of the nature introduced into the literature by Hauseman
(1978) and Wu (1974) were carried out on NxT observations, for the variables
CRk, IMPS, G, and AS. The results, which are reported more fully in an
appendix, indicate that EXPS is not endogenous nor are G and CR3. In fact the
results suggest that the simultaneity problem is important only with respect to
AS. But as we saw in Chapter 6, AS has potentially serious measurement
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problems which may have affected the outcome of the tests.
ACCOUNTING FOR POOLED CROSS-SECTION AND TIME-SERIES DATA
The final stage in the estimation consisted of investigating the effects of
pooling cross-section and time-series data. Since straightforward estimation of
the equations using the entire data set ignores the characteristics of the error
terms with respect to time effects and cross-section units, the above OLS
estimates may not be efficient. The problems we are concerned with here are
those of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
The former is likely to arise due to the fact that in dealing with time-series
observations the errors corresponding to different years may not be
independent. Athough in the presence of serial correlation, the OLS estimates
would still be unbiased and consistent, the efficiency of the estimates is
affected. As an example, with positive serial correlation the standard errors will
be smaller than the true standard errors giving the impression that the
parameter estimates are more precise than they actually are and this can
therefore lead to incorrect assessments of the null hypotheses. With our data
set, the problem arises because we use observations for the period 1969-1972.
Heteroscedasticity is another situation which leads to efficiency loss. The
problem arises when the differences among cross-section units are such that
the error terms associated with different units have unequal variances so that
we might expect higher error sums of squares than in situations where this
problem does not arise. The problem means that the variances of the
parameter estimates will not be minimum variances or unbiased, so that
standard statistical tests for the significance of coefficients could also be
incorrect. In the Malawian case the heteroscedasticity problems might arise
because different policies (such as price controls, international trade
regulations etc.) are bound to affect different industries differently and we
have not allowed for appropriate variables to account for the effects of all such
policies.
An obvious way to deal with the problems of serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity would be to account for the cross-section and time-series
effects by using dummy variables, as in the covariance approach. This model
137
assumes that the intercept terms (associated with each observation) varies
systematically (as opposed to randomly) where the dummy variable coefficients
measure the cross-section and time-series intercepts. The problem with this
approach is that it not only leads to losses of degrees of freedom associated
with all the dummy variables, but it also lets these dummy variables stand in
for lack of knowledge of the system represented by the equation(s). In contrast
to this, there are several forms of Generalised Least Squares (GLS) techniques
whose attraction is that they make use of knowledge about the system,
obtained from the errors. These techniques could therefore be more efficient as
far as use of information is concerned, and as it turns out, most are also
potentially efficient by preserving degrees of freedom.
Two variants of generalised least-squares estimation, were considered to take
care of both the problem of serial correlation and that of heteroscedasticity.
These are the error components approach [discussed in Judge et al (1980) and
the cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive (CHTA)
approach discussed in Kmenta (1971). What the two approaches entail by way
of assumptions regarding the error term or implementation of the estimation is
discussed more fully in the Appendix. Suffice it to mention here that the error
components approach is more restrictive in assuming no cross-sectional
heteroscedasticity and no autoregression. Consequently we relied on the more
general CHTA approach, which permits both serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity.
The CHTA was used to get the results presented in Table 7.3b. Since the Time
Series Processor statistical package was the most accessible and the current
version does not deal with the problems of pooling, the estimation was done in
stages involving the following procedure;
138
Table 7.3a
Serial Correlation Coefficients (p) and
Error Variances for Cross-section Units (V)
1 2 3
Value of k for CRk(=l) (=2) (=3)
Industry p V p V p V
1. 0.43 75.8 0.48 16.6 0.35 22.14
2. 0.94 36.6 0.13 32.8 1.28 15.1
3. 0.88 30.6 0.25 21.8 0.96 4.6
4. 0.93 20.7 0.99 10.6 0.72 14.1
5. 0.28 286.3 0.13 39.6 -0.08 30.9
6. 0.02 54.7 0.19 20.7 -0.28 17.4
7. 3.04 47.4 -0.14 27.9 0.15 35.2
8. 0.69 16.8 0.32 9.8 0.71 14.7
9. 0.06 6.0 -0.26 13.4 0.20 7.1
10. 0.36 66.4 -3.05 13.0 0.08 30.6
11. 0.45 20.7 0.17 2.4 0.07 20.0
12. 1.22 52.6 1.30 4.0 0.63 13.4
13. 0.04 24.9 -0.03 11.8 0.23 17.2
14. 0.06 59.7 0.12 14.6 0.25 10.2
15. 0.93 34.8 0.84 6.1 0.05 10.5
16. -0.66 57.7 -0.57 5.2 0.00 13.5
Note:
* These estimates were calculated from the errors of the earlier stages
of estimation for models whose results are presented in
Table 7.3b. For explanation see text.
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Table 7.3b
Price-cost Margins Equation: Simultaneity Considerations37 and
Instrumental Variables Estimation
(GLSb/, with Cross-sectional Heteroscedasticity and Time-wise
Autoregression cA































































































Notes:a/ The instrumental variables for all equations were
CONST, KS, G, EXPS, DV, MES, RMS, FIN, SKLL. CDR, MKT,
ASD(the radio advertising dummy).
b/ Generalised Least Squares.
c/ Variables were double transformed for serial correlation
and heteroscedasticity using the P and V values listed
in Table 7.3a.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
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-1: Estimate the complete model using Instrumental Variable
estimation. From the error terms, obtain estimates for
the serial correlation coefficients for each cross-section
unit. [These are the columns p in Table 7.3a where the ps
can be judged against the null hypothesis Ho: pi = 0],
-2: Adjust all the observations for serial correlation and
re-estimate the model. In the simple regression example
(with variables as differences from means) we estimate
the model,
V*it = Bx*it + u*it
where y*it = yit - pjyit-i
x*it = *it ~ Pi*it-1
U*it " Uit - PiUj(_
for t = 2, 3 T
i = 1, 2 N
-3: From the errors u*jt, obtain estimates for cross-section
variances (columns V in Table 7.3a), then adjust the observations
for heteroscedasticity by transforming the observations as
follows,
Y**it = VVsui
* it * it ui
U**it = UAit/Sui
where suj is the standard deviation of the errors,
from s2ui = 1/T-g-1 LTt=2 u*2it, where
where g is the number of estimated parameters.
[Note that in our case T = 4 < g so the adjustment for
degrees of freedom was not possible, but this is not a
major problem since what we have is an alternative
measure of variance. From Table 7.3a, the differences
in variance are self-evident]
-4: Estimate the model using the double transformed variables.
The above procedure was streamlined by writing a short program for
transforming the variables so that the only task required was simply to obtain
p and V for each different model. One problem with this method is that it is a
bit wasteful of degrees of freedom in the calculation of the correlation
coefficients (in our case 16 degrees of freedom were lost in this way)4.
After estimating the models with the results shown in Table 7.3b, some
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experimentation was done to find out the effects of non-linear specification,
since in Chapter 2 it was indicated that price-cost margins were related to
barriers to entry in a non-linear way. Following the models by Saving (1970)
and Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980) a similar argument can be extended to the
relationship between price-cost margins and the k-firm concentration ratio. The
experimentation was done by letting dummy variables represent the
non-linearities in, concentration and minimum efficient scale. These dummies,
say d-,,...,dd would represent size classes of the relevant independent variable
according to deciles, quartiles or whatever. In our case quartiles were used to
classify the levels of concentration and MES because of the problem of few
firms which would have resulted in many empty size classes. [Ideally the more
size classes the better would be the representation of non-linearities.] For
concentration, the dummy variables were defined as; d! = 1 for 0 < CRk < 25
%, and di = 0 otherwise; d2 = 1 for 26% < CRk < 50% and d2 = 0 otherwise,
and so on. The same size classes were used for the MES dummies. In order to
avoid the problem of perfect colinearity (which would make estimation
impossible) one of the dummies (d-|) was dropped when the estimation was
done.
In order to judge whether a non-linear specification was more appropriate than
a linear one of Table 7.3b one would need to test for the joint significance of
the dummy variables, using the F-test. The equations of Table 7.3b would in
this case be considered to be the restricted forms while those which include
non-linearity dummies would be the unrestricted forms (because they also
essentially involve more variables). The acid test for improvement in moving
from restricted to unrestricted form would consist of simply checking whether
there was significant reduction in the error sum of squares ESS (after all the
F-test is based on this difference). The results of the experimentation were that
all our non-linear specifications lead to higher ESS although in some cases this
was only marginally so, giving results quite similar to those in Table 7.3b. For
example the equation with CR3 and concentration dummies was
M = 0.06 + 1.53 CR3 + 1.53 KS + 0.18 G - 65.29 IMPS + 9.22 EXPS
(0.55) (0.55) (5.65)** (4.40)** (1.49)*
+ 0.44 DV + 0.27 MES + 0.03 AS + 0.21 RMS + 0.09 FIN +6.58 SKLL
(4.42)** (1.92)** (0.54) (3.50)** (1.86)** (0.66)
+0.12 CR3d2 - 0.55 CR3d3 - 0.20 CR3d4
(0.23) (1.41) (0.44)
R = 0.95 Error Sum of Squares = 13.94
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The two likely reasons why the non-linear specifications did not represent
improvement are the use of quartiles for the size classes, and, even more
importantly, the possibility that linear specifications were good enough. The
latter is supported by the fact that in the equations without non-linear
specification, the ESS achieved were quite low, so that improvement on them
was bound to be marginal at the most.
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
The results of the Table 7.3b are comparable to those of other authors
reviewed in Chapter3 (ie. Geroski, Intriligator et <?/) which showed some
changes in signs and significance of coefficients, in moving from OLS to Two
Stage Least Squares (approximated by Instrumental Variable Estimation in our
case). A comparison of the results of Table 7.2 and those of Table 7.3b shows
that most of the results are fairly consistent with each other in terms of which
coefficients are significant. The only major exceptions are the changes with
respect to the significance attached to the AS and FIN variables.
From the review of the earlier studies for Western economies, it seemed that
the non-significance of the concentration variable is not now considered to be
remarkable. The Malawian circumstances were such that this result might be an
expected one, because of the price controls, whose implementation seemed to
be influenced by the degree of market concentration. In this connection, it is
noteworthy that the use of different values of k for CRk brings about little
change in the results of Table 7.3b.
With regard to KS, the usual practice is to use the variable to represent capital
intensity because price-cost margins are usually not measured properly to
account for the return on capital (ie. depreciation, interest, and a risk
premium). In this study, price-cost margins were measured exclusive of
depreciation and interest, ie. they were included in the deducted costs. Our
measure could therefore be described as an approximation for net return on
sales, though it is a rough one because of measurement problems5. With this
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interpretation, the non-significance of the KS coefficient could be indicating
that controlling for capital intensity was not necessary.
The coefficient for G is consistently positive and significant, indicating that
despite price controls firms were still largely free to respond positively to the
demand stimulus. This in itself implies that while the resfictiveness of price
controls was sensitive to levels of concentration it was not at the same time
restrictive as far as responses to demand were concerned. This is not such a
curious result as it might sound since demand considerations in the form of
estimates for actual size of market or its growth are not involved in calculus of
price increase determination.
IMPS has the expected sign throughout and the significance of its coefficient
suggests that the competitive pressures which were noted in connection with
import competition and radio advertising for the late 1970s, were also at work
during the 1969-1972 period. This acted in such a way as to reduce margins in
the manner suggested by either the import barriers to entry hypothesis or the
market shares hypothesis (which we saw to be very closely related). That is for
some industries import competition could have been important enough for
them to maintain low prices in a bid to maintain their shares of the domestic
market or prevent these shares from falling rapidly. The intensity of radio
advertising activity among foreign and domestic competitors in some of these
industries is another indication of such pressure.
It has already been suggested that high export intensity in Malawi, is
associated with price-taking. Although the sign of EXPS coefficient is mostly
negative its non-significance is a surprising result. The theoretical expectation
would have been that where the international market is associated with highly
elastic demand functions this would lead to lower monopoly power in export-
dependent industries. The typical export industries in Malawi are agro-based
and prone to the influences of oligopsonistic/monopsonistic market structures
on the buyers' side in the domestic market and on the international market.
Another consequence of this is that it is also not worthwhile for firms in these
industries to exercise international price discrimination against the domestic
market because their individual domestic demand curves are also likely to be
highly price-elastic. Apart from this and from a policy point of view export
activity was free from the restrictions that might be associated with price
controls6. In view of this, one possible explanation for the present result may
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therefore be the fact that export activity is itself largely confined to only two
industries, tea and tobacco, which would make them isolated cases so that the
results are not sensitive to their influence.
DV has been measured in terms of industries' association with diversified
enterprises. Conventionally defined (as in Chapter 3), the diversification variable
is usually intended to control for the measurement of concentration which is
affected by imbalanced diversification of firms among products allocated in an
industry. In our case, DV could be seen in terms of the advantages (or
disadvantages) derived by firms from association with diversified enterprises.
The results, suggest that there are advantages, which have a significant
influence on margins. The nature of some of these advantages will be explored
in the following chapter.
The scale economy barriers represented by MES did not make a significant
impact on the pricing decisions of Malawian firms, which is consistent with the
findings of other studies. Although we have noted that this variable was poorly
measured due to the nature of the data, we argued that in relative terms it
reflected the relative ease/difficulty of entry into the various industries, and
could closely approximate the effects of a better measured variable. If this is
the case, the possible explanation for the result obtained in the case of Malawi
would be as follows.
Firstly, price controls already imposed constraints on pricing so that limit
pricing or entry regulatory pricing would not be necessary in the industries
which would otherwise be attractive to prospective entrants (ie. the highly
concentrated industries). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there is also
the possibility that entry regulatory pricing was simply not an important
strategy for entry deterrence among Malawian firms, whether price controls
were effective or not.
The results suggest that entry regulatory pricing based on barriers to entry,
was not an important entry deterring strategy for Malawian firms. In Chapter 5
we examined some of the strategies available to existing Malawian firms in
deterring entry. We saw that lobbying against new manufacturing licence
applications based on the existence of current excess capacity, was potentially
a very direct way of trying to deter entry. Even if it was anticipated to be
potentially unfruitful in preventing the granting of the new licences, firms could
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still use it for effective entry deterrence. This is because the representation
against the licence application can be used to make the prospective entrants
aware of the existence of excess capacity, and because the existing firms can
gain time for the implementation of other strategies. We pointed out in
Chapter 5 that these possibilities may have accounted for the fact that despite
the granting of numerous new manufacturing licences, effective entry trailed far
behind. These same reasons (apart from the potentially serious measurement
problems mentioned in Chapter 6) may also account for the non-significance of
the AS coefficient.
Of the three input variables, skill intensity is the only one which did not
significantly influence price-cost margins, while the rest, RMS and FIN do so in
a way that supports the hypothesis postulated in Chapter 4. That is, the
potential constraints on production caused by input availability problems might
influence conjectural variations and through this would facilitate collusive
tendencies in pricing. This might still be effective in raising margins despite the
price controls because, as we have seen above, the price controls did not seem
to affect other factors which could affect pricing, eg. demand, and also because
industries with colluding firms might be in a better position to influence the
price control authorities in authorising price increases.
THE DETERMINANTS OF CONCENTRATION
In this section we investigate the determinants of the degree of concentration.
Let the change in the degree of concentration be a function of entry. The
latter is usually taken to depend on barriers to entry, and industry profitability.
Most specifications of static concentration equations are made with respect to
these variables.
In a more sophisticated specification for concentration Martin (1979) (reviewed
in Chapter 3) included lagged M and CRk variables, the variables MES, CDR and
AS for barrier effects, and G for demand. In a similar approach using averaged
observations it was decided here that the use of variability of margins would
be particularly suitable for measuring the attractiveness of entry or the risks
associated with it. That is, the possibility of high margins will attract entry, but
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their variability would discourage it. One should therefore not expect to find
that highly concentrated industries are associated with high margins with low
variability unless entry there is faced with high barriers or is foreclosed. On
the contrary, if barriers are controlled for, highly concentrated industries would
be associated with high average margins but which are also highly variable
because this discourages subsequent entry.
OLS was used for the estimation. The argument here is that even if there were
feedback effects between concentration and margins, the use of variability of
margins ensures that the simultaneity problem does not arise. On the basis of
the exogeneity tests of Appendix CH 7A, the simultaneity problem does not
arise even when M is an explanatory variable.
The main result of comparing alternative specifications is that the significance
of the variability variable VarM was reduced by the inclusion of DV in the
equation. The coefficient of DV was itself positive and nearly significant at 5
percent level. This in itself has the significance that diversification is a likely
source of finance for 'risky' ventures. This explanation would not be at odds
with the 'cross-subsidisation' effects of diversification observed by other
authors, except that in the Malawi case the cross-subsidisation would often be
more in terms of entering 'new' industries rather than intra-industry rivalry.
The substitution of M for VarM in the CR3 equation results in;
-a) reduction in the F-statistic.
-b) nonsignificance of the coefficient of M.
-c) reduction of R2.
a) to c) imply that the use of VarM instead of M in the CR3 equation is
probably more appropriate and that though the M and CR3 equations may be
part of the same system, it is a recursive one. Thus CR3 may play a role in the
M equation but with no feedback effects from M to CR3 (at least not directly
through current-dated values of M and CR3). One could say that VarM
represents dynamic feedback effects and that these are somewhat similar to
specifications with explicit lag structures such as in Martin's (1979) model.
The regressions are well determined, and highly significant in terms of the F-
statistics. Not surprisingly, much of this is due to the barrier to entry variable
Table7.4
DeterminantsofConcentration
OrdinaryLeastSqu res:D p.V r=CR3;bservations16 (tstatisticsinbrackets)
x
CONSTMVarMGEDVAKR 30.460.04-0.1291927 8- 083F(6,9)=2 6 (1.46)*0.38)7 1 *(1.29)50( .53)* 34.410.05-0.148827- 192F(5,1 )=2 .58 (2.51)**(0.41)(6.81)**0.47)1 96 * 28.310.07-0.0188316 8249F(6,9)=16.30 (0.26)026.21)**(2.23)**(0.27)81 Notes:*Significantatthe10%level. **Significantatthe5%lev l.
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MES. This confirms the earlier observations made in Chapter 5 that
government's role in regulating entry could be regarded as an informative one
concerning economic conditions, while barriers to entry play the role of entry
regulation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The GLS estimates presented in this chapter for the profitability equation,
indicate that some variables which might be directly connected with domestic
pricing (CR3, and MES) do not exert significant influence on it. In connection
with CRk, we have noted some peculiar features of the Malawian conditions
such as
- high degrees of concentration in certain industries
- the absence of anti-monopoly legislation
- the likelihood that price controls were stiffer, the
higher the degree of concentration
On the basis of this combination of factors it is highly probable that the
negation of the expected strong tendency towards collusive pricing (facilitated
by the first two factors) is largely attributable to price controls.
As far as MES is concerned, we have suggested here that the result that it
does not play an important role in pricing may have something to do with price
controls. But what to us seems to be an even more important possibility is that
firms do not extensively use pricing for purposes of entry deterrence. The
reason for this is that there are available some other direct avenues for doing
this. One such avenue is excess capacity, where its existence could easily be
signalled to prospective entrants via a provision in the entry regulations, which
allows existing firms to make representations against new licence applications,
and where excess capacity is considered to be a legitimate ground for doing
so. Moreover, such representations could also be used to gain time for
implementing other strategies.
Other results of this chapter indicate that the existence of price controls did
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not completely constrain firms from making decisions based on commercial
principles. For example, demand factors and import competition were still
important determinants of profitability, while profitability and barriers to entry
respectively provided stimulus and deterrence to entry.
One result, whose investigation is still relatively rare, relates to the influence of
potential input problems, on pricing behaviour. On the basis of the results of
this chapter, it appears that potential problems with imported inputs and
working capital might be instrumental to collusive behaviour and ultimately, to
the exercise of greater monopoly power. We use the cautious 'might' here
because we have not yet examined any evidence explicitly linking these
potential problems to collusive behaviour. If such a link does exist, then we
have an unusual source of monopoly power.
In the next chapter we shall examine evidence of a different type, relating to
some of the issues discussed here, including the felt effects of price controls,
the popular entry deterring strategies, and whether input problems really have
anything to do with collusive tendencies.
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NOTES
1. It is possible that in some cases firms in monopolistic industries could
influence the levels of tariffs on competing imports through lobbying. One
suspects that this has been the case particularly in industries with granted
monopolies such as in the brewing industry. For some other industries, this
type of protection would not be necessary. For example, firms producing
products like soft drinks, bricks etc. with low value-to-weight ratios would be
protected from import competition by transportation costs.
2. t-statistics are in brackets. The levels of significance indicated with asteriks
have the same explanation as in Table 7.2. This is the convention we shall
adopt for reporting regression results for the rest of this study.
3. For a discussion of bias and efficiency in connection with pooling of
cross-section and time-series observations see Jugde et a{ 1980).
4. A way of replacing the observations in the correction for serial correlation
involves the use of the estimated ps to transform the observations associated
with t = 1 by multiplying them byyl-p2 (see Maddala, 1977, pp278-279).
Although the method is simple, implementing it in the present estimation is too
involved (because it involves every cross-section unit necessitating numerous
sample statements in the TSP program). We therefore decided to forego it.
However there are now statistical packages which can handle the pooling
problem and using the observation replacement procedure eg. White's,
(1984) SHARZAM
5. For example, the risk premium is not accounted for and the depreciation
used for tax purposes often bears little relation to the 'economic depreciation'
which takes into account 'wear and tear' and technical absolescence of the
capital stock.
6. Export activity has not been completely free of controls of the nature being
discussed here. For example, export levies have been in effect and have only
been abolished recently, in March, 1986.
CHAPTER 8
SOME DIMENSIONS OF CONDUCT: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we present an analysis which is an advance on previous work
for Malawi or elsewhere, (including the analyses of the foregoing chapters), by
illuminating the 'conduct' part which is so often neglected in the
structure-conduct-performance approach. This analysis is based on first-hand
information from the firms themselves about their behaviour with respect to
certain issues and what constrains that behaviour. As far as Malawi is
concerned (and possibly other African countries with similar manufacturing
conditions) this type of information should be invaluable for policy formulation,
implementation, and for minitoring firms' reactions to recent policy changes
such as the move towards price control liberalisation.
The data which are analysed here were obtained by means of a questionnaire
sent out to manufacturing firms in October, 1984. But before we start
examining the data, we indicate below, some specific ways in which the
present analysis improves on the analyses of previous chapters.
THE NEED FOR PRIMARY SOURCE DATA
The resort to a questionnaire to obtain the data used in this chapter was
mainly prompted by the fact that analyses of the type presented in the
previous chapter are limited by the nature of available secondary data. Typically
the restrictions are such that while the analyses are expected to answer
general questions about relationships among variables, the measurement of the
variables and indeed the models themselves are often compromised by data
problems. And perhaps more important than this, the analyses are based on
assumptions that are meant to be taken at face value and basic questions such
as the prevalence of certain aspects of behaviour or phenomena, cannot be
answered in a straightforward way. The following problem areas are discussed
according to how they have been represented in the questionnaire, and the
discussion is presented in such a way as to show what weaknesses in the
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foregoing chapters could be improved on by analysing questionnaire-based
data.
Entry by diversification
In Chapters 6 and 7 a variable was defined and used in regression analyses to
represent the extent to which firms in an industry were associated with parent
enterprises. It was suggested that such association could create problems in
the measurement of individual firms' price-cost margins and therefore those of
the industries in which they are classified. Apart from this, it was also
suggested that the firms associated with diversified enterprises might derive
advantages, particularly financial ones, which could modify their behaviour
vis-a-vis rivals who do not enjoy such advantages. A problem therefore arises,
of whether to interpret this variable as merely controlling for the measurement
of price-cost margins or whether it represents the behavioural traits of
diversified firms. In our case another problem that was identified with respect
to this variable was a measurement one, since it was only possible to measure
diversification from parent interprises which already had interests in other
manufacturing activities. Thus for example diversification from interprises with
interests in only one type of manufacturing activity but with extensive activities
in non-manufacturing sectors, would not be represented despite the fact that
this association may provide advantages to the affiliates just as any other type
of association. With the survey data it is possible to investigate not only the
relative extent of different types of diversification, but also to specifically deal
with the question of whether such affiliation makes any difference to behaviour.
Capacity utilisation
In Chapter 5 it was suggested that firms in Malawi could deliberately invest in
excess capacity as a way of influencing the government to prohibit new entry.
Even if the government did not concur with this, the existence of excess
capacity might still have the effect of deterring entry, where the potential
entrants are made aware of the existence of excess capacity through Malawi's
entry regulations, which allow for representations to be made by existing firms,
against new licence applications. Thus the Malawi situation provides an
excellent opportunity for the strategic use of excess capacity and yet there is
currently no source of information that can be used to assess the extent of
excess capacity. This is why in Chapter 5 we were unable to make an adequate
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assessment of the situation or make usefull suggestions regarding the likely
causes of excess capacity . Apart from this, the variables used in Chapter 7 to
represent likely problems with inputs, were measured in such a way that they
represented the potential problem rather than its actual occurance. In the
regression analysis of that chapter, there was also the possibility that one of
the input variables, dependence on imported inputs, was associated with
another independent variable, export intensity, giving rise to problems of
interpretation of the individual coefficients.
This chapter allows us to make an assessment of the extent of excess capacity,
to identify the likely causes, and to verify whether input problems do influence
pricing behaviour.
Pricing
Pricing behaviour is central to the SCP as well as to the recent changes in the
Malawi government policies with respect to price controls. From both the
theoretical and policy points of view it should therefore be interesting to find
out even in a merely indicative way, whether the absence of anti-trust
legislation might foster more explicit collusive behaviour be it in relation to
pricing or entry prevention. Here there is also scope to study related issues,
such as whether the phenomenon of price leadership is prevalent, whether
pricing behaviour responds to cost and demand conditions, and whether price
controls were felt to be effective.
Behaviour in the face of entry
The model discussed in Chapter 2 which lead to the estimated form discussed
in Chapter 4, assumed as a matter of course that firms were motivated by the
prospects of long run profitability and that they were therefore concerned
about new entry. This was also reflected in Chapter 5 where we discussed
some possible reactions to potential entry. As yet we do not know the extent
to which existing firms are aware of potential entry and the courses of action
they take to deter it, if they do anything at all. Do they, for instance, use
predominantly pricing strategies, or do they resort to non-price strategies such
as advertising, product quality improvements or some other strategies? Some
answers to such questions can be offered in this chapter.
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Performance m a dynamic context
Profitability is only one aspect of performance, and even so it is regarded as a
static one. In a dynamic context, firms have been known to engage in activities
such as research and development (R&D) which although the activities add to
costs in the short run (and can therefore reduce price-cost margins), they are
expected to improve firms' long term profitability and survival. Typically
industries that are to be found in LDCs such as Malawi at an early stage of
industrialisation, are still mostly concerned with import substitution, involving
products on which much research and development will have already been
carried out in countries from which the technologies were transferred. It should
still be interesting to find out whether there is any such activity in Malawi and
to determine its nature.
THE SURVEY
The Technique of Investigation
There are several techniques for gathering primary source data, and each is
associated with its own mix of problems.1 For this study the mail questionnaire
approach was adopted firstly because it offered the possibility of a wide
coverage cheaply, and secondly because it could be carried out without the
physical presence of the user of the information. The major problems of this
approach are the likelihood of low response rates, and the difficulty of
collecting rich information about each respondent without worsening the
response rate. Below we discuss some of the steps which we took in order to
minimise the problems of the questionnaire approach.
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The questionnaire design
The design and coverage of a questionnaire depends on its purpose. The
Malawi survey was meant to give an impressionistic view of the extent to
which certain phenomena and behavioural characteristics are widespread
among large manufacturers. The questions could therefore be simple ones
requiring simple answers, while the coverage would be as extensive as
possible.
Since the distribution of the questionnaires was by mail, the questionnaire itself
was to be as simple and as short as possible to encourage completion. This is
why in most cases only categorical YES/NO answers were sought and the
questions themselves were meant to be straightforward enough to require no
explanation. The whole idea was to make it possible for the respondents to
complete the questionnaire in one sitting without recourse to elaborate sources
of information such as files and so on. Although this strategy was supposed to
influence the response rate, there can be no doubt that it also imposes
constraints on the subsequent use of the data. The major constraint is in
relation to the formal testing of hypotheses such as in regression analysis. This
problem and its resolution is discussed in the section that deals with
regression results.
ii)Coverage of the Survey
In order to make the coverage of the survey as extensive as possible the
questionnaire was mailed to all known substantial manufacturing
establishments.These are the ones that satisfied the National Statistical
Office's(NSO) size criterion for inclusion in the Annual Economic Survey(AES)
(that is those employing 20 or more persons),and those that did not but were
nevertheless large enough to require manufacturing licences (those employing
10 or more people or using machinery of at least 25 horsepower).The resulting
list was compilled from the NSO's Mail Control List(1984) and the Ministry of
Trade and Industry's Licencing Working Lists, neither of which source is
published.
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The survey therefore covered 100 percent of operational substantial
manufacturers. In addition, a few firms were included whose operational status
was uncertain although they had manufacturing licences. These included firms
in the 'pre-operation', 'quitting' and 'merging' transitions. Although the coverage
of this survey can in theory be considered to be an improvement on that of
AES by attempting to include smaller firms, in practice little of this was
achieved. This is because as mentioned in Chapter 5, in Malawi the size
distribution of firms is such that small firms that would be in the category of
those employing between 10 and 20 persons are very few. The majority of
small producers are of the 'informal' type, often employing much fewer than 10
people. While it should have been worthwhile to have a sample of such
producers especially in the industries characterised by a large presence of such
small producers, there is little information on which to base the sampling or of
where to find the units. It will therefore be useful to bear in mind that the
analysis of this chapter, much like that of the previous one, is restricted to
large firms. But from the type of questions we are interested in, this should not
be a serious problem.
Like for NSO surveys, the unit of coverage was the firm, which was initially
assumed to be a single establishment (ie. comprising one factory) and
responsible for 'reasonably' independent decision-making at least as far as
major decisions are concerned eg. output levels, pricing etc.. In certain cases
'firms' in this sense could not be identified with certainty as in the case of
branch plants each operating in a diferent location but producing the same
product. If no major decisions were made at the branch level then it was hoped
that the branch plants would relegate the completion of the questionnaires to
their head offices (as they would for NSO surveys). As it turned out, this is
exactly what happened. Those branches that completed and returned separate
questionnaires operated under conditions that required taking into account
diferent regional conditions like special product variations , different product
ranges, and prices.
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iii)Timing of the Survey
The survey was done in October in order for it to benefit from the backup
service for the NSO's own surveys. The backup service is itself timed to avoid
the busy pre-Christmas period for the respondents. For this survey the
respondents were allowed as little time as was practical. According to a
recommendation from the NSO, the respondents were only allowed 14 days for
completing and returning the questionnaires/This was done to discourage
'shelving' of the questionnaire which is a usual cause of low response rates
especially in mail surveys.
iv)Administration of the Survey
Semi-official backing was obtained for the administration of the survey. This
meant that although there would be no reference to the Statistics Act obliging
firms to complete and return the questionnaire, the survey itself could be
administered from the NSO (but not necessarily by the NSO). An official of that
office agreed to undertake this task and all the replies were to be returned to
him. This arrangement was partly instrumental to the achievement of the high
response rate discussed below.
Response Rate and Distribution Across Industries
In all 168 questionnaires were mailed, of which 8 were firms that were too
small to qualify for inclussion in NSO's AES. 3 turned out to be quitters, 2
were involved in takeover/mergers, and 1 operated a 'service' type of business,
where the manufacturing was done to order. 65 establishments were
associated with 23 multiplant enterprises.
The total number of responses was 102, from firms in 40 four-digit SIC
industries. These comprised 93 usable (in 38 four-digit industries), and 9 not
completed (2 returned to sender,1 merged ,6 non-manufacturing).
Non-responses numbered 66.
Taking into account the fact that some branch plants relegated the completion
of the questionnaires for reasons described above, the response rate was very
high going by mail survey standards. For 'firms' in the decision-making sense,
this would be between 60% (ie.102/168x100) and 80% (ie.102/[168-65+23]x100).
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Table 8.1
Distribution of Responses in Four_digit SIC Inds.
No. of Questionnaires Distribution Total
Not of mailed
Product(s) SIC Completed Completed Tot Non-responses
Meat prods. 3111 1 - 1 1 2
Fruit & veg. 3113 1 - 1 — 1
Fish 3114 - - - 1 1
Edible oils 3115 1 - 1 - 1
Grain millg. 3116 1 1 2 6 8
Bakeries 3117 4 - 4 6 10
Sugar 3118 - - - 1 1
Confectionary 3119 1 - 1 — 1
Tea 3123 14 - 14 4 18
Distilling 3131 1 - 1 - 1
Beer 3133 2 - 2 2 4
Beverages 3134 - - - 1 1
3137 1 - 1 — 1
Tobacco 3140 3 2 5 4 9
Spinning etc. 3211 3 1 4 - 4
Textiles 3212 2 - 2 — 2
Knitwear 3213 1 1 2 - 2
Rope & netting 3215 1 - 1 1 2
Clothing 3220 4 - 4 10 14
Leather prods. 3233 1 - 1 - 1
Footwear 3240 1 - 1 - 1
Sawmill prods. 3311 4 - 4 4 8
Handicrafts 3319 2 - 2 — 2
Furniture 3320 4 - 4 2 6
Packaging 3412 - - - 1 1
Paper prods. 3419 - 1 1 — 1
Printg. & pub. 3420 3 - 3 4 7
Ind. chems. 3511 1 - 1 . 2 3
Fertilizers 3512 - - - 1 1
Paints 3521 2 - 2 1 3
Drugs & med. 3522 2 - 2 — 2
Soaps etc. 3523 4 - 4 1 5
Matches 3529 1 1 1 — 1
Tyre & tube 3551 4 - 4 - 4
Plastic prods. 3560 4 - 4 1 5
Concrete prods. 3690 1 - 1 - 1
Bricks, tiles 3691 2 - 2 - 2
Cemet, lime 3692 1 - 1 - 1
Other non-met. 3699 - - - 1 1
Handtools 3811 1 - 1 - 1
Structrl.met. 3813 5 - 5 1 6
Fab.met.prods. 3819 4 1 5 3 8
Agric. mach. 3822 - 1 1 - 1
Other mach. 3829 1 1 2 3 5
Other met. prods .3813 - - - 1 1
Radio ass. 3832 1 - 1 - 1
Batteries 3839 - - - 1 1
Motor veh.ass. 3843 2 - 2 2 4
Sports gds. 3903 1 - 1 - 1
Total = 93 9 102 66 168
159
In order to get an impression of the spread of the responses and
non-responses across 4—digit SIC indusrties an analysis of of these is given in
Table 8.1.
The modal response frequency per industry is 1. These frequencies reflect the
distribution of firms in the industries and the tendency towards high
concentration in Malawian manufacturing.
The distribution of the non-responses reveals two important features. The first
one is that two industries with the highest number of non-responses (bakeries
and clothing) are also associated with large numbers of smaller producers who
make up large proportions of the non-responses. This means that we end up in
a situation where the effective survey coverage (in the sense of the actual
returns) does not offer much improvement over the AES as far as
representation of the smaller producers is concerned. The second feature of
the non-responses is that about half of them are associated with 28 multiplant
enterprises. This reduces the effective number of non-responses (and raises
the effective response rate) in so far as we are interested in decision-making
units in the manner described above.
THE RESUITS:A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
In the summary results presented here, it should be noted that in the returns
of the survey and subsequent coding of the data for the YES/NO questions, the
YES answers were taken to be the more definitive. NO was assigned to two
types of situations, firstly where NO was indicated as the answer and secondly
where the question had been left unanswered. The latter was taken as an
indication of either uncertainty or non-relevance of the question for the
particular respondent. It is for reasons of such possibilities under NO, that the
percentages were calculated and presented for only the YES replies. Apart from
this problem, which mainly affected questions relating to behaviour in the face
of entry, the quality of the responses was generally good and this might be
attributable to the simple qualitative replies. Inevitably, for this type of study,
there would still be cases where respondents might have been confused by
certain questions and where parts of the questionnaire could present problems
of analysis. Since these relate to specific parts of the questionnaire, they are
discussed below, under appropriate headings.
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Affiliation
Hines{1957) argued that diversification is an important form of entry. This is
because it is on balance easier for enterprises established in other industries to
enter yet others. To them the level of overall barriers to entry is low
compared to completely new and independent entrants. For LDCs, where the
capital requirements barrier tends to be high, this form of entry can be an
important source for the broadening of the manufacturing sector as a whole.
The ties between individual firms and their diversified parent enterprises can
also be fortifying to the former in the modus vivendi of competition in their
respective industries in the manner suggested by the hypothesis of
cross-subsidisation of competition. But these ties can also be constraining on
the firms' independence in decision-making.
From Table 8.2 , out of 93 responses, 73 (ie.40 + 33) were associated with
diversified enterprises. Many of these derived financial advantages.
There are three features of the figures worth noting. Firstly, affiliation to
foreign enterprises is quite important in Malawian manufacturing. Secondly,
vertical integration from agriculture is nearly as important as diversification
within the manufacturing sector. Thirdly, finance seems to be the most
important advantage from affiliation and at the same time the major source of
restrictions. The financial restrictions are probably associated with long-term
decisions such as those relating to capital investment. Decisions on current
issues such as rates of production, pricing, and selling, seem to be much less
affected. The following figures give some indication of 'other' advantages and
disadvantages from information volunteered by respondents.
Table8.2 Summarv:Affiliation
Al* 23A4567A89A10l12 Baseof parentco.Sectoradvantagesrestrictions loc.forgna r.manuth.fin.othut.fin.pricemktgoth.
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Investment [n Fixed Assets & Capacity Utilisation
During the mid-to-late 1960s much new industrial capacity was still being
created in the early phase of import- substituting industrialisation and excess
capacity may not have been pronounced. But it may be that things had
changed by the 1980s. Table 8.3 summarises the relevant responses from the
survey.
From the table, one form or other of investment in fixed assets has been
widespread and firms' own resources were by far the most important source of
finance (that is medium-to- long term). Inter-company and bank loans are still
a significant source of finance but the latter is not as important (for already
established concerns) as one would expect in other economies where capital is
less scarce. The major 'other' sources of funds that were mentioned by the
respondents were international finance corporations.
The most constraining operational problems affecting investment decisions (and
by extending the argument current capacity utilisation) were due to imported
material inputs and plant and machinery (presumably also imported). This
would tend to lend support to the suggestion made in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
that imported imports might be an important source of production constraints
due to rationing of foreign exhange. It was also suggested that this constraint
might facilitate the exploitation of monopoly power via its effects on colussion.
Skilled labour does not seem to be as important a source of production
constraint as imported materials. Inputs such as fuel, and machinery
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Price changes for Malawian manufacturers are typically price increases partly
because of the influence of ever increasing costs of imported inputs
particularly fuel and partly because of lack of vigorous competition. Although
the rate of inflation has averaged between 15 to 20 percent in recent years, the
price increases are normally effected on a once-a-year basis, usually soon
after the budget speech suggesting that firms take advantage of the budget
statement to increase prices. It is this kind of general pricing situation which
gives meaning to the formulation of the pricing question in the questionnaire,
where firms were asked whether they had raised prices once, twice, or never
during the previous three years.
Three years was specified in order to reduce the role of special short-term
circumstances, in determining price increases. Where responses of 'several'
times were indicated, in the Malawian situation this can be interpreted as
meaning that price increases where of a frequency of at least once a year. As a
post survey lesson, there can be no doubt that there would have been a
definite improvement in the data relating to price increases, if firms were
simply asked how many times they had raised the prices of their major
products in the last three years. This will of course have broken with the
general design of the questionnaire but it would have been worthwhile for this
important question.
The assumption behind the question relating to price increases is that firms
produce products which are related in both production and demand so that
price increases sought by firms affect most of those products. Nearly half of
the respondents had raised prices several times during the previous three
years. Considering that three years is a long time and that production is mostly
confined to consumer non-durables which have a high frequency of purchase,
one might have expected that a larger proportion of firms had raised prices
several times. This could mean that either demand or price controls were
constraining. But in view of the high rate of inflation this could also mean that
although price increases were infrequent, when they did change, they did so
with large margins. The right hand portion of Table 8.4 shows the importance
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of various factors on pricing decisions.
Just about a third of the respondents considered demand factors to be very
important in influencing pricing decisions while just under a third considered
government intervention to be very important. Given that the survey was done
about a year after the announcement of price liberalisation the low proportion
of respondents who indicated the importance of price controls, may not be
unexpected. From the results, it is quite clear that input costs are an important
influence on firms' pricing decisions.
It is quite likely that respondents interpreted 'demand' in the questionnaire as
refering to the general level of demand2. The rather low proportion of
respondents who mentioned demand as being very important (37%) suggests
that other factors may have had overriding importance.
On the question of how the pricing decisions were implemented, a significant
proportion of respondents (24%) admitted that they were price leaders and
there seems to be some reciprocity in that a sizeable proportion of
respondents admitted to being price followers. The distribution of these
responses across industries indicates that the highest incidence of
price-leadership was in industries with considerable competition (in terms of
numbers) eg. the 'chemical and allied' and the 'metal products' industries.3
Admitted collusion was found in 13 percent of the cases.The percentage would
be much higher than this if it was based only on respondents producing mainly
for the domestic market. This underscores the argument that in the absence of
antitrust legislation, conditions favouring collusion could lead to overt
arrangements and the existence of recognised dominant firms could facilitate
this.
Behaviour [n the Face of Entry
Firms which indicated that there was too much competition are in 18
industries. It is now possible to go back to the question of perception by large
firms of competition from small firms or the fringe (comprising 'informal'
producers). Significantly, of all industries suggested in Chapter 5 as possibly
having important fringe competition only respondents in 'meat products' and
'grain milling' did not indicate that competition was too much. The respondent
















































































































Commission, in the case of meat, and the Grain Milling Company, in the other
case. Each has hundreds of very small competitors operating mainly on a
family bussiness basis. In the case of grain milling, the small competitors are
typicaly grain mill owners providing private services to the local customers
rather than trading in grain products. In the case of meat, the Cold Storage
Commission is the sole producer of special meat products such as sausages
and other processed meat products, while the competitors trade in basic meat
products.
Among the rest of the industries which have significant fringes confectionaries,
clothing, furniture and metal products, there were respondents who made it
clear from their volunteered comments that fringe competition was the source
of too much competition. For example one confectioner complained about
'boys selling peanuts on every street corner', while one metal products firm
which happens to be a subsidiary of the Malawi Development Corporation,
complained about 'unrealistic' prices charged by the small prducers in that they
were too low. These two comments suggest that large firms are sometimes
obliged to seriously consider the impact of small producers. If they should
ignore them, they might do so at great threat to their own survival.
The next set of questions to be looked into relate to whether firms were aware
of the dynamics of their industries, whether they sought to influence it, and
how they do it. The list of possible variables has been suggested by, among
others, Jacquemin and Thisse(1972) in their generalised dynamic model of
oligopoly. Table 8.5 summarises the survey results.
The 52 respondents who perceived new entry into their industries within the
previous 10 years were in 23 of the 39 4—digit SIC industries. Entry may
therefore be described as having been widespread. But then this may have
something to do with the ten-year reference period which cannot be described
as short. In a small economy such as Malawi with an even smaller
manufacturing sector,the fact that as many as 20 out of the 52 respondents
had no immediate knowledge of entry is remarkable. That this is so when the
entry process has a built-in 'early warning' system and that the responses
were from industries with relatively small numbers of firms is even more
remarkable. One must attribute such a result to error (of omission) on the part
of the respondents.
Table8.5 Summary:ReactiontoEntry
Col.ElE23456E789E10ll213 TooRecentIfYESt 2 ▼ muchnew comp?.? Immed.Conslt.Effncy.Qual.Expt.N wLowerRaiseAd.E .byOth r knowl.OthersDriveImpr.DriveProdsPrlc sL s ofabt.?than entry?reactn.?5%?0%?>10% YES37521339271635 (%)(40)56)(62)(25)3(637( )31(25)07) NO564120193325649373 Tot93525225
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Implementation of entry deterring strategies in an industry that is not currently
monopolistic is complicated by the question of who gains most from the
deterence and who bears what costs. In the case of a clear leader, that firm
might be expected to be the one that should worry most about new entrants
and hence more prepared to bear a significant proportion of the costs. It is
easy to see this in the case of limit pricing. The greatest losses (in absolute
terms) would be distributed according to relative size of sales. Consultations
among firms about courses of action to be taken could lead to strategies that
might avoid heavy costs. It might even lead to non-economic approaches such
as lobbying against the issue of new licences. This was mentioned in the
volunteered comments of 3 respondents (producing leather and luggage,
Venetian blinds, and plastic products). Apart from those that appeared on the
questionnaire, other strategies mentioned were diversification of sales effort
into the rural areas and the offer of hire-purchase arrangements. The rest of
the results are given in the table.
25% of the firms indicated that they had 'consulted' others about the course of
action to be taken in the face of entry, and this is quite a high proportion. The
affirmative responses were spread across 8 industries namely bakery products,
confectionary products, sawmill, paints, tyre and tube, plastic products,
non-metalic mineral products, metal products, non-electrical machinery and
equipment. There is a possibility that in three cases this question may have
been interpreted to include consultations between subsidiary or affiliate firms
and their parent companies but this would still leave the percentage of
consulting firms quite high.
The various types of responses to entry, shown in Table 8.5 must be taken to
refer to attempts to frustrate both potential and new entrants. This is because
the reactions relate to a number of situations, namely: where the potential
entrants were still in the process of applying for licences; where they had been
granted licences and were contemplating entry; where the new licence holders
were in the process of entry; where the new licence holders were effective
entrants.
The much preferred reactions to entry are quality improvements, new products,
advertising, and efficiency drives, in that order of popularity. Export drives are
relatively less important strategies, supporting the earlier assumption of
Chapter7, that export activity is generally confined to traditionally
170
export-oriented industries. In all only 16 respondents used prices as an entry
deterring strategy. A comment by a respondent on this issue was that price
controls reduced price-cost margins and this made firms avoid price based
strategies. The overall picture that emerges from the results must be that
non-price strategies are much favoured, and these may also be the popular
modes of competition.
Modes of Sales Promotion
Table 8.6
Summary:Sales Promotion
Col. SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
Radio Ad/
Demo. prog. Quant.
Posters Mags.Newsprs.units sponsorship discounts Other
yil 11 23 40 14 26 21 20
(%) (12) (25) (43) (15) (28) (23) (22)
NO 82 70 53 79 67 72 73
* These figures are based on two most used
modes of sales promotion.
Table 8.6 reveals the expected result that the mass media advertising
(newspapers and radio) are the favourite modes of sales promotion.
Research and Development
Vigorous R8iD activity might be viewed as an indication of future capabilities
for diversification of the manufacturing base. According to the responses the
incidence was quite high involving 57 per cent of the total respondents.
However a closer look at the affirmative responses leads to some qualifications.
Firstly, the research in the tea industry is done on an industry basis by the Tea
Research Foundation.The 5 affirmative responses from this industry must be
seen in this light.
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Secondly, 4 affiliates of multinational corporations indicated that R&D was done
on a 'group' basis for the whole corporation.None may therefore be actually
done in Malawi.
Thirdly,the heaviest concentration of R&D activity appears to be in the
chemicals and allied industries (SIC 3511 to 3560).This involved 14 out of a
total of 18 responses.The explanation of this may lie in that they are
skill-intensive industries with much product differentiation, which is partly due
to intense import competition. These factors coupled with the favourable
technological possibilities, encourage diversification of the 'joint production'
type, which probably accounts for the R&D.
Fourthly and lastly, much of the rest of the affirmative responses were
scattered across many industries.Given that most industries are oriented
towards inexpensive consumer goods for which much research would already
have been done elsewhere,the expectation must be that some of the R&D
concerned is generally of a minor nature and confined to slight product
variations.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS & HYPOTHESIS TESTS
In the previous section the survey results for different variables were analysed
in isolation from each other.ln this section results of regression analysis are
discussed. In order to perform the analysis, the special problems resulting
from categorical YES/NO responses had to be taken into account.
The use, in economics and business, of data from surveys often means dealing
with behavioural responses which typically involve qualitative choices.
Qualitative choice responses such as categorical YES/NO responses present a
problem in regression analysis when they are used as the dependent variable,
and represented by a dummy variable eg. 1 for YES and 0 for NO. Part of the
problem is due to the non-normality and heteroscedasticity of the errors,
making inappropriate the use of ordinary least squares and the use of classical
tests for the estimated parameters. The following model, called the linear
probability model, demonstrates these problems.
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Suppose we have the simple regression model (written as deviations from
variable means)
Yi = BXi + Uj
with E(Uj) = 0. The conditional expectation E(y,lXj) = Bx( can be interpreted as
the probability that the event will occur given x,. Let Pi = Prob(yj = 1) and 1 —Pi
= Prob(Vj = 0). E(y,) = 1 (Pi) + 0(1-Pi) = Pi = BXj. From the model above and since
Yi can only take the value 1 or 0, the errors can only take the values 1-BXj and
[0]-BXj respectively and the probability of the events will be the same as for
the respective y; that is Pi and 1 —Pi or Bx( and 1-Bxj. We can tabulate the
corresponding values of yi( Uj and Pi as in
Yi u; Pi
1 l-BX; BX;
0 -Bxf (1-BX; )
From this we have
Var(Ui) = E(u2i) = (1 - Bxi)2Bxi + (Bx^O - BXj)
= Bxj(1 - BXj)
which indicates heteroscedasticity since the variance of the error term depends
on Xj and hence is not constant. For example, observations for which Pi is close
to 0 or close to 1 will have low variance while if Pi is close to 0.5 will have
large variance. Ordinary least squares would not be efficient in such a case.
Another problem arises from the interpretation of the predicted values of y, as
the conditional probabilities that the event will occur given Xj where in many
cases these could lie outside the (0,1) limits.
Although there are intermediate solutions to some of these problems, eg.
correction for heteroscedasticity by transforming the variables, and constraining
the predicted values, the solutions remain inadequate. For example the former
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would leave the problem of non-normal errors unresolved, while the latter does
not quarantee unbiased estimates.
These problems require a different aproach to model specification. The solution
involves alternative distributional assumptions so that the predicted values lie
in the (0,1) interval. By using the notion of cumulative probability function as
the basis of the transformation the values of the independent variable X (which
can lie over the entire real line) can be translated to probabilities which lie in
the (0,1) interval. The solution can be based on the cumulative distribution
function, F(Uj) in the likelihood function
L = n F( - BXj) n [1 - F( - BXj)]
Yi=0 Yi=1
where F depends on the assumptions made about the distribution of u,. Two
widely used cumulative probability functions (among many other possibilities)
are the cumulative normal function and cumulative logistic function, which are
similar in form, and give rise to the probit probability model and logit model
respectively. With the assumptions about the distribution of ui( Maximum
Likelihood (ML) estimates are obtained by maximising L over the parameter
space. Due to the non-linear nature of the first-order conditions for maximising
L estimation involves an iterative estimation procedure. Given the desirable
properties of ML estimators (including asymptotic normality, unbiasedness
etc.4), asymptotic tests can be carried out for hypotheses on the parameters
and model specification.
For the present analyses the models were estimated using the probit model.
The LIMDEP statistical package (see Greene, 1981) was used. It gives t-ratios
for the parameters with their levels of significance, as well as the significance
level of the likelihood ratio test5.
Since the variables of the models investigated here differ somewhat in
measurement from those used in earlier regressions, they are defined below.
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Definition of the Variables
The following definitions relate to the initial coding of the questionnaire
responses.
P = 1 if prices had been raised SEVERAL times during
the previous three years and 0 otherwise.
CONST = constant
CR3D = 1 if three-firm concentration ratio> 75% and 0
otherwise.
AFFIL = 1 if YES and 0 for NO to financial advantages
from being an associate firm or subsidiary.
CAP = 1 if YES and 0 for NO if output rate could be
increased by at least 25% using only present
fixed assets ie. without the need for
further investment..
INAV2 = problems with input availability
in production. 1 for 'VERY'
important indicated for at least two inputs
and 0 otherwise.
INAV1 = -do- but with 1 for 'VERY' mentioned with
respect to at least one input and 0 otherwise.
D = 1 if demand was 'VERY' important for pricing
decisions and 0 otherwise.
IMP = 1 if import competition was 'VERY' important for
pricing decisions and 0 otherwise.(NB.In the
earlier variable IMPS, the S stood for industry
sales)
EXP = 1 If industry is export oriented (see Chapter 5 and
appendix to that chapter), and 0 otherwise.
INCOST= 1 if total score was at least 3 for importance of
local and foreign input costs in pricing decisions
and 0 otherwise.The scores were from the codes:2 for
'VERY';1 for 'FAIR';0 for 'UNIMPORTANT'.
GOVT = 1 if government price controls were 'VERY' important
in pricing decisions and 0 otherwise.
ENTRYP= 1 if 'YES' to use of price related strategies as
a reaction to entry, and 0 otherwise.
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AD2 = 1 if at least two modes of sales promotion
were used, and 0 otherwise.
AD1 = 1 if one or no mode of sales promotion
was used and 0 otherwise.
The Nature of the Regression Models
The models relate to price increases, excess capacity, and the exercise of
government price controls. Models concernig pricing draw from the discussion
presented in Chapter 4. Those relating to excess capacity and price controls
can best be described as exploratory They are based on the previous
discussion of some relevant issues in Chapters 2 , 4 and 5 for excess capacity,
and Chapters 4 and 7 for price controls.
For the binary ONE/ZERO dependent variables the binary probit estimation




The set of equations from 1) to 4) in Table 8.7 must be seen in a slighltly
diferent light from the price-cost margins equations of Chapter 7 not simply
because of the nature of the independent variables but because the dependent
variables represent different though often related phenomena. The dependent
variable in the equations is derived from data relating to the frequency of price
increases. This may or may not reflect the potential for high profitability, which
the price-cost margins are supposed to measure. While both variables can
have common links in the theory of oligopoly pricing, they could be said to be
looking at the problem differently, price-cost margins being more general in
approach than the price increases. The equations of Table 8.7 can be said to
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be investigating in a more direct way, how flexible prices were upward, which
corresponds to only the top part of the kinked demand curve.
In its simplest version the kinked demand curve hypothesis says that the top
part of the demand curve for firms in oligopolistic industries is likely to be
more elastic than the bottom part if the nature of competition is such that if a
firm were to cut its prices, rivals would retaliate, while unilateral price
increases would go unmatched so that the firm concerned would lose
customers. This is supposed to lead to stability of prices in the upward
direction, unless effective collusion is possible, which would therefore facilitate
the exercise of joint monopoly power. The important question here is whether
collusion is likely to be associated with greater upward price flexibility, and
what factors are important in independently influencing that flexibility. From
the equations it appears that severe problems with the availability of inputs are
an important factor in influencing the frequency of price increases. The lack of
significance for the overall input availability variable in the first equation is
likely to be a result of collinearity from the inclusion of the two variables
distinguishing local inputs from imported ones, both of which are incorporated
in the composite variables INAV1 and INAV2. It will also be noticed that apart
from this the first three equations are quite similar. We can therefore base our
discussion on the equations 3) and 4), since 3) adequately represents the first
two.
With the highly significant coefficient for the input variable, the regression
results of equation 3) appear to lend supporting evidence to the hypothesis
postulated in Chapter 4 that severe input problems, if they are common to all
the competing firms, could facilitate collusive behaviour which could result in
joint monopolistic profits. We might also expect that where input problems are
severe and there is a price leader in the industry, collusive agreements to
increase prices would be easier to implement than where no such leadership
exists. In the former case the arrangements would be easier even where price
controls exist since the price leader could present a common front to the price
control authorities. The PLEAD coefficient is significant at the 5% level and this
together with its positive sign indicates that it might indeed facilitate this type
of process. But can we say anything about the explicit link between input
problems and collusion? The above results only provide strong circumstantial





Method of Est. = Binary Probit
Dependent Var. = P2(=raise prices several times)
Equation No. 1) 2) 3) 4)









































































































R2 a/ a/ a/ a/
MOTES: * Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
a/ The significance of these equationsis discussed in the text.
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Even though there is no antitrust legislation in Malawi we have a strong
suspicion that there were cases in the survey where the respondents may have
been reluctant to answer the collusion question truthfully. It was on the basis
of this suspicion that an appropriate collusion variable was not used because
of the possibility that it may be unreliable. We can stiil analyse the affirmative
responses on collusion to see how they relate to the input availability variable
INAV2.
The industries which registered at least one affirmative response to the pricing
collusion question were edible oils, bakeries, confectionaries,tea, 'spinning, and
weaving', tyres and tubes, structural metals, and fabricated metal products.
With the exception of edible oils, all other industries had firms indicating
severe input problems. On the basis of this and the results discussed above for
the pricing equations we might conclude that input problems are indeed
associated with collusion and that in turn collusion is associated with upward
flexibility of prices.
The results of 3) also suggest that while advertising mode intensity contributes
positively and significantly to the frequency of price increases, demand does so
negatively. The result for demand like those for IMP, and GOVT in these
equations may be due to the definition of the variables. The fact that they are
all derived from questions relating to whether these variables were important
in pricing decisions may well mean that their effects are already accounted for
in the dependent variable. The fact that the significance level of the Log
Likelihood test (see Maddala, 1977, pp. 43-44) associated with equation 4) is 1%
(compared to about 3% for equations 1) to 3)), indicates that we are better off
excluding these variables, aithough the results with respect to the remaining
variables are not significantly affected.
The frequency of price increases appears to be independent of all the other
variables in the equation 4) which interestingly include the degree of
concentration. We saw above that a significant proportion of firms (30%)
indicated that they were constrained by price controls. It is therefore possible
that the non-significance of the concentration coefficient could be attributable
to price controls just as in the previous empirical results. But since this is an
important question, we shall reserve firmer conclussions on this issue until we
have had an opportunity to investigate directly, the question of whether price
controls were influenced by the degree of concentration. This is done in the
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section after the next.
The non-significance of the export intensity variable for price increases should
not be too surprising, given that export orientation is associated with
price-taking behaviour.
It might be argued that the above results are partly a consequence of the
'loose' measurement of the dependent variable. That is raising prices several
times during the past three years may not be a rigorous measure of the
frequency of price increases. But this form of the variable could be defended
on the grounds that greater precision would have faced the formidable
problems associated with distinguishing the prices of individual products of
multi-product firms. Still, an attempt was made to get round this problem by
estimating models of the degree of monopoly power by regressing estimates
of price-cost margins on the survey variables grouped by industry. The major
problem with this was that the latest estimates for the price-cost margins
could only be calculated for 1977 and 1981. This was considered to represent a
time difference which is too long for a worthwhile interpretation of the results,
especially as it involved the dependent variable.
2)Excess Capacity
From the two equations for excess capacity in Table 8.8, the variables that
significantly influence excess capacity are import competition, export intensity,
government restrictions on pricing and problems with local inputs. We examine




Dependent Var. = CAP: Estimation = Binary Probit
(t-statistics in brackets)
CONST CR3D D IMP EXP GOVT INCOST INAV2 LOCINP IMPINP AFFIL
-0.46 0.06 0.50 0.84 -1.17 -0.73 -0.24 0.23 -0.61
(0.15)(1.47)(2.19)**(2.09)**(1.79)**(0.66) (0.73) (1.59)*
-0.47 -0.01 0.30 0.96 -0.90 -0.61 -0.40 1.11 -0.22 -0.39
(0.01)(0 .81)(2. 38)**(1.60)* (1.43) (1.05) (2 . 36 ) **(0 . 56 ) (0.97)
Notes:* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
NB. The significance levels of the likelihood ratio test
for the two equations are respectively 2% and 0.5%.
The coefficient for the import variable implies that stiffer import competition is
associated with higher levels of excess capacity, and we might expect the
assosiation to be of this nature. If as was suggested in the previous section,
the import tariff duties in Malawi are such that they were high enough to give
local producers some protection for their own pricing decissions, it would
seem from the present results that the tariffs do not at the same time
sufficiently stimulate local production to lead to full utilisation of capacity.
The fact that export intensity has a significant and negative influence on excess
capacity is likely to be from the fact that export activities are associated with
both the use of local inputs (whose supply is elastic) and price-taking
behaviour. These two imply that all that can be produced can be sold. The
coefficient of the strictness of government controls variable, GOVT suggests
that the variable is associated with higher capacity utilisation which is not
meaningful economically. The expected relationship is a positive one rather
than the negative one revealed. The positive relationship between local inputs
and excess capacity is also surprising in the sense that it is the coefficient of
this variable rather than that for imported inputs which is significant. This is
contrary to the argument which we have presented before that imported inputs
181
rather than local ones are likely to be a major cause of excess capacity.
Government Price Controls
Table 8.9 sets out the results of two models of how price controls might be
influenced by variables which represent conditions in different industries. They
derive from the firms' point of view and so there is a slight chance that the
results may not explain the behaviour of the authorities in an exact way. But
then the firms' point of view is arguably the best point of view given that
records from which to undertake a similar exercise from the authorities' point
of view were not available.
Table 8.9
Regression Analysis:Factors Influencing the Perceived Restrictiveness
of Government Price Controls
(t-statistics in brackets)
Dependent Var.= GOVT: Estimation = Binary Probit
CONST CR3D D IMP EXP INCOST INAV2 LOCINP IMPINP CAP PLEAD
-2.33 1.53 -0.11 0.42 0.28 0.89 -0.46 -0.59 0.35
(2 .19)**(0.29) ( 0 .97) (0 .43) (2.30)** ( 1. 33) (1.46)(1.02)
-2.40 1.50 -0.01 0.29 0.18 0.85 -0.51 0.08 -0.48 0.42
( 2 .15)**( 0.02 ) ( 0.68) (0 .28) (2 .19)** ( 0.98) ( 0.21) (1.07)(1.15)
Note:** Significant at the 5% level
* Significant at the 10% level
NB. The significance levels of the likelihood ratio
test for the two equations is less than 1%.
The significance of the concentration coefficient supports our earlier
interpretation of the implementation of price controls in Malawi ( described in
the model presented in Chapter 7). That is the stringency of price controls is
directly related to concentration levels.
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The significance of the input cost coefficient and its positive sign suggest that
the pressure of price controls is felt more where pricing is most sensitive to
input costs, regardless of concentration levels. Since the basis of upv/ard price
revisions under price controls is changes in costs, industries or firms for which
cost changes are important would also be the most inclined to ask for frequent
price increases and therefore the most likely to feel the pressure of
government intervention. This explanation is compatible with the fact that
demand considerations do not seem to make a significant impact on the
exercise of the controls. This indirectly lends support to the hypothesis
suggested in Chapter 7, regarding the mutual exlusivity between price controls
and demand constraints.
The result that demand pressure does not influence the stringency of price
controls may seem paradoxical considering that demand conditions were said
to be the basis of the government-prescribed margins over cost. But the
explanation must be that market security is only an initial condition for
establishing the basis for future implementation of the price controls.The
implementation may therefore be little influenced by levels of demand in
subsequent periods of time.The best illustration of this would be to imagine a
newly establishing industry. At the point of entry of the firm(s) the government
decides whether the market may be termed 'secure' or not. An "appropriate
markup over cost is established for that industry and is applied during
subsequent periods of time.
Government control over prices is neither significantly influenced by excess
capacity nor import competition. The reason for this is likely to be that these
two are not relevant variables for the controls, although they may influence
other forms of government intervention in manufacturing such as entry of new
firms and tariff rates on imports. In the case of entry, it has been indicated that
the government and the firms sometimes see the existence of excess capacity
as valid grounds for considering the prevention of entry.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of the simple analysis of the survey can be summarised as follows:
the major consequence of affiliation to other
enterprises by firms are financial advantages
though the restrictions of such affiliation also
tend to be connected with finance.
the factors leading to most operational problems
and hence potential causes of excess capacity
have been availability of imported inputs, including
materials, plant and machinery.
the effect of price controls was still felt a
year after the announcement of price liberalisation
but it was not as widespread as it might have been
before this.
demand considerations including domestic and import
competition were indicated as important in influencing
pricing decisions.
evidence of price-leadership appears to be quite
strong.Express collusion over pricing though less
in evidence, is still there.
there is fairly strong evidence that firms do try to
influence the structure of their industries using
non-economic and economic strategies. The economic
strategies, which are many, tend to overshadow the
the former, which is restricted to lobbying against
the granting of new licences to potential entrants.
Such measures tend to just 'buy time' for the
incumbent firms since success is rare.
The economic strategies are predominently efficiency
drives and quality improvements and to a much lesser
extent price- or sales promotion-oriented. There is
ample evidence of consultations among incumbent firms
on the course of action to be taken when there is
threatened entry.
The regression results for price increases allow us to make some comparisons
with results of the previous chapter on certain important issues, particularly the
implications on pricing behaviour or the degree of monopoly power, of price
controls and potential problems with the availability of inputs.
Both the summary results of the survey and the regression analyses strongly
suggest that price controls were still important in 1984. The effect of these
controls appears to have been the dampening of the influence of the degree of
184
concentration on pricing, which might have been expected to be strong in the
Malawian setting, due to the absence of anti-monopoly legislation and the
tendency towards high degrees of concentration in certain industries. The
regression results supporting this are the combination of lack of significance of
the concentration coefficient in the pricing equation, and the significance of the
concentration coefficient in the price control equation.
The results of this chapter also indicate, as did those of the previous chapter,
that input availability problems are positively associated with both profitability
and price increases. There is also a positive association between price
leadership and price increases and between input problems and collusion. This
set of results in combination must represent fairly strong support for a
hypothesis posed in this study, of a possible link between input problems,
conjectural variations, and collusive pricing behaviour.
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NOTES
I.See for example Reid (1981), Chapter 5, for a discussion of some of the
problems associated with gathering of primary source data on behaviour.
2.ln order to separate out various aspects of demand, eg. its elasticity vs. its
level the questionnaire would need to have been much more complicated than
it was (see examples in Reid, 1981). But even with an elaborate questionnaire
design, there would be the problem that firms (unless they are monopolists,
see Triffin, 1940) are likely to be faced with unstable demand curves so that it
might be only possible for respondents to supply answers of a general kind.
3. 9 respondents (ie. about a third of the respondents for which this question
was relevant) answered affirmatively both the question of whether they were
price-leaders and whether they were price-followers. This was permissible
since it is possible that firms might alternatingly act as leaders and followers.
4. However the estimates for error variance is not unbiased, though it is
consistent (Pindyck and Rubinfeid, 1976, p53).
4. However, due to the similarity of the cumulative normal and the cumulative
logistic distributions, the results generated by the logit model are similar to
those of probit. They can be made to approximate the probit results even more
closely by means of a simple transformation (see Maddala, 1983, p23).
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION INCLUDING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Part One of this study has involved theoretical analyses which have resulted in
the highlighting of three characteristic features of Malawian manufacturing
industries. These are: high scale related barriers to entry, price controls and
scarcity of some inputs. The empirical investigations of the present Part Two,
and particularly Chapters 7 and 8, have indicated the strong possibility that
policies with regard to pricing and international competition have influenced
structure/ conduct/performance relationships in such a way that some
important policy-oriented remarks can be made. This chapter discusses the
important empirical findings and the policy implications. Since there has been
no previous study like this one for Malawi, the discussion will not only be
based on the findings of the formal models of Chapters 7 and 8, but will also
draw from the evidence reviewed in Chapter 5, on features of Malawian
manufacturing and in Chapter 8 from the survey of behaviour.
PRICE CONTROLS AND COMMERCIAL DECISION MAKING
One of the important findings of this study is that the exercise of price
controls appears to have had the required effect of constraining the exercise of
monopoly power by firms which would be inclined to do so because their
industries are highly concentrated and because collusive behaviour is not
illegal. In this sense one can say that the evidence suggests that price controls
have interferred with commercial decision making by design. This conclusion is
based on two sets of results.
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The first set is based on data relating to a period when price controls were
widely in effect. The results suggest that the degree of industrial
concentration has not exerted a significant influence on pricing.
The second set of results is based on the 1984 survey, and indicates that a
significant proportion of firms (30%) still felt very constrained by price controls
at that time, ie. after the initialisation of price deregulation. These 30% mostly
represent firms in the highly concentrated industries, in which case it could be
said that the price controls still modified the influence of concentration on
pricing. Regression results also tend to support this direct evidence in that they
indicate that the degree of concentration did not significantly affect price
increases.
The above conclusion with respect to the effects of price controls specifically
relates to the degree of concentration which directly influenced the stringency
of the controls. These results do not necessarily mean that all commercial
decision making was greatly affected by the controls since other variables
relevant to pricing could have been largely independent of the price controls.
Further direct evidence from the survey tends to point to this possibility. For
example, most firms indicated that they did not consider price controls as the
most important factor affecting their pricing decisions. Instead, input prices
and demand factors were regarded as the important considerations. There are
policy recommendations which can be drawn from these results but they must-
be taken as conditional upon other policy goals which may be affected, for
instance through distributional effects.
Complete abolition of the price controls will facilitate the exploitation of
monopoly power where the potential exists, which is in many industries. This is
because in the absence of antitrust legislation, express pricing collusion, in
which a number of firms have admitted to have engaged, would go largely
unchecked. Demand factors and especially the elasticities of demand will of
course set the ultimate limit to pricing flexibility. The elasticities will
themselves be affected by the regulation of entry, and government policies
with respect to import competition.
Long-run elasticities of demand would be higher and monopoly power lower if
the entry process were also deregulated so that potential entrants are free to
respond to the stimulus of high profits. The evidence reviewed in this study
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suggests that there have been instances where the government has barred
potential entry. But the incidence has been quite small relative to the number
of prospective entrants. The fact that there has been little effective entry
during the 1970s despite large numbers of successful licence applications
suggests the existence of some other forms of barriers. Likely candidates for
this are large minimum efficient plants and significant cost disadvantages of
plants smaller than this, the existence of excess capacity among existing firms,
and the scarcity of foreign exchange with which potential entrants might
procure capital equipment. These are discussed in the sections that follow.
HIGH BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND ENTRY REGULATION
The Malawian economy is small in terms of overall purchasing power.
Consequently most markets for manufactures are small and capable of
supporting only limited numbers of competing firms. Oligopoly and
near-monopoly have therefore been the characteristic market structures
especially for industries which are oriented towards the domestic market.
Despite measurement problems with the barrier to entry variables it has been
indicated that one of these variables reflected fairly well the relative ease of
entry into different industries. Where the stringency of price controls is directly
related to the degree of concentration one could argue that the less
concentrated industries (those less restricted by price controls) could still use
lower prices to deter entry, according to the height of barriers In their
industries. But the empirical results have shown that pricing is not significantly
influenced by the height of barriers to entry. This seems to be in line with the
findings of other studies and suggests that firms do not resort to lower prices
in order to discourage entry. For Malawi, and on the basis of the evidence of
Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, we have been able to say why this was the case, and
this is due to the fact that there are other attractive alternative strategies and
in some cases alternative barriers to entry which could effectively serve the
purpose.
In some cases, the tendency towards high industrial concentration has been
reinforced by government regulation of the entry process implemented through
industrial licencing. In certain situations, the government has sought to entice
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foreign direct investment in new industries requiring large capital investment
by granting monopoly status for given periods of time. In other situations 'too
much' competition that was considered to lead to unnecessary market
fragmentation and therefore excess capacity, has been avoided by restricting
further entry.
In either situation it can be said that entry regulation was influenced by
considerations of excess capacity. This and the rules governing the entry
process could easily have lead to situations whereby incumbent firms could not
only regulate or even prevent entry into their industries, but do so with
government help.
The entry rules, under the Industrial Development Act virtually amount to an
early warning system to existing firms, about potential competition, and gives
them vital information about the potential entrants. Apart from this, the same
rules have provision for objections by existing firms against the granting of an
industrial licence. From various government statements, the existence of
excess capacity is considered to be a valid basis for such objections. This
leads to the important question of whether or not firms have indulged in
strategic excess capacity with the intention of deterring entry or, worse still,
preventing it with government assistance.
The answer to this question can be inferred from three strands of evidence.
The first is that investment in extra productive capacity has been widespread.
The second is that a significant proportion of firms consider competition in
their industries to be excessive. The third is that the level of awareness of
new or intended entry is high and that firms are generally anxious to do
something about it. All these combine to make excess capacity a potentially
important means of influencing industrial structures by existing firms and
especially given the government's position with regard to entry where excess
capacity exists.
In this respect, the evidence reviewed in this study suggests that if the
considerable existence of excess capacity was strategic, its use in limiting
entry via the institutional entry regulatory channel must have met with only
limited success. But the authorities need not take too much solace in this
because the excess capacity could still have been used strategically, through
economic channels but with firms exploiting the entry rules to their own
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advantage.
Normally excess capacity among incumbent firms is usually not 'visible' as far
as intending entrants are concerned. This would tend to weaken its
discouraging effect on potential entrants. But in the Malawian case this can be
communicated to the potential entrants during representations against licence
applications. This could have lead to the situation revealed here, where there is
a long list of potential entrants who have not actually established themselves,
long after having been granted licences. It is also suggested here, that among
other things, non-strategic factors which influence excess capacity, should also
be a worrying factor as far as entry or general industrialisation is concerned.
These are looked into next.
SCARCITY OF INPUTS, EXCESS CAPACITY AND MONOPOLY POWER
It would not be sensible to allow greater discretion in pricing, designed to
provide incentives for industrial expansion, while at the same time having
output expansion or new entry frustrated by operational problems. Chapter 7
and 8 of this study have indicated that imported material inputs are considered
by firms to be the most important source of operational problems and
therefore a potential cause of excess capacity, which in turn can be an
effective barrier to entry. This would also have contributed to the fact that
despite the granting of many new licences, effective new entry has lagged far
behind.
Another result that should be worrying, is the possibility that problems with the
availability of imported inputs can be used as a basis for the exercise of
monopoly power. In the past firms exercised monopoly power by exploiting
the implementation of the price controls, which favourably considered
exogenous cost changes, particularly those of imported inputs, as valid grounds
for raising prices. In this study another hypothesis has found some supporting
evidence. The hypothesis is that common problems with input availability
could easily lead to greater awareness of interdependence among competing
firms so that collusive pricing arrangements become a strong possibility. The
absence of anti-monopoly legislation and high levels of industrial concentration
are both features of the manufacturing environment which also facilitate
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collusive pricing. For the future, greater discretion in pricing will almost
certainly guarantee higher collusive prices.
Discretionary pricing must be seen as eventually providing a stimulus to new
entry through the signal of high profits. But to the extent that the possibility
of excess capacity inhibits entry and the extent to which this is a result of
problems with the availability of imported inputs that role of discretionary
pricing may be frustrated unless the availability problems are tackled.
The problems largely result from the scarcity of foreign exchange, which is a
general problem in less developed countries. As far as the manufacturing
sector is concerned, direct ways of tackling the problems include more active
efforts to encourage import substitution in new industries which have extensive
forward linkages with existing industries. This is necessarily a long-term
measure but the rapid developments in the packaging industries should serve
as an encouragement. Here, local production has been rapidly replacing
imports and involving all sorts of material inputs. Such a trend could benefit
from active encouragement.
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
The results of Chapters 7 and 8 indicate that the performance of firms is
influenced by their industries' positions with respect to international
competition.
Import competition was found in most cases to exert a significant negative
influence on profitability, which is in line with theoretical predictions. The
moderating influence of competing imports on domestic pricing may largely be
attributable to Malawi's policies towards imports.
The absence of quantitative restrictions and the moderate tariff rates (which
are said to be largely unresponsive to domestic prices) have resulted in a
strong presence of imports. In some industries, such as the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries, the competition has been heavy and characterised by
much product differentiation and advertising for both domestic and foreign
products. This competition will no doubt have ensured quite high levels of
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efficiency in such industries. Other industries which currently enjoy high levels
of protection, such as the beverages industry, might benefit from similar
competition.
As far as export activity is concerned, this too has been independent of the
influence of price controls simply because the prices of Malawi's manufactured
exports are determined on the international market. The local manufacturers
may therefore be taken as price takers and the evidence suggests that as a
result of this, they do not enjoy high profits.
Perhaps the best recommendation with regard to export activity is to leave
alone the currently export-oriented industries. As far as the rest of the
manufacturing sector is concerned, export performance is dismal and its
encouragement should be a high priority area.
Aggressive measures in export promotion could benefit from both the Southern
African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) agreement and the
Preferential Trade Agreement. But the export performance is quite often
inhibited by the prohibitive costs to the individual firm of foreign market
penetration including the costs of quality improvements. There is no doubt
that individual firms must directly meet some of these costs, but there is also
a clear need for strong incentives aimed at reducing them. Selling costs to the
individual firm could be reduced by enhancing centralised marketing strategies
represented by the Export Promotion Council and the International Trade Faire
arrangements. Although the government's efforts in this will amount to an
implicit subsidy to the industries concerned, there are potentially enormous
economies of scale which should make the undertaking worthwhile as far as
Malawi's prospects for rapid industrialisation are concerned. In this respect it
should be stated here that little hope should be attached to Malawi's recent
currency devaluations, as a boost to export activity within the SADCC region.
This is because fellow SADCC members under similar pressures have also
instituted similar devaluations, thereby cancelling some of the effects of
Malawi's own devaluation.
CONCLUSION
Although it is possible to make economic policy recommendations without the
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benefit of empirical work, they would be of the nature, 'If such and such
conditions/phenomena exist then . . They would not be very useful. The
ability to replace 'if' with statements about the existing conditions would be a
positive step, where such conditions had not been studied before or given
much attention within certain contexts. This is the light in which the policy
recommendations offered below should be seen. Many more recommendations
could also be generated from this study, for instance, several could be based
on each one of the summary tables of the survey results of Chapter 8. But the
ones offered here are necessarily few because of the need to highlight the
important ones, which are likely to have a great impact on the development of
the manufacturing sector. The other thing to note is that the recommendations
are made in the context of the recent moves to permit greater discretionary
pricing for manufactures.
In the absence of anti-monopoly legislation the move towards an economy
with more discretionary pricing would have desirable effects if it is
complemented by the following measures:
a) freer entry, without provision
for excess capacity. New entry,
through search would provide a
vehicle for rationalisation of
technology and hence plant sizes;
current profitability would be an
adequate signal for entry decisions.
b) problems with imported inputs should
receive greater attention, to remove
a source of barriers to entry and a
likely source of greater monopoly
profits.
c) current policies as they affect
imports should at least be maintained
if inefficiency and higher prices due
to high levels of protection are to be
avoided.
d) drives for exports from the manufacturing
sector should be intensified and
diversified to benefit industries which
are not currently export oriented.
Before concluding this study, the word of caution is that it is not a claim of the
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present study, that it has dealt with or even attempted to deal with nearly
every important or interesting issue. Gaps remain because we did not set out
to fill them. It should therefore be fitting to conclude the study by making brief
statements about the issues which could benefit from further work. We restrict
ourselves to two important issues.
The first is that although import policies have been mentioned and discussed
here much detail eg. about the structure of effective rates of protection is still
wanting.
The second issue is that although the study has made much of the recent
moves to permit more discretionary pricing of manufactures, this move was
not confined to manufactures but involved other prices as well. Other prices
affected include those of inputs into manufacturing, namely labour and material
inputs (including imported ones affected by currency devaluations). These other
moves will certainly affect firms' profitability by countering the effect of
increased discretion in the pricing of manufactures. The relevant question here
would be What is the net effect of all these changes on profitability in the
manufacturing sector? In order to answer this question, one must study the
flexibility of costs (due to the increased discretion in setting of other prices)






SUMMARY OF HADAR'S ANALYSIS OF PRICE CONTROLS
0
Assume monopoly and that optimal output q. and optimal price p.
are positive. Assume further that in the solution to the profit
maximisation problem, price would be set at above the
government-imposed ceiling Po. That is the shut down condition and
the case of a redundant ceiling are discounted. If it is further
assumed that excess demand exists (rather than supply equaling
quantity demanded at a given price), the profit maximisation








where q = h(p) is the market demand function,f(q) is the total
variable cost function. The constraints can be written with dummy
variables v. for excess demand and v. for excess price ceiling. The
latter is the amount by which the price ceiling exceeds the price
chosen by the monopolist.
q + Vj = h (p) (A4.2b)
p + v2 = Po (A4.3b)
Vj > 0 (A4.4)
v2 2 0 (A4. 5)
The problem is now in four unknowns (q, p, v,. v^ with four
constraints. With q*. p* > 0 there are only four exhaustive cases
that could hold the solution. Let v* v* be the optimal values of the
I.Note: See Hadar (l97l).
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L=pq- f (q) -C+ * [q+Vp-h (p) ] + X^ p+v2 -Po)
Diff. w.r.t. the four unknowns
q-^h' + X2 = 0 (w.r.t.p)
p-f'+ Xi =0 (w.r.t. q)
= 0 (w.r.t. Vi)
X2 = 0 (w.r.t. v2)
DISCUSSION
q*= 0




















h(p)+ph'-f'h'+X = 0 (w.r.t.p )fe)
X = 0 (w.r.t.v,)
L= Poq-f(q)-c+X[q+v1-h(Po)]
Po-f'+ X = 0 (w.r.t.q)
X = 0 (w.r.t.v,)






p* is same as that
for (z) and p*>Po













FEATURES OF MALAWIAN MANUFACTURING
Table Ch5.1
Geographical Distribution of Firms
(By Net Industrial Licence Holders, 1978)
Location
Blantyre Lilongwe Thyolo/ Mzuzu Zomba Other
SIC Products Mulanje
3111-3115 Meat etc. 3 1 1 1 0 0
3116-3123 Grain-tea 18 4 22 1 0 7
3131-3134 Beverages 4 2 0 1 0 0
3140 Tobacco 3 1 1 0 4 1
3211-3215 Textiles etc. 5 4 1 0 2 0
3220 Clothing 14 4 1 0 4 2
3233-3241 Leathers f/wr. 2 0 0 0 0 0
3311-3320 Wood prods. 17 5 3 0 0 1
3411-3420 Paper,p & p 7 1 1 0 0 0
3511-3513 Chem.s allied 5 0 0 0 0 0
3521-3529 Pharma.,soaps,etc7 1 0 0 0 0
3551-3560 Rubber,plastics 6 2 0 0 0 0
3620-3699 Non-met.mineral 4 2 0 0 1 0
3710-3819 Metal prods. 13 8 0 0 0 1
3822-3842 Machine prods. 15 5 1 0 0 1
3843-3909 Veh.ass.,other Q 3 0 1 0 0
Total 137 44 31 4 11 13





Entry Lags for Entrants from 1967-1978
Products No Entry Lags
of
firms shortest longest Average
Fruit 1 13
Grain 1 0
Tea 2 1 1+ 1+




Clothing 4 2 8 + 4.5 +
Leather 1 3 +
Sawmill 2 0 2 1
Furniture 2 1 8+ 4.5+
Paper 2 1 + 3 2 +
Printg. 3 0




Toiletries 3 0 8 + 5 +
Matches 1 2 +
Brick & tiles 1 3
Structural metal 2 1 2 1.5
Other non-metal 3 1 10 + 5.3
Machine prods. 1 1+
Radios 1 5 +
Batteries 1 9+
Motor veh. ass. 1 6+






Takeovers, Mergers and Exit:1975-1984
SIC Taken-over/merged By/with Relative conc.
level
3117 Associated Bakeries














3215 Central Africa Co.(rope manu.
3311 Nanthipwili Sawmills
3419 Artmail (paper stationery)










Notes:a)These descriptions can be derived from Table 5.2
b)This applies to paper products
c)These register output on an intermittent basis
in NSO files.




Relative Magnitude of Selected Variables
Across Malawian Manufacturing Industries
Price Var. 3 Firm Minimum Export Skill
cost of conc. efficient intensity intensity
Industry margins margins ratio scale
Grain mill. 0 104 84 62 53 26
Bakery prods. 9 22 72 45 0 40
Tea 5 24 37 11 83 24
Beverages 42 63 100 83 0 67
Tobacco 0 26 71 39 80 35
Ginning... 23 41 100 83 0 37
Blankets... 30 278 100 54 11 26
Clothing 14 46 41 22 9 28
Sawmill prods. 13 455 99 72 9 29
Furniture 8 56 66 22
'
0 30
Print.& pub. 15 68 54 32 2 64
Chem.S Allied 21 2 100 89 3 80
Other chem. 15 114 100 80 0 57
Non mach.met. 24 114 94 64 3 43
Mach. & motor
veh. ass. 12 34 100 78 5 62
Note.The variables are derived from data averaged for the
period 1969-72.Of the variables listed here
only variance of margins and
skilled labour intensity are not in percentage terms.
The derivation of these variables is discussed in Chapter 6.
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Table CH5.5
The Extent of Product Differentiation: Brand Products
(based on radio advertising data)































































































Short-term Assets and Liabilities:Malawian Manufacturing, 1974-1975
Current Assets Current Liabilities
Total
(MK'OOO).
As % of Total Total
(MK'OOO)
Tear
Stocks Trade Cash Inter-
debt- Co.
ors debts
As % of Total
Suppl'rs' Inter-Co. Advances

















Source:NSO, Annual Economic Survey 1974-1975.
Table CH5.7
Composition of Long-term Liabilities:Malawian Manufacturing, 1975
(MK'OOO)
Industry











































































































Total 132887.3 23158.7 43333.6 27282.8 16146.8 22965.4




Assume a linear cross-section model of the form
y± = ot0 + + o^Z^ •+■ i = 1, N
where Z is known to be exogenous. It may not be known with
certainty whether x is also exogenous or endogenous and this
becomes the object of the test.
In a partial specification of the SCP model such as dealing only
with the performance equation, two possibilities of x being
endogenous can be distinguished:
a) x is explained by a set of other variables in the
system and which do not include y but could include
Z.
b) the set of explanatory variables for x includes y
Problems of endogeneity in estimating the model only arise when b)
applies because the error term is not independent of x. The null
hypothesis may be set up as;
Case a)= Ho;x is exogenous.
y± = ctQ + ct^ + a2Z1± + u£
xi = Sq + SiYG + S2z2i +
where 2, =0, E{ u, e.} =0 .1 i i
I.Note: These are discussed in Geroski (1982) ana Reid (1985).
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Case b)= H ;x is not exogenous
y± = a0 + a1xi + a2Z1± + u±
= So + + B222i + ^323;^ + £i
where S ^0. E{u^e^}^0.
The test of E{u,E}=0 against the alternative E{u,£}?0, requires
looking at the role of y in the equation for x,
x± = So + $222j_ + &3z3i + Yzlj_ + + ej
where the Z's comprise all the exogenous variables in the system. "»
(/3-y. * E, ) can be seen as a combined error which if found to be random"
would^suggest that systematic effects of y on x are absent or not
significant and 3^=0.
Let v. = Si y.* E.. Estimates of this can be obtained from the full
X 1 X X
reduced form for x xe.
A A A A A
v. = x± - B0 - S2z2i - S3z3i - YZ1±
Inputing this into the y equation we have a testable hypothesis in
the form of the coefficient for v. as in
1
A A
y± = a0 + o1xi + a2Z1± + 9^ + ^
A A
When x is exogenous =0 and v^ = E^ so that E (v.^ ) = 0 and 0=0. The
last part therefore comprises the test. For tests simultaneously
involving more than one variable this would proceed in a
conditional manner with the aid of the F-test. That is more than
one of the x's are subjected to the test assuming that the rest are
taken to be endogenous.A time-saving approach would involve
grouping the variables either according to prior convictions about
their exogeneity or according to their relatedness in the model.
The following table gives results of the tests done on individual
variables of interest, namely rate of growth of sales (G), the
concentration variable (CR3) , import intensity (IMPS), and the
advertising intensity variable (AS). The corresponding variables
with the coefficients to be tested are respectively VG, VCR3 VIMPS,
and VAS.
Results of Exogeneity Tests
Oep.Var.=Price—cost margins;No of obs.=64
Method of estimation=Instrumental vars\
Test
C CR3 KS G IMPS EXPS MES OV AS VAR.
VG
62.60 -1.51 13.95 0.70 -22.21 -31.32 1.26 0.55 -0.23 -0.60
( 1 . 47 X 1.24) (0.86) (0.69) ( 0 .72) ( 2 . 26 ) ( 1 . 3 8 ) ( 1 . 6 1 ) ( 1.01 ) (0 .58;
VCR3
38.45 -1.06 17.47 1.00 -2.18 -20.30 0.74 0.27 -0.23 0.80
(0.30X0.25) (0.37) (0.36) (0. 04) (1 . 02 ) ( 0 . 25 ) ( 0 . 33 ) (0.37) 10. 19 )
VIMPS
59.96 -1.53 21.21 0.93 -7.31 -28.19 1.18 0.40 -0.35 -1.53
( 0. 60X 0. 62 ) ( 0.51 X0. 48 ) ( 0.07 ) (0.75) (0.55) (0.34) (0. 59 ) (0.01 )
VAS
21.56 -0.41 16.96 0.45 12.38 -18.55 0.40 0.04 -0.34 0.37
( 0.80 X 0.70 ) (1 .29) (0.77) ( 0.37) ( 1 . 50 ) ( 0 . 64 )( 0 . 1 0 ) ( 1.50) (1 . 54 )
From the results, only the coefficient for VAS is significant and
then only at the 10 percent level. These results suggest that none
of the variables G, CR3, and IMPS are likely to be significantly
influenced by margins, that is feedback effects from M to any of
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these variables are minor. The system of equations comprising these
variables may well be regarded as recursive as far as M is
concerned. The variable most likely to be affected by the feedback
effects from M is AS. It would therefore be desirable to treat AS




POOLING OF CROSS-SECTION AND TIME-SERIES DATA
The general linear model in matrix form can be written as
Y = X8 + s
where Y is the NTx1 column vector of the dependent variable, X
the NTxK matrix of K independent variables including the constant
term, [3 the Kx1 column vector of unknown parameters, and £ the
NTx1 column vector of disturbances. In the general case,
observations will be over N cross-section units, that is i = 1,2,...,N
and T time periods t = 1,2,....T. The generalised least squares (GLS)
estimates of 8 are given by
-1
1
s = (x1 n-1 x) x1 a""1 y
Ubiased, consistent and efficient estimates can be obtained from
appropriate assumptions about the behaviour of the error term,
leading to some error variance-covariance matrix,TL. Since A is usually
not known it is necessary to obtain estimates for it. Although in
deriving the appropriate estimates, ,one can be as adventurous as
one likes, in practice the limitations are imposed by information and
computational requirements. Often too, simpler specifications have
similar statistical properties as the more sophisticated ones.
There are therefore a variety of GLS forms based on different
restrictions or requirements for the error term. They all eventually
involve some type of weighting to adjust the original data. The two
types of models used in the chapter are the error components and




The error term is specified as comprising three components , ck
associated with the cross-.sectional units, vk with time, and e.^. the
general error term varying over cross-sections and over time. That
is
£„ = u. + V + (I = 1, 2, ... N; t ~ 1, 2, ...
it i t it
where u. , v , and e, are all normally distributed with mean zero
it it
and variance a 2,.a 2,ando2respectively. The conditions(restrictions) are
u v e
given as
E(u.v ) = ECu.e. ) = E(v.e. ) =» 0
It 1 It 1 it
E(uiu£') 3 0 Ci 4 i')
E(vtvt,) = 0 Ct 4 t')
E(eit2U') " ECeitei't) = E(eitei't') - ° « + *' c +
These conditions imply homoskedasticity. Although the correlation
between the disturbances of each cross-section unit over time may
be non-zero, that correlation does not change, unlike that for
first-order autoregression, which declines geometrically.
Often, the exercise of finding A is brought about by the need to
account for the differences among cross-section units so that v, is
often ignored for computational simplicity. The matrix for the











v v . . .
where V =cr2 / a2 or c2/(a2 * a2 ), from a2 = a2 + a2.
ueuue eue
Ways of estimating and adjusting for /I based on the error
components variances have been discussed by a number of people,
including, Balestra and Nerlove(1966), Nerlove(1971), Wallace and
Hussain(19S9), Maddala(1971) and Swamy(1970).






e^ { rz1 £ ~12 - e^ £2 }
v - i°l 1L t=l it^ Lt=l £it/
t r* ^ .2
where are the error terms obtained from a regression over the
whole set of the stacked data (ie. all the time-series observations
for one cross-section unit first, followed by those of the next,
and so on).
The model that was used on Malawian data is the one due to Swamy
and outlined in Judge al. This model requires two sets of error
term estimates. One set, which can be represented by e;t is
obtained from 'within' estimates , which involve transformations as
in
(y. - y.) = E^ Sk(x, . - x... .) + e.7 it 1i k=2 kit ki i
where y^and x^.are the respective means of the dependent and
independent variables and e. is also in terms of deviations from
t
the means. That is e. = v. - E^ , v.
it it i=T it
T
where v. may be seen in terms of the model
it
7it = Sl + yi + ek=2skxkit + vit i - l, 2, —, n
t =■ 1, 2, ...., T
where (Bi+vu) = B]_Js the intercept of the ith cross-section unit,
comprising the mean intercept, and a disturbance termju;(the
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difference between Bi.and8x). Estimates of the intercepts can be
_
obtained from bx. = yi - \=2bkxk£) •
The second set of error terms,.u^ are obtained in a more
straightforward manner from the 'between' estimates,
-?!♦». * * Et=avit
T
which is simply the model for y^ above, with all the variables
averaged over time.
The final stage is to estimate
yit - «7. ■= a - «)?! + ^,2skCxk.t: - * c.c
cr
where a = 1 -
a
u
The Cross sectionallv Heteroskedastic and Time wise Autoregressive
Model
Kmenta(1977) and is characterised by
(i T i')
This model is described in
E(s?t) = d?
■ 0
su " °iei-t-i +
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These stipulate heteroskedasticity. cross-sectional independence and
autoregression respectively. The error terms u. and e. are normally
it it
distributed with zero means and variances a2. anda2./(1 -p2 •)
UX Ul 1
respectively.
Allowing for p to vary from one cross-section unit to another, the

















L X X X
Estimation of A requires double-transforming the variables. First
autoregression is adjusted for by cross-section estimates for p ie
|3.
x
ZZ . Z .
xt xt-l
Zz<
(t = 2, 3, ... T)
it-1
where e^^are error terms from all NxT observations. Next, using the
transformed variables obtain error terms z* from which the
xt







The standard deviations s. . are used to divide the
ui
autoregression-corrected variables to obtain the double-transformed
variables yielding estimates that are asymptotically non-autoregressive
and homoskedastic. In the final regression N(T-1) pooled observations
can be used.
NOTES
1.Simplified descriptions including comparisons with other forms of
GLS models can be found in Kmenta(1971) and Judge at a/(1981).
2.Transformation for the simple model is illustrated as
y*. = Six*. + s*.
it 1 it it
where
x*it • xir_ -




THE MAIL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
(CONFIDENTIAL)Ref: No.» - v
Sept/Octabar 1984
Name of Firm or Establishment.: ,
SURVEY OF BEHAVIOUR OF MANUFACTURINO FI SMS IN MALAWI
For all questions indicate with a tick (_/) the answers applicable to your
own experience,' You may elaborate your answers in soaces between questions
or on a separate sheet of paper*
Please return the completed questionnaire by 15 QCTJBER, 1984, to
Mr, C, Machinjili., the National Statistical Office, P.O., Box 333, Zomba*
1, AFFILIATION
1.1 Is your establishment a subsidiary or an associate of any other
company in Malawi? /YES/NO/ or elajhera? AeS./NQ/
1.2 If YES to either,
1,2,1,- is the other company's major activity in
agriculture? AGS/NO/ manufacturing? AES/NO/
ocner (please specify)
A^/W
1,2,2,- does your establishment enjoy any financial advantage
from this connection (ether than share-capital) e.g..
access to inter-company debts/loans, access to bank
loans e,t.c.? AES/NO/
1,2,3,- are there any other advantages?
_____
(If YES please specify)..,.., i.AES/Nq"7*
T.2.4.- does this association restrict you in making decisions
about
_____
a) output levels A' S/NC/ b) financial AES /NO/
.
. _ matters
c; price or _____
products /YES/NO/ d) marketing /YES/NO/
a) Other /YE3/N0*7 (please specify),........,
-2. CAPACITY AND, CAPACITY UTILISATION
■2.1 In the last 3 years, have ynu made extensions to yaur factory
buildings or to plant and machinery? AES/ND/
•2.2 If YES was the major source of funds
a) inter-company loan(s) /YES/NO/ h) bank(s) /YES/NO/
c) oum AES /NO/ d) other - AES/NQ/
(please specify)
2.3 If NO could you increase your output rate by more than 25U
without requiring any such additions? /YES/NO/
<LZ4
2.4 la your experience which among the follaujing have you had the most
serious problems with, in your operations? Tick (_/) correct degree
of seriousness..
Deoree of Seriousness









d) availability of skilled labour very /noderate yfnild
a) other (specify), very yfaoderata /mild
PRICE-FORMATION
3.-1 How many times have you raised the prices of any of your pro ducts
the last 3 years? /NEVER/ONCE
/ SEVERAL TIMES,





Is there a firm or firms whose lead you follow in making price
changes? AES/NO/
Have you at any time come to an agreement with any other firm or
firms on what prices ycu should adopt? /YETZM7
If any of the following determines the prices of your products
indicate the degree with an appropriate tick(V)
Deg ree of Importance
a) Demand factors very /fair /uni. portant
b) Competitors' prices Local very /fair /unimportant
Foreign very /fair /unimportant
c) Input costs Local very /fair /unimportant
Imported very /fair /unimportant
d) Government restrictions on pricing very /fair /unimportant
a) Other (please specify) very /fair /unimportant
U ENTRY OF NEW FIRMS
4."1 Do you. feel that there are too many competitors in the market for
your products? AES/NQ/
4.2 Have you had any new competitors in your industry in the last
10 years? AES/NQ/
4i3 If YES, did your
4;3«,1; -• know immediately of their intention to enter? AES/nq/
AES/NO/
4;3.2i» -■= consult other firms in your industry about
possible action?
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4.4. If YES, did your.
4.4.1. — institute an efficiency drive? AlS/NG/
4.4.2* - institute an improvement in quality products? ACS/NO/
4.4.3. - institute an export drive? /YES/IMG/'
4.4.4. - introduce new products? /VET3/NO '
4.4.5. - lower the prices of your products or offer
Higher discounts to wholesalers? AE3/N0/
4.4.6. - raise your advertising expenditure by less than
5% AlIS/MO/ or between 5 and 1Q;j? A-3/MQ/
or more than 10/? AtS /Kill/
4.4.7. - take any other action? (pleaso specify)
* AES/MO/
!RCDUCT PROMOTION
5.1 Among the following, which two ways do you rely on most to promote
your products? Indicate with a tick (V)
a) posters / / b) magazines /_ / c) newspapers / /
d) demonstration units / /a) quantity discounts / /
i
f) radio advertising or programme sponsorship / /
g) other (please specifyi..i..*•*.i«..;
RESEARCH A NO DEW EL OP ME NT
6,1. Apart from quality control, do you engage in major research relating
to your present, future or any other products? /YES/NO/
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that to the best cf my knowledge and belief the
information given in this questionnaire is correct.
Signed ------------- Data --------- Telephone No.
Name Title --------
(BLOCK CAPITALS) (Director, Accountant, etc).
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